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RETHINKING THE PENALTY PHASE 
Kyron Huigens *
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court tells us that the issue in the penalty phase of a capital 
trial is the defendant's culpability, 1 responsibility ,2 blameworthiness,3 or 
desert. 4 These words are used more or less interchangeably ,5 and therein lies 
an explanation for the confusion that besets death penalty law. These words 
do not all mean the same thing, and each of them often is used to mean more 
than one thing. In its decades-long effort to ensure just punishment for those 
who are accused of capital crimes, the Court rarely has invoked or examined 
the theory of punishment. Instead, it has made do, and made a mess, with 
misplaced notions of equal protection and due process. As a result, the basic 
* Associate Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. The author wishes to
thank Stewart Sterk, Michael Rosenfeld, and the participants in faculty workshops at the University 
of Minnesota Law School and Cardozo Law School for their advice and assistance. Thanks also are 
due to the editors of the Arizona State Law Ioumal. 
1. "Lockett and Eddings reflect the belief that punishment should be directly related to the 
personal · culpability of the criminal defendant. Thus, the sentence imposed at the penalty stage 
should reflect a reasoned moral response to the defendant's background, character, and crime rather 
than mere sympathy or emotion." California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., 
concurring) (citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) and Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 
(1982)). 
2. In Eddings, the judge refused to consider the defendant's youth and history of "beatings
by a harsh father, and of severe emotional disturbance." We emphasized that this
evidence tended to diminish the defendant's responsibility for his acts, noting that youths
"are less mature and responsible than adults, and they deserve less punishment because
adolescents may have less capacity to control their conduct and to think in long-range
terms than adults."
Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 12 (1986) (quoting Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115-16). 
3. "Nor did the second special issue provide a vehicle for the jury to give mitigating effect
to petitioner's evidence of mental retardation and childhood abuse .... Although such evidence 
may lessen his blameworthiness, it made an affirmative answer to the second issue more likely." 
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S.302, 304 (1989). 
· 4. "In considering this evidence, the jury does not attempt to decide whether particular 
elements have been proved, but instead makes a unique, individualized judgment regarding the 
punishment that a particular person deserves." Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 900 (1983) (citing 
Lockeit, 438 U.S. at 602-05). 
5. "If a jury is to assess meaningfully the defendant's moral culpability and
blameworthiness, one essential consideration should be the extent of the harm caused by the 
defendant." Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367,397 (1988). 
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terms of the Court's death penalty jurisprudence are worse than useless in its 
efforts to create a coherent, hwnane, and effective body of law under the 
Eighth Amendment. 
This Article offers a single, central point of clarification. The word 
"culpability" has been invoked in connection with the penalty phase of 
capital trials, but "culpability" is ambiguous between the concepts of 
eligibility for punishment and fault in wrongdoing. With this distinction in 
hand, the values which the Court has pursued with the concepts of 
aggravation and mitigation can be more precisely addressed. Because 
aggravation and mitigation only imperfectly correspond to fault and 
eligibility, the basic terms of constitutional analysis in the matter of the death 
penalty must change. The fundamental, imperative nature of these changes 
cannot be overstated. For example, the existence of mitigating factors 
consistently has been mis-assigned to the defendant for proof by a 
preponderance. Because most of these mitigators indicate non-fault, and 
because none of them are quasi-excuses, the theory of punishment tells us 
that the government ought to be required to disprove the existence of 
mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. 
This Article takes the Supreme Court to task over its failure to draw on 
the conceptual resources of criminal law theory. This will seem an unfair 
criticism to anyone who is familiar with the radical lack of consensus in this 
body of literature. The point is well taken. This Article, while it advocates 
greater attention to the theory of punishment, has at least the virtue of 
championing only one of the competing schools of thought. This Article's 
ulterior purpose, indeed, is to demonstrate the superiority of one particular 
theory of punishment by a demonstration of its capacity to clarify the Court's 
death penalty law. 
The two principal theories of punishment are commonly known as the 
deterrence and retributive theories. Both of these names are misnomers. 
Deterrence and retribution are merely functions of punishment, as are 
incapacitation, education in social norms, public catharsis over wrongdoing, 
and so on. Whether any of these functions serves to justify punishment­
which is the principal, but not the only, question in the theory of 
punishment-depends on whether a broader moral or ethical theory gives it a 
justifying effect. Therefore, theories of punishment are properly 
distinguished and named according to their underlying ethical theories. 
Consequentialism stresses the justifying effects of deterrence (but not only 
deterrence), and deontological morality stresses the unique justification 
provided by retribution. 
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The theory of punishment on which this Article's analysis of 
constitutional death penalty jurisprudence is based is neither a 
consequentialist nor a deontological theory of punishment. It draws instead 
on the third major tradition in philosophical ethics: virtue ethics. Originally 
framed by Aristotle, virtue ethics was more or less dormant for centuries, 
but . received a vigorous revival in the last half of the twentieth century. 6
Several writers have suggested a distinctive virtue ethics theory of 
punishment.7 This Article's focus on the distinction between fault and 
eligibility reflects the importance of this distinction in such a theory of 
punishment. The prevailing consequentialist and deontological theories of 
punishment obscure the distinction between fault and eligibility. 8 To 
demonstrate the value of this distinction in the death penalty context is to 
demonstrate the explanatory power of a virtue ethics theory of punishment. 
Part II of this Article is an unorthodox critical history of the Supreme 
Court's death penalty cases. I argue that an unfounded and destructive 
underestimation of the Court's institutional competence has led it to neglect 
the theory of punishment in its.regulation of death sentencing. The Court's 
6. See Roger Crisp & Michael Slote, Introduction to VIRTUE ETHICS 1, 3--4 (Roger Crisp &
Michael Slote eds., 1997) (dating the modem revival of virtue ethics to G.E.M. Anscombe's 1958 
essay, Modem Moral Philosophy). See generally G.E.M. Anscombe, Modem Moral Philosophy, 
reprinted in id. at 26. 
7. See, e.g., Peter Arenella, Character, Choice, and Moral Agency: The Relevance of
Character to Our Moral Culpability Judgments, in CRIME, CULPABILITY, AND REMEDY 59, 61-65 
(Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1990) (arguing that so-called rational choice theory is inadequate to 
describe the criminal law's concern with character); Claire 0. Finkelstein, Duress: A Philosophical 
Account of the Defense in Law, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 251, 252-53 (1995) (relying on Aristotle's 
conception of judgment to give an account of duress in terms of states of character); Kyron 
Huigens, The Dead End of Deterrence, and Beyond, 41 WM. & MARYL. REV. 943, 948 (2000) 
[hereinafter Huigens, Deterrence] (arguing that "[a) virtue ethics theory of punishment does provide 
an adequate account of fault"); Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Inculpation, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1423, 
1458-62 (1995) [hereinafter Huigens, Virtue] (arguing that the criminal law enforces a responsibility 
for the development of one's character); Edmund L. Pincoffs, Legal Responsibility and Moral 
Character, 19 WAYNE L. REV. 905, 918 (1973) (arguing that punishment represents a demand that 
one develop and exhibit certain character traits). 
8. The consequentialist theory of punishment employs the concept of fault as a side
constraint on punishment in order to avoid the implication that consequentialism justifies the 
punishment of scapegoats for the sake of optimizing social welfare. Given that eligibility operates 
only as a side constraint on punishment, the consequentialist can get by perfectly well with a unitary 
concept of culpability that comprehends both fault and eligibility. Huigens, Deterrence, supra note 
7, at 959-61, 970-73. Deontologists collapse fault and eligibility into culpability in a different way. 
Following Kant, deontologists take the will to be the seat of moral agency. See Alan Brudner, 
Agency and Welfare in the Penal Law, in ACTION AND VALUE IN CRIMINAL LAW 21, 29-30 
(Stephen Shute et al. eds., 1993). They treat intentional-states and other indicators of fault as 
modes of voluntariness and excuse as the absence of voluntariness. This "two sides of the 
voluntariness coin" approach conflates fault and eligibility, and leads deontologists, as well, to 
work with a unitary concept called "culpability." See infra notes 155-60 and accompanying text. 
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inattention to the theory of punishment has caused it to overlook a double 
layer of ambiguity in its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence: capital sentencing 
statutes employ the ambiguous concept of mitigation, which the Court then 
analyzes in terms of the ambiguous concept of culpability. 
Part m explicates culpability, distinguishing between fault in wrongdoing 
and eligibility for punishment according to capability. The Court's working 
theory of punishment is a vague amalgam of consequentialist and 
deontological ideas, and in order to draw the distinction between fault and 
eligibility clearly, it is necessary to take a different view. Under a virtue 
ethics theory of punishment, fault is an aspect of wrongdoing that necessarily 
is determined in adjudication, and eligibility is a question of the expressive 
rationality of punishing an individual offender, in light of his capacity to 
govern his conduct at the level of motivation. 
Part IV evaluates the principal death penalty cases in light of this 
distinction. I resolve the central conflict in the case law, between the 
Furman-Gregg line of cases and the Woodson-Lockett line of cases, and 
describe the structure of a constitutionally valid penalty phase. In the course 
of this analysis, I reconsider five specific issues which the Court has 
addressed with mixed success: the necessity of "weighing;" the nature of 
mandatory death sentencing; the right to a jury at the penalty phase; the 
burden of persuasion on mitigators; and jury unanimity on mitigation at the 
penalty phase. The Conclusion briefly assesses the scope of the reform in 
capital sentencing that my argument implies. 
II. A DIAGNOSTIC HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT'S DEATH PENALTY 
JURISPRUDENCE 
Punishment by death for rape is a per se violation of the Eighth 
Amendment9 and, in all likelihood, the same is true for any other crime 
except murder. The Supreme Court also recognizes a few circumstances in 
which the amendment absolutely bans the death penalty for murder. 10 In all
other cases, the validity of the death penalty depends on whether the 
sentencing decision is adequately structured by law. 11 The Eighth
9. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598-99 (1977) (holding that the death penalty for rape 
is a per se violation of the Eighth Amendment). 
10. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81S, 822-23 (1988) (holding that the death
penalty applied to juveniles under the age of 16 is per se unconstitutional). 
11. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,242 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) (arguing that the
aim of the Eighth Amendment is "to forbid arbitrary and discriminatory penalties"). 
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Amendment is said to require sentencing procedures that guard against the 
arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty. 12 
However, the Court also has said that death sentencing juries must give 
individualized consideration to each case, 13 and must determine each 
offender's culpability, in light of the particular facts of his crime and 
personal history. 14 Commentators and some members of the Court have 
decried the apparent conflict between the constitutional command of 
structured death sentencing and the constitutional command of individualized 
death sentencing. 15 
In this Part, I argue that the Court's difficulty is not that it has pursued 
conflicting objectives of structure and individualization. The real problem 
has three stages, which are addressed in the three Sections of this - Part. 
First, the Court has not been clear about the value that the Eighth 
Amendment is to serve. The Court originally framed its objective as equality 
in death sentencing, but quickly began to pursue the distinct value of 
proportionality in sentencing. Second, the Court's requirement of 
individualized consideration is actually an attempt to find the proper structure 
for the jury's determination of proportionality. The apparent conflict 
between structured sentencing and individual consideration is in fact a failure 
to find a workable structure for an inquiry into proportionality. Third, the 
reason for this failure is the fact that proportionality in punishment is a 
problem of substantive criminal law, for the solution of which the Court 
needs a robust theory of punishment. The Court has concluded, mistakenly, 
that the use of such a theory is beyond its institutional competence. As a 
result, its difficulties in the constitutional regulation of the death penalty 
continue, and will continue until the Court engages the theory of punishment 
in a serious way. 
The foregoing analysis will serve to set the stage for the main business of 
this Article, which is an argument that a theory of punishment can resolve 
the seemingly intractable conflicts in the Court's death penalty cases. The 
point of this Part, in other words, is to explain why the Court ought to be 
fully engaged with the theory of punishment in its Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence. 
12. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976) ("In summary, the concerns expressed in
Furman that the penalty of death not be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner can be met by 
a carefully drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is given adequate information 
and guidance."). 
13. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).
14. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 602-0S (1977); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 304
(1989). 
15. See infra note 5S and accompanying text.
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A. The Equality Proxy
In Funnan v. Georgia, 16 a fractured Court decided that the Eighth 
Amendment effectively prohibits the grant of absolute discretion over the 
death penalty to the jury in a criminal case. 17 In spite of the diffuse nature of 
the decision, one theme emerges from the nine Funnan opinions. The 
Justices sought to eliminate arbitrariness in jury death-sentencing in the 
interest of equality. 18 Justice Douglas made this value most explicit, 
asserting that "the idea of equal protection of the laws . . . is implicit in the 
ban on 'cruel and unusual' punishments. " 19 The other Justices largely 
followed suit. Justice Brennan argued that correcting the unequal application 
of capital punishment, not its frequent application, was "[t]he more 
significant function of the Clause. "20 Justice White's comment that "there is 
no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death 
penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not, "21 frequently is 
cited as a statement of the principle of equality that ought to inform death 
sentencing. In the course of a comprehensive historical analysis of the death 
penalty, Justice Marshall frankly condemned the racial discrimination that 
had occurred as a result of jury discretion in sentencing.22 Finally, Justice 
Stewart supplied the most frequently-quoted rationale for the Funnan 
decision: 
These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that 
being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual. For, of all the 
j>eople convicted of rapes and murders in 1967 and 1968, many 
16. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
17. In holding that the Eighth Amendment required the jury's decision in a capital case to be 
structured by rules, the Court repudiated very recent authority that was only nominally 
distinguishable. One year before the Court decided Furman, it held that the Due Process Clause did
not prohibit states from granting the jury in a murder case the absolute discretion to sentence a 
defendant to death. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 207-08 (1971). The Furman opinions 
themselves are less than frank in explaining that decision's relation to McGautha. Furman� 408
U.S. at 427 n.11 (Powell, J., dissenting) (stating that McGautha presents a "severe problem of
stare decisis for those Justices who treat the Eighth Amendment essentially as a process 
prohibition"); Id. at 400 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("[l]t would be disingenuous to suggest that 
today's ruling has done anything less than overrule McGautha in the guise of an Eighth Amendment
adjudication."). 
18. This emphasis reflects the scholarly analysis of death sentencing that guided the litigation
that led to Furman. See MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, THE SUPREME COURT AND
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 170-85 (1973); see also Arthur J. Goldberg & Alan M. Dershowitz,
Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1773, 1792-94 (1970).
19. Furman, 408 U.S. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring).
20. Id. at 277 (Brennan, J., concurring).
21. Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
22. Id. at 364-66 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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just as reprehensible as these, the petitioners are among a 
capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of 
death has been imposed. My concurring Brothers have 
demonstrated that, if any basis can be discerned for the selection of 
these few to be sentenced to die, it is the constitutionally 
impermissible basis of race . . . . [T]he Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death 
under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so 
wantonly and freakishly imposed. 23
1201 
The value of equality as the guiding principle in death sentencing could not 
have been more clearly articulated. 
Four years after Furman, the Court held in Gregg v. Georgia24 and in two 
accompanying cases that the Eighth Amendment requirement of structured 
decision-making could be met by the use of a bifurcated trial, in the penalty 
phase of which the jury was to consider aggravating and mitigating factors. 25 
Gregg and its companion cases also reaffirmed the importance of equality as 
an Eighth Amendment value.26 The Court emphasized that the states had
guaranteed "evenhandedness" in death sentencing because their statutes 
provided for automatic appeals of right to each state's highest court,27 and for 
a post-conviction "proportionality" review consisting of a comparison 
between the case on appeal and other capital cases in the jurisdiction. 28
However, almost immediately after deciding Furman and Gregg, the 
Court stopped using the language of equality in its decisions. In a relatively 
few years, the Court made it clear that equality was not an Eighth 
Amendment value at all. 
23. Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
24. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
2S. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189 (Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) ("Furman mandates that
where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the detennination of whether 
a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to 
minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action."); see also id. at 196-207 (holding that 
the Georgia statute meets constitutional standard of Furman). 
26. Id. at 188 n.36 ("The decisive grievance of the opinions ... is that the present system of
discretionary sentencing in capital cases has failed to produce even-handed justice . .. " (quoting 
Furman, 408 U.S. at 398-99 (Burger, C.J., dissenting))). 
27. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976) ("By providing prompt judicial review of the
jury's decision in a court with statewide jurisdiction, Texas has provided a means to promote the 
evenhanded, rational, and consistent imposition of death sentences under law."). 
28. Proffitt v. Florida, 428. U.S. 242, 259-60 (1976) (finding that a statute is valid because
the death sentence is "conscientiously reviewed by a court which, because of its statewide 
jurisdiction, can assure consistency, fairness, and rationality in the evenhanded operation of the 
state law"). 
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In the case of Pulley v. Harris29 the Court concluded that the comparative 
proportionality review that it had commended in Gregg and its companion 
cases was not constitutionally required. 30 The Court argued that, in spite of 
its clear, even enthusiastic, approval of this exercise in its earlier cases, 
comparative review was not essential to those holdings.31 Instead, the saving 
feature of these statutes for Eighth Amendment purposes was their use of 
aggravating and mitigating factors to assess the gravity of offenses and the 
desert of offenders in a trial-like penalty hearing. 32 In other words, Pulley 
held that. the relevant comparison for Eighth Amendment purposes was not 
between death penalty defendants in relation to one another, but instead 
between each individual defendant and some measure of desert. 
A few years after Pulley, the Court was asked to state expressly that 
equality is an Eighth Amendment value, and the Court declined. Warren 
McCleskey offered Professor David Baldus' detailed statistical analysis of 
Georgia death sentencing as evidence of racial discrimination in the 
administration of the penalty, and argued that this discrimination violated 
both the Equal Protection Clause and the !;ruel and Unusual Punishments 
Clause. The Court rejected both claims. Regarding the Eighth Amendment 
claim, the Court stated explicitly that "absent a showing that the Georgia 
capital punishment system operates in an arbitrary and capricious manner, 
McCleskey cannot prove a constitutional violation by demonstrating that 
other defendants who may be similarly situated did not receive the death 
penalty. "33
The abandonment of equality as an Eighth Amendment value is troubling 
in some ways, but on the whole it is perfectly understandable. Equality in 
death sentencing is not a negligible value,34 but it is an odd one to pursue 
under the rubric of cruel and unusual punishment. The difficulty is that 
equal treatment requires us to avoid not only overinclusion-the execution of 
those who do not deserve it-but also to avoid underinclusion: the failure to 
execute those who do deserve it.35 Indeed, underinclusion is the complaint 
29. 465 U.S. 37 (1984).
30. Id. at 59.
31. Id; at 44-50.
32. Id. at 50.
33. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 306-07 (1987).
34. See generally Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and
the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388 (1988). 
35. Carol Steiker & Jordan Steiker, Sober Secon<J Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of
Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 381 (1995) [hereinafter 
Steiker & Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts] (arguing that narrowing the class of death-eligible 
offenders addresses Furman's concern with overinclusion, but not its concern with underinclusion); 
Carol Steiker & Jordan Steiker, Let God Sort Them Out? Refining the Individualization Requirement 
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implicit in Justice Stewart's "struck by lightning" simile. However, as 
Professor Scott Howe points out, the notion that not to sentence an offender 
to death constitutes cruel and unusual punishment is strongly 
counterintuitive, even if one supposes that another similarly situated offender 
has been sentenced to death. 36 To take the elimination of underinclusion to
be an Eighth Amendment value conjures up the disturbing image of death 
row inmates' clamoring for others to be put to death, and carries the 
unsettling implication that these inmates would have been treated more fairly 
if this were to occur. 
The reason for this conceptual dissonance, and for the Court's relatively 
quick abandonment of equality as an Eighth Amendment value, is the fact 
that equality is nothing more than a proxy value in the constitutional analysis 
of death sentencing. The Court's real concern is not equality in punishment, 
but proportionality in punishment. 
Equal punishment and proportionate punishment are not the same thing. 
The proportionality of punishment is evaluated for a single case; no 
comparison to another person and his punishment is involved. The question 
is only whether, roughly speaking, the punishment imposed is accurate with 
respect to the person's desert.37 In contrast, to judge equality in punishment
obviously does involve a comparison between two persons who have been 
punished. The question is whether they have been treated alike, given that 
they are alike in a relevant respect-in this case, with respect to their deserts, 
The fact that the likeness of the cases is likeness with respect to desert makes 
equality a plausible proxy for proportionate punishment. If A and B are 
similarly situated with respect to· desert, then it is impossible to punish them 
proportionately but unequally. But the converse is not true. If A and B are 
in. Capital Sentencing, 102 YALE L. J. 835, 862-66 (1992) [hereinafter Steiker & Steiker, Sort 
Them Out]. 
36. Scott W. Howe, The Failed Case for Eighth Amendment Regulation of the Capital­
Sentencing Trial, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 795, 825 (1998) (commenting on the "profound irony" of 
executing an offender on equality grounds, so that he will be spared the cruel and unusual 
punishment of unequal treatment in death sentencing). Professor Howe argues, as I do, that 
proportionality in punishment is the value that the Court has pursued in the Eighth Amendment 
regulation of the death penalty. As the title of his article suggests, however, Howe concludes that 
this goal cannot be attain� because "no evident consensus exists as to how to refine the deserts 
measure." Id. at 836. Howe is correct about the absence of consensus, but he also contributes to 
the difficulty when, like the Court, he uses the words "desert," "culpability," "blameworthiness," 
and "responsibility" interchangeably, making no effort to give any of them a precise, distinct 
meaning. See, e.g., id. at 829-30. No consensus is likely to develop if we use the same language 
to talk about different things. This Article attempts to move us toward a consensus on 
proportionality in death sentencing with the obvious first step of clarifying our meaning. 
37. A considerably more refined account of proportionality is given below. See infra Part
III.D.
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similarly situated with respect to desert, then it is entirely possible to punish 
them disproportionately but equally. Imagine, for example, that A and B are 
equally culpable shoplifters, each of whom has been sentenced to be drawn 
and quartered. Their punishment is equal, but disproportionate, because the 
proportionality of the punishment in each case is independent of the two 
cases' relationship to one another. 
Proportionality in punishment is a substantive criminal law value that is 
impossible to understand, or even to identify in the Court's cases, without 
resort to the theory of punishment. The case of Zant v. Stephens38 serves to 
illustrate this point. 
The Zant decision authorizes the unequal treatment of similarly situated 
offenders, in apparent contradiction of Furman. In Zant, Georgia's highest 
court informed the Supreme Court explicitly that the aggravating factors in 
the statute at issue served to define a death-eligible class of murderers, but 
that, after this narrowing function had been performed, the . jury retained 
absolute discretion to impose or not to impose a death sentence in light of an 
unlimited range of mitigating factors. 39 Nothing in the Georgia statute served
to channel the jury's discretion toward the imposition of a death sentence in 
any death-eligible case, regardless of the fact that all such offenders, by 
definition, had been found to be deserving of death. 40 In other words, the
jury was permitted to "underinclude" death-eligible offenders in the class of 
those who actually would be executed. 
If equality were a core Eighth Amendment value, as Furman asserted, 
then the Georgia statute at issue in Zant would have been struck down. 
Equal treatment of similarly situated cases requires one to avoid both 
underinclusion and overinclusion with respect to the. relevant traits in the 
disposition of a body of cases so defined. For example, to permit the jury to 
consider only a limited menu of mitigating factors in its deliberations on the 
fate of the death-eligible class would further narrow this class, while it also 
would have the effect of channeling all death-eligible offenders who could 
not show one of the required mitigators onto death row. This approach 
would avoid underinclusion and ensure equal treatment of all death-eligible 
offenders. But by the time Zant was decided, the Court already had decided 
that a limited menu of mitigators would itself violate the Eighth 
Amendment. 41 In its approval of underinclusion, Zant merely confinned a
foregone conclusion: equal treatment is not a core Eighth Amendment value. 
38. 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
39. Id. at 870-72.
40. Id. at 870-73.
41. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
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The true core Eighth Amendment value is proportionality in punishment. 
Proportionality, or accuracy with respect to desert, might require one to 
avoid underinclusion, but probably would not do so. 
Whether the principle of proportionality makes underinclusion with 
respect to desert objectionable depends upon one's understanding of the role 
of desert in punishment. A strict deontological theory of punishment might 
condemn underinclusion with respect to desert. 42 But this theory is an 
extraordinarily radical one, and there is no evidence whatsoever that the 
Supreme Court adheres to it. Other theories of punishment would not 
condemn underinclusion with respect to desert. The more common view 
among deontological theorists is that desert provides a moral justification for 
punishment, and a reason to punish, but not a categorical duty to punish. 
Punishment according to desert is not inconsistent with the pursuit of other 
aims in punishment,43 nor with the exercise of mercy.44 For her part, the 
consequentialist holds that desert operates only as a side constraint on 
punishment. Desert is not a reason to punish, plays no role in the moral 
42. The strict deontological theory of punishment stated in Immanuel Kant's Metaphysics of
Morals imposes a duty to punish in those cases in which punishment is deserved. Kant writes that: 
Even if a civil society were to be dissolved by the consent of all its members 
. . • the last murderer remaining in a prison would first have to be executed, so 
that each has done to him what his deeds deserve and blood guilt does not cling 
to the people for not having insisted upon this punishment; for otherwise the 
people can be regarded as collaborators in this public violation of justice. 
IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 142 (Mary Gregor trans., Cambridge 
University Press 1991) (1797). Underinclusion with respect to desert would be a vice in death 
sentencing under such a theory. Jeffrie Murphy has argued that Kant's conception of punishment is 
not as starkly retributive as this passage suggests. Jeffrie G. Murphy, Does Kant Have a Theory of 
Punishment?, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 509, 512 (1987) (arguing that the views Kant stated in the 
Metaphysics of Morals are unrepresentative of and inconsistent with Kant's philosophy as a whole). 
However, Murphy himself has argued that the extension of mercy is inconsistent with a Kantian 
theory of punishment. Jeffrie Murphy, Mercy and Legal Justice, in JEFFRIE 0. MURPHY & JEAN 
HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 162, 167-77 (1988). 
43. See, e.g., NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND PROBATION: 
INTERMEDIATE PUNISHMENTS IN A RATIONAL SENTENCING SYSTEM 106 (1990) (advocating "a 
system that is parsimonious in the use of punishment within the concepts of desert, equality, and 
proportionality"); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS 48 (1993) ("[W]e may agree 
that sanctions should be proportionate in the main, and still debate a certain degree of deviation."). 
44. Eric Muller has argued, against Jeffrie Murphy, that a proper understanding of the value 
of human autonomy in a deontological theory of punishment implies that sentencing should involve 
discretion and mercy. Eric L. Muller, The Virtue of Mercy in Criminal Sentencing, 24 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 288, 341-44 (1993); see also J.L.A. Garcia, Two Concepts of Desert, 5 LAW & 
PHIL. 219, 230 (1986) ("That a person deserves punishment implies no obligation to punish her."); 
R.A. Duff, Justice, Mercy, and Forgiveness, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Summer/Fall 1990, at 51, 59 
(book review) ("But if a criminal is suffering seriously ... we might, and perhaps should, come to 
see him from the perspective of compassion and mercy rather than from that of retributive 
justice."). 
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justification of punishment, and . certainly imposes no duty to punish. 45 
Neither of these latter conceptions of desert condemns underinclusion in 
death sentencing with respect to desert, and the Court in various places has 
relied on these theories in its Eighth Amendment analysis. 46 If the Court's 
conception of desert does not condemn underinclusion with respect to desert, 
then Zant's authorization of underinclusion in death sentencing suggests that 
proportionality, not equality, is the core Eighth Amendment value. 
B. The Structure of Individualized Sentencing
From one perspective, the Court has made it perfectly clear that 
proportionality, not equality, is its primary concern under the Eighth 
Amendment. The concern for proportionality that lay behind the Court's 
45. Under a consequentialist theory of punishment, the criminal law's system of prohibitions
is morally justified as a whole by virtue of its optimizing social welfare. If the optimization of 
social welfare is the only basis for moral justification, then the justification of punishment at the 
individual level potentially authorizes scapegoating for the sake of this optimum. For this reason, 
the consequentialist argues that punishment is not morally justified at the individual level. It is 
distributed by legal rules within the morally justified legal system. These rules for the distribution 
of punishment may be premised on desert, but desert plays no morally justifying role here, because 
the moral justification of punishment is not in issue. For the consequentialist, then, desert is never 
more than a side-constraint on punishment. See H.L.A. HART, Prolegomerwn to the Principles of 
Punishment, in PUNISl:IMENT AND REsPONSmILITY: EsSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1, 5-11 
(1968) (advancing this argument). 
46. In at least one critical juncture in its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has
invoked the principles of a sophisticated consequentialism. Spaziano v Florida, 468 U.S. 447 
(1984). In response to a claim that only retribution justified a death sentence, the Court argued that 
deterrence justifies the penalty at the level of legislation, which then justifies th� application of that 
rule in the individual case. Id. at 461. This, of course, echoes Hart. See supra note 45. When it 
refers to the deontological theory of retributivism, the Court usually states a common but utterly 
misconceived notion of what retribution is. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 304 
(1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (equating retribution with "naked vengeance"); Id. at 308 
(Stewart, J., concurring) (referring to "the instinct for retribution"); Id. at 311 (White, J., 
concurring) (arguing that the "need for retribution" would not be satisfied if executions were 
infrequent); Id. at 363 (Marshall, J., concurring) (characterizing retribution as "purposeless 
vengeance"); see also K.G. Armstrong, The Retributivist Hits Back, 70 MIND 471 (1961), reprinted 
in THE PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT 138, 139 (H.B. Acton ed., 1969) (evaluating the 
misconception of retribution as revenge). Properly speaking, retribution refers to punishment's 
fitness in retrospect according to desert. MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL 
THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 33 (1997). On the few occasions when a member of the Court has 
stated a recognizable deontological principle of punishment, it seems to come from a moderate 
deontological theory. See, e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 408 (1986) (Marshall, J.) 
(commenting that retribution "is not served by execution of an insane person, which has a 'lesser 
value' than that of the crime for which he is to be punished"). The balance of benefits conception 
of retribution is commonly attributed to Herbert Morris. See R.A. Duff, Penal Communications: 
Recent Work in the Philosophy of Punishment, 20 CRIME & JUST. 1, 25-28 (1996) (citing Herbert 
Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 MONIST 475-501 (1968)). 
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equality analysis in Furman and Gregg quickly emerged in a distinct line of 
cases that has vied with them for authority. In the leading case of Woodson 
v. North Carolina47-decided the same day as Gregg-the Court banned the
most obvious method of ensuring equal treatment in death penalty cases:
simply to mandate the death penalty in all cases of murder in the first degree.
Instead, states must provide for individualized death sentencing. Within five
years, the Court extended the principle of Woodson to hold, in Lockett v.
Ohio,48 that a state may not place limitations on the jury's consideration of
mitigating evidence.49 In Penry v. Lynaugh, 50 the Court held that the jury
must be able to use this evidence effectively to consider the defendant's 
"personal culpability, "51 so that death sentencing constitutes a "reasoned 
moral response to the defendant's background, character, and crime. "52 
The conflict between Furman-Gregg 53 and Woodson-Lockett 54 is fairly 
obvious. If a state cannot impose limitations on the introduction of 
47. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
48. 438 U.S. 586 (1977).
49. Id. at 604-05.
50. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
51. Id. at 336. Whether this proposition is a holding of the case depends on how Justice
Marshall's vote is counted. See Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 191 n.1 (1988) (stating that 
Justice Marshall's concurrence on broader grounds gives the Lockett plurality the "same 
precendential value" as an opinion). In any event, a majority adopted Lockett's reasoning in 
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 n.10 (1982) (stating "Lockett requires the sentencer to 
listen" to all mitigating evidence). 
52. 492 U.S. at 337. 
53. The term Furman-Gregg refers to the line of cases in which a concern for equal treatment 
of offenders and/or structure in jury deliberations predominates. These cases include: Blystone v. 
Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 301 (1990) (holding sentencer's consideration of whether aggravating 
factor standing alone is sufficient to support death sentence is not required); Boyde v. California, 
494 U.S. 370, 377 (1990) (agreeing with the holding in Blystone); Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 
U.S. 738, 741 (1990) (holding a state appellate court may affirm a death sentence "based in part on 
an invalid or improperly defined aggravating circumstance either by re-weighing of the aggravating 
or mitigating evidence or by harmless-error review"); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 492-93 (1990) 
(finding the jury instruction not to consider sympathy permissible); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 
639, 653-54 (1990) (finding appellate weighing of aggravation versus mitigation.after invalidation 
of an aggravating factor is permissible); California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 543 (1987) (holding 
that the so-called "anti-sympathy" instruction is permissible). 
54. This term refers to the line of cases in which the Court has stressed the importance of 
individualized sentencing and has invoked substantive criminal law principles in doing so. These 
cases include: McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 444 (1990) (White, J., concurring) (stating 
unanimity on mitigating factors cannot be required where defendant carries the burden of persuasion 
on the issue); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 384 (1988) (finding risk that jury believed that 
unanimity on mitigating factors was required is constitutionally intolerable); Sumner v. Shuman, 
483 U.S. 66, 83-84 (1987) (holding mandatory death penalty for defendant who kills while under a 
life sentence is invalid); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (holding evidence of good 
behavior while defendant was incarcerated must be considered by jury); Caldwell v. Mississippi, 
472 U.S. 320, 341 (1985) (finding it impermissible to suggest to jury that it may not bear ultimate 
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mitigating evidence or the uses to which it may be put, then does it have any 
constitutional capacity to channel the jury's decision-making toward the 
imposition of the death penalty in order to avoid underinclusion? Apparently 
not; but if not, then has not the Court, in Woodson and Lockett, actually 
precluded compliance with Furman and Gregg, at least where mitigation is 
concemed?55 We have already noted one affirmative answer to this question, 
in 'Zant 's authorization of underinclusion with respect to desert. 7.ant is only 
one of a number of cases in the Woodson-Lockett line, in which the Court 
has sought to ensure proportionate punishment with a guarantee of 
individualized sentencing. 
The apparent conflict between Furman-Gregg and Woodson-Lockett has 
caused most commentators to overlook an important fact. The individualized 
sentencing that the Court mandated in Woodson has a structure of its own. 
This structure was set up in Lockett and Penry, and it is made up largely of 
concepts drawn from the theory of punishment, including mitigation, 
aggravation, deterrence, retribution, culpability, and desert. In this light, the 
conflict between Furman-Gregg and Woodson-Lockett is not a conflict 
between structure and its absence, but instead between two conflicting 
structures. The structure implied by Furman-Gregg serves the value of 
equality or consistency. The structure implied by Woodson-Lockett serves 
the value of proportionality. Furthermore, Woodson-Lockett ought to prevail 
in this conflict. Neither equality nor consistency has ever been more than a 
proxy for proportionality, and it would seem to be a simple matter to resolve 
responsibility for death); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1982) (holding that youth 
and mental disturbance are issues that the sentencer must be permitted to consider); see also 
Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 738-39 (1992) (holding due process requires exclusion of jurors 
predisposed against mitigating evidence in order to effectuate Eighth Amendment rights). 
55. See Vivian Berger, "Black Box Decisions• on Life or Death-If They're Arbitrary, Don't
Blame the Jury: A Reply to Judge Patrick Higgenbotham, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1067, 1080 
(1991); Stephen P. Garvey, "As the Gentle Rain From Heaven•: Mercy in Capital Sentencing, 81 
CORNELL L. REV. 989, 1001 (1996); Howe, supra note 36, at 819 n.102; Steiker & Steiker, Sober 
Second Thoughts, supra note 35, at 368-70; Steiker & Steiker, Sort Them Out, supra note 35, at 
861-66; Scott E. Sundby, The Lockett ParatkJx: Reconciling Guided Discretion and Unguided
Mitigation in Capital Sentencing, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1147, 1164-86 (1991). Among members of
the Court, two Justices have stated that Furman-Gregg and Woodson-Lockett are irreconcilable.
Justice Blackmun drew the inference that the death penalty therefore ought to be abolished. Callins
v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145-46 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Commentators also have
made this argument. See, e.g., Berger, supra, at 1092; Margaret Radin, Cruel Punishment and
Respect for Persons: Super Due Process for Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1143, 1155 (1980) ("Thus,
if death as a punishment requires both maximum flexibility and non-arbitrariness, and these
requirements cannot both be met ... then death cannot be a permissible punishment."). Justice
Scalia has concluded that Woodson-Lockett ought to give way to Furman-Gregg. See Walton, 497
U.S. at 671 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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a conflict between a proxy value and the fundamental • value for which it 
stands. 
One reason that Woodson-Lockett has not clearly prevailed in its conflict 
with Furman-Gregg has to do with the Court's apparent fear that the theory 
of punishment invoked in the former line of analysis is too controversial and 
too robustly normative to be given a leading role in constitutional analysis. I 
will consider this problem in the next Section. For now, I want to consider 
another reason for the relative weakness of Woodson-Lockett: the fact that, 
on its own terms, the structure of individualized sentencing which the Court 
has established in this line of cases is incoherent. The Court has used the 
rudimentary concepts of aggravation, mitigation, and culpability in its 
regulation of individualized sentencing, and these concepts import a double 
layer of ambiguity into the analysis. 
After Furman, most states adopted some version of the Model Penal 
Code's Section 210.6.56 Section 210.6 contains a list of aggravating factors57 
56. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179 n.23 (1976) {citing Ala. H.B. 212, §§ 2-4, 6-7
(1975); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-452 to 13-454 (West Supp. 1973); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-4706 
(Supp. 1975); Cal. Penal Code §§ 190.1, 209, 219 (Supp. 1976); Colo. Laws 1974, c. 52, § 4; 
Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. §§ 53a-25, 53a-35{b), 53a-46a, 53a-54b (1975); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 
4209 (Supp. 1975); Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 782.04, 921.141 {Supp. 1975-1976); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 26-
3102, 27-2528, 27-2534.1, 27-2537 (Supp. 1975); Idaho Code § 18-4004 {Supp. 1975); Ill. Ann. 
Stat. c. 38, §§ 9-1, 1005-5-3, 1005-8-lA (Supp. 1976-1977); Ind. Stat. Ann. § 35-13-4-1 (1975); 
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 507.020 (1975); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:30 (Supp. 1976); Md. Ann. Code, 
art. 27, § 413 (Supp. 1975); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 97-3-19, 97-3-21, 97-25-55, 99-17-20 {Supp. 
1975); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 559.009, 559.005 {Supp. 1976); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 94-5-105 
(Spec. Crim. Code Supp. 1976); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 28-401, 29-2521 to 29-2523 (1975); Nev. Rev. 
Stat. § 200.030 (1973); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 630:1 (1974); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-29-2 (Supp. 
1975); N.Y. Penal Law § 60.06 (1975); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-17 {Supp. 1975); Ohio Rev. Code 
Ann. §§ 2929.02-2929.04 (1975); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 701.1-701.3 (Supp. 1975-1976); Pa. 
Laws 1974, Act No. 46; R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 11-23-2 (Supp. 1975); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-52 
(Supp. 1975); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-2402, 39-2406 (1975); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03(a) 
(1974); Utah Code Ann.§§ 76-3-206, 76-3-207, 76-S-202 {Supp. 197S); Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-10, 
18.2-31 (1976); Wash. Rev. Code§§ 9A.32.045, 9A.32.046 (Supp. 1975); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-54 
(Supp. 1975)). 
57. (3) Aggravating Circumstances.
{a) The murder was committed by a convict under sentence of imprisonment.
{b) The defendant was previously convicted of another murder or of a felony
involving the use or threat of violence to the person.
{c) At the time the murder was committed the defendant also committed
another murder.
(d) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons.
{e) The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged or was an
accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after
committing or attempting to commit robbery, rape or deviate sexual intercourse
by force or threat of force, arson, burglary or kidnapping.
{t) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a
lawful arrest or effecting an escape from lawful custody.
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and a list of mitigating factors. 58 In a sentencing proceeding that is separate 
from the trial on the merits, the jury is to determine the existence of 
aggravating and mitigating factors, and then to weigh these factors against 
one another in order to determine whether the death penalty is to be 
imposed.59 This sentencing hearing must be separated from the trial on the 
merits because some evidence which is relevant to aggravation or mitigation 
is barred from the trial on the merits by well-established evidence rules. 60 
Gregg and Proffitt v. Florida,61 decided on the s.ame day, indicated the 
status of Section 210.6 as the paradigm of a valid death penalty statute. In 
Gregg, the Court approved a statute that required the jury to consider and 
determine aggravating and mitigating factors, but that did not require the jury 
to balance these factors against one another.62 In Proffitt, the Court approved 
a statute that required the jury to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors 
against one another, but that made the jury's decision only advisory; the 
sentencing decision was to be made by the trial judge. 63 
A third case decided on the same day as Gregg and Proffitt indicated the 
extent to which the Court was willing to tolerate different procedural 
schemes under Furman. The statute that the Court approved in Jurek v. 
(g) The murder was committed for pecuniary gain. 
(h) The murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting 
exceptional depravity. 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(3) (1985). 
58. (4) Mitigating Circumstances. 
(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.
(b) The murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance. 
(c) The victim was a participant in the defendant's homicidal conduct or 
consented to the homicidal act. 
(d) The murder was committed under circumstances which the defendant
believed to provide a moral justification or extenuation for his conduct.
(e) The defendant was an accomplice in a murder committed by another person
and his participation in the homicidal act was relatively minor.
(t) The defendant acted under duress or under the domination of another 
person.
(g) At the time of the murder, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the 
criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or 
intoxication.
(h) The youth of the defendant at the time of the crime. 
Id. § 210.6(4). 
59. Id. § 210.6 cmt. 8.
60. Id. § 210.6. 
61. 428 U.S. 242 (1976). 
62. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206-07 (1976).
63. Profitt, 428 U.S. at 247-60. 
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Texas64 asked thejury to determine the defendant's eligibility for the death 
penalty based on five additional offense elements to be determined at trial, 
and on two penalty phase issues to be determined at a sentencing hearing. 65
The Court's affirmance of this statute was surprising, because none of these 
offense elements or sentencing factors resembled mitigating factors. 66 All of 
them resembled aggravating factors. 67 Nevertheless, the Jurek decision 
approved the Texas scheme on the ground that the statute's reference to the 
defendant's future dangerousness permitted the defendant to offer evidence of 
youth, duress, extreme emotional disturbance, or other mitigating 
circumstances. 68 This evidence, the Supreme Court held, was sufficient to 
"guide□ and focus□ the jury's objective consideration of the particularized 
64. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
65. Id. at 265-69.
66. In two other cases decided the same day, the Court had held that a mandatory death
sentence for murder was unconstitutional. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976); 
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 336 (1976). In Jurek, the Court drew the inference that a 
death penalty statute which asked the jury to consider only the aggravated nature of a murder must 
be unconstitutional. 428 U.S. at 271. 
67. The five additional offense elements of capital murder are:
(l) the person murdered a peace officer of fireman who was acting in the·
lawful discharge of an official duty and who the defendant knew was a peace
officer or fireman;
(2) the person intentionally .committed the murder in the course of committing
or attempting to commit kidnapping, burglary, robbery, forcible rape, or
arson;
(3) the person committed the murder for remuneration or the promise of
remuneration or employed another to commit the murder for remuneration or
the promise of remuneration;
(4) the person committed the murder while escaping or attempting to escape
from a penal institution;
(5) the person, while incarcerated in a penal institution, murdered another who
was employed in the operation of the penal institution.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1257(b) (1973), cited in Jurek, 428 U.S. at 265 n.1. The three penalty 
phase issues are: 
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased
was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death
of the deceased or another would result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal
acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing
the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the
deceased.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 37.07l(b) (Supp. 1975-1976), cited in Jurek, 428 U.S. at 269. 
68. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 272-73 (quoting Jurek v. Texas, 522 S.W.2d 934, 939-40 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1975)). 
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circumstances of the individual offense and the individual offender before it 
can impose a sentence of death. "69 
This reasoning was flawed or incomplete, because a jury that was 
instructed in the language of the Texas statute would have no way to make 
sense of, or to give effect to the mitigating evidence that the defendant had 
been permitted to introduce. For example, a mentally retarded defendant 
who had little capacity. to control his impulses or to learn from his mistakes 
would be a continuing danger to society, and so his condition would dictate 
death under jury instructions written in accordance with the Texas statute. If 
jurors happened to consider the same condition to be a mitigation, a reason 
not to execute the defendant-as most jurors might be expected to do-then 
they would have no way to give effect to this conclusion under their 
instructions. In a subsequent Texas case, Penry v. Lynaugh,70 the Supreme 
Court recognized this particular difficulty, and reversed Penry's conviction 
on a challenge to the Texas statute as applied. The Court held that the jury's 
instructions must enable the jury to give mitigating effect to the defendant's 
evidence at the penalty phase, regardless of how, or even whether, it relates 
to the question of future dangerousness.71 
The decisions in Jurek and Penry give rise to a host of questions. I want 
to focus attention on one in particular which is raised in Justice Scalia' s 
Penry dissent. Justice O'Connor insists on behalf of the majority that the 
jury instructions in a capital case must allow the jury to consider the 
"personal culpability" of the defendant, so that the jury can arrive at a 
"reasoned moral response" on the question of life or death. n Justice Scalia 
points out that the part of the Texas scheme known as Special Issue One­
whether the killing of the victim "was done deliberately and with the 
reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased or another would 
result" -addresses the "personal culpability" of the defendant. 73 Mental 
states such as these are thought to be paradigmatic indicators of culpability. 74 
Penry asked for and received an instruction to the effect that his mental 
retardation affected his ability to deliberate upon and foresee the death of the 
victim. 7s Therefore, the jury in his case did have the opportunity-within the 
Texas statute as written-to consider the defendant's "personal culpability" 
69. Id. at 274.
70. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
71. Id. at 326-28.
72. Id. at 327-28.
73. Id. at 356 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
74. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (1985) (listing mental states as "Kinds of Culpability").
15. Penry, 492 U.S. at 356 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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as required by the majority. Why was this not sufficient to validate Penry's 
trial and conviction in the majority's eyes? 
This question is more deeply puzzling than might at first appear. In 
Justice Scalia's argument, no less than in Justice O'Connor's, the categories 
of aggravation and mitigation seem protean or unstable. Special Issue One 
seems to be an aggravating factor; indeed, it extends the inquiry into malice 
or intention in killing which defines murder, and asks whether the malice or 
intention was so extreme as to call for a higher punishment. 76 But Justice 
Scalia seems perfectly justified in drawing attention to the significance of a 
negative finding on this question, and in calling this effect mitigation. If, as 
seems to be the case, aggravation and mitigation are two sides of a single 
issue, then what is the issue? If the issue is culpability, then what accounts 
for Justice O'Connor's refusal to acknowledge that the instructions in the 
Penry case did address culpability in the way that Justice Scalia describes? 
The ambiguities that Penry displays extend beyond the matter of 
aggravation versus mitigation, to the matter of aggravation versus the 
definition of an offense. An unacknowledged confusion over the relationship 
between culpability, aggravating factors, and offense elements distorts the 
constitutional concept of mandatory death sentencing. This distortion matters 
tremendously because, not surprisingly, the word "mandatory" is a term of 
art in this context. To say that a death penalty statute imposes mandatory 
death sentencing is simply a way to say that the legislature has imposed too 
much structure or too rigid a structure on the sentencing process. In other 
words, the concept of a mandatory death sentencing provision governs the 
line of conflict between Furman-Gregg and Woodson-Lockett. 
Consider the two cases which first outlawed mandatory death penalties: 
Woodson v. North Carolina11 and Roberts v. Louisiana.18 Commentators and 
the Court ordinarily treat Woodson and Roberts as indistinguishable; or they 
treat Roberts as an application of principles stated at greater length in 
Woodson.19 On closer examination, however, the cases are significantly 
different from one another. 
In Woodson, the Court examined the history of the death penalty in terms 
ironically reminiscent of McGautha v. California. 80 First, the Court 
16. Id. at 310 (O'Connor, J .) (Special Issue One asked "whether the conduct of the defendant
that caused the death of the deceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable 
expectation that the death of the deceased or another would result"). 
77. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
78. 428 U .s. 325 (1976).
79. See, e.g., Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 271 (1976); Steiker & Steiker, Sober Second
Thoughts, supra note 35, at 369; Sundby, supra note 55, at 1158 n.40. 
80. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
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described an era in which death was a mandatory punishment for many 
offenses, and in which juries balked at convicting in cases of obvious guilt­
apparently because they wished to avoid this harsh and disproportionate 
punishment. 81 Then the court recounted the states' efforts to define an 
ultimate degree · of homicide for which death would be a mandatory 
punishment, by means of the concepts of malice aforethought and 
premeditation-and the failure of those efforts. 82 Finally, the court described 
the states' resort to the expedient of frankly granting juries absolute 
discretion over death sentencing. 83 These were the systems struck down in 
Furman. 
The Woodson case represented the latest stage in this history: a post­
Furman return to mandatory death sentencing. 84 North Carolina had 
employed a murder statute that defined first degree murder as any "willful, 
deliberate and premeditated killing;" that imposed a penalty of death for first 
degree murder; and that gave the jury the prerogative of recommending life 
imprisonment. 85 After Furman was decided, North Carolina eliminated the 
jury's prerogative to recommend life imprisonment. 86 The effect of this 
deletion was to return North Carolina to the second historical era described 
by the Court in Woodson: that in which concepts such as malice aforethought 
and premeditation defined an ultimate degree of homicide that warranted 
death as a punishment. The Court held in Woodson that, as a constitutional 
matter, North Carolina could not simply return to an approach to death 
sentencing that history showed to be inadequate. 87 
In Roberts, the Court struck down Louisiana's mandatory death penalty 
scheme on the same rationale as that employed in Woodson. The Court 
concluded that: "As in North Carolina, there are no standards provided to 
guide the jury in the exercise of its power to select those first-degree 
murderers who will receive death sentences . . . . "88 The remarkable thing 
about this statement is that it is patently false. Louisiana had done something 
fundamentally different with its murder statute than North Carolina had 
done. Louisiana had not simply imposed a mandatory penalty of death on a 
standard-issue premeditated murder. Louisiana had redefined its first degree 
murder offense completely. Thus, there were five specific, alternative ways 
81. Woodfon, 428 U.S. at 289-90. See supra note 17 (explaining the irony). 
82. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 290-91. 
83. Id. at 291-93. 
84. Id. at 298-99. 
85. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1969), cited in Woodson, 428 U.S. at 285 n.4.
86. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Supp. 1975).
87. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 301-05.
88. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325,335 (1976). 
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in which one might commit first degree murder in Louisiana: to kill with a 
specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm, and also, at the same 
time, (l) to commit a specified felony; (2) to kill a fireman or police officer; 
(3) to have been convicted of murder or to be serving a life sentence; (4) to
have more than one victim; or (5) to receive payment for the killing. 89 
Four of these five alternative offense elements correspond to aggravating 
sentencing factors in Model Penal Code section 210.6. 90 This raises a 
seemingly obvious question. If these aggravating factors can operate in the 
penalty phase to facilitate an inquiry into the particular circumstances of the 
offense and the offender, and to narrow the class of death-eligible 
defendants, then why can they not perform this. function as offense 
elements?91 Bifurcation is not constitutionally required. The penalty phase is 
separated from the trial on the merits in order to facilitate a fair trial under 
standard evidence rules, but this has never been held to be a matter of 
constitutional necessity, and in any event it does not imply a. distinction 
between offense elements and aggravating factors as vehicles for the issue of 
culpability. Louisiana's law clearly did provide for individualized 
consideration of the offense and the offender in a way that North Carolina's 
law did not. 92 Whatever the case in Woodson, it was not true in Roberts that 
there were no "standards provided to guide the jury in the exercise of its 
power to select those first-degree murderers who will receive death 
sentences. "93 
Furthermore, Roberts is distinguishable from Woodson in the way 
suggested by Justice Scalia's Penry dissent: a negative finding on these 
offense elements has a mitigating implication. 94 The defendant who is found 
not to have killed for hire or not to have committed an accompanying felony 
89. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (West 1974), cited in Roberts, 428 U.S. at 329 n.3.
90. See supra note 57 (listing Model Penal Code aggravating factors of previous conviction
of a felony, multiple victims, murder in the course of a felony, and pecuniary gain). 
91. Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244-45 (1988) ("We see no reason why this
narrowing function may not be performed by jury findings at either the sentencing phase of the trial 
or the guilt phase."). 
92. The Louisiana law was constitutionally objectionable because it invited compromise
verdicts. Roberts, 428 U.S. at 334-35. The Court in Roberts stated that "[u]nder the current 
Louisiana system, however, every jury in a first-degree murder case is instructed on the crimes of 
second-degree murder and manslaughter and permitted to consider those verdicts even if there is not 
a scintilla of evidence to support the lesser verdicts." Id. at 334 (citation omitted). But this was a 
problem of jury discretion that was completely unmoored from the law, such as that which Furman
condemned, not a problem of mandatory death sentencing. 
93. Id. at 335.
94. Failure to convict of this degree of murder would have resulted in a conviction of a lower
degree of homicide, even under proper evidentiary requirements. Id. at 334 (citing LA. CODE 
CRIM. PROC. ANN. §§ 809, 814 (Supp. 1975)). 
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is less culpable than a murderer who actually did do one of these things. In 
the terms which the court later adopted in Penry, Louisiana had adopted 
rules which would permit the jury to formulate "a reasoned moral 
response"95 based on the defendant's "personal culpability,"96 including the 
matter of mitigation, as later required by Lockett. And yet, as would be the 
case in Penry, the Court seemed not to recognize the legislature's attentions 
to the issues of mitigation and culpability, as it had been willing to do in 
Jurek.91 
Given that this difficulty arose under both Louisiana's death penalty 
statute in Roberts and under Texas's fundamentally different death penalty 
statute in Penry, one begins to suspect that the categories of aggravation and 
mitigation are largely meaningless, and that the "culpability" determination 
which the Court has tried to ensure is an essentially ambiguous undertaking. 
The Lockett decision confirms both of these suspicions. 
Sandra Lockett played a very minor role in a pawn-shop robbery in which 
her friend Parker killed the shop owner. Lockett was found guilty of felony 
murder as an accomplice, which made her eligible for the death penalty. 98 
Ohio law limited consideration of mitigating factors to three questions: 
whether the victim had induced or facilitated the offense; whether the 
defendant was under duress, coercion, or strong provocation; and whether 
the offense was primarily the product of psychosis or mental deficiency. 99 
Lockett was sentenced to death because there was no evidence to support an 
affirmative answer to any of these questions. 100 
The Supreme Court reversed Lockett's conviction on the ground that the 
Ohio statute's limited menu of mitigating factors violated the principle of 
Woodson. It failed to ensure "consideration of the 'character and record of 
the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a 
constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the death 
penalty. '"101 Specifically, the Ohio statute did not allow the jury to consider
the fact that Lockett did not intend the victim's death or the fact that her role 
in the crime was a minor one. 102 The mitigating effect of both of these facts
is obvious. Minor involvement as an accomplice is listed as a mitigating 
95. Peruy v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989).
96. Id.
91. See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
98. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1978).
99. Id. (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.03-2929.04(8) (1975)).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 601 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976)).
102. Id. at 608.
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factor in the Model Penal Code's section 210.6. 103 The fact that Lockett did 
not intend to kill has a mitigating implication if mitigation is a question of 
culpability, and if (as is generally agreed) intentional-states indicate 
culpability and its degrees. 104
However, each of these mitigating factors also has an obvious aggravating 
converse. Not to intend the victim's death mitigates a homicide only because 
to intend the victim's death makes a homicide worse than it would be 
otherwise. Murder is a knowing or purposeful killing, whereas manslaughter 
requires only recklessness, and a killing with no intentional state will be a 
negligent homicide or no crime at all. 105 A killing which is low on this scale 
is mitigated only because a killing which is high on this scale is aggravated. 
The second of the considerations on which Lockett turned also has two sides. 
To be an accomplice who plays only a minor role in a murder clearly 
mitigates the offense, but the general matter of one's role in a crime, relative 
to the roles played by others, can easily be framed in aggravating _terms. We 
might well treat as an aggravating factor the fact that one is a leader in a 
homicidal conspiracy or other deadly criminal enterprise. 106 
These converse formulations are important because they suggest that one 
might simply factor the question of mitigation out of the Lockett case. 
Lockett's conviction was overturned because the Ohio statute did not permit 
consideration of her intent to kill and her relative level of involvement in the 
form of mitigating factors. However, if the same considerations had been 
available to the jury in converse form-as offense elements or aggravating 
factors-then it is likely that the Court would have affirmed the conviction 
and sentence. The jury would have had an opportunity to consider Lockett's 
state of mind and relative degree of involvement. 107 But if we can satisfy the 
103. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(4)(e) (1985).
104. See, e.g., id. § 2.02 (describing a hierarchical set of intentional-states as "Kinds of
Culpability"). 
105. See, e.g., id. §§ 210.2 (defining Murder), 210.3 (defining Manslaughter), 210.4
(defining Negligent Homicide). 
106. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-l(b)(l3) (West 1999) (listing as an
aggravator: "the defendant was a principal administrator, organizer, or leader of a calculated 
criminal drug conspiracy consisting of a hierarchical position of authority superior to that of all 
other members of the conspiracy"). 
107. In order to factor mitigation out of the Lockett case, suppose that the evidence in the case
was more ambiguous than it was in fact. Suppose that there was evidence from which the state had 
argued that Lockett knew that it would be necessary to kill the shop owner in order to rob him; 
whereas Lockett might have argued from the same evidence that she recognized a risk of death at 
most. Suppose further that there was evidence from which the state had argued that Lockett had 
manipulated Parker into committing the crime, and that he did so primarily to benefit her; whereas 
Lockett might have argued from the same evidence that Parker had acted on his own initiative and 
primarily for his own benefit. On these less appealing facts, Lockett's case before the Supreme 
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Court's concerns without touching Ohio's limited menu of mitigating factors, 
then mitigation was not the issue in Lockett. If the issue in the penalty phase 
of a capital trial is the defendant's culpability, then the concept of mitigation 
is an unnecessary and potentially misleading device for the analysis of 
culpability. 
Furthermore, the term "culpability" itself is ambiguous. In order to 
demonstrate this, let me confess to a sleight of hand. In my analysis of 
Lockett so far, I have supposed that the Court was concerned with Lockett's 
ability to argue that her role as an accomplice in a non-intentional felony 
murder did not warrant the death penalty. The absence of an intent to kill 
and Lockett's minor role in the offense were the Court's main concerns, but 
there was at least one more. The Court also cited Lockett's inability to argue 
that her age was a mitigating factor. 108 
Lockett's age was indeed a mitigating factor, and it does not fit the 
analysis that I have presented so far, because it does not have a converse 
form. The fact that Lockett was twenty-one at the time of the murder might 
indicate an understandable lack of judgment or the undue influence of older 
co-defendants. But this mitigator has no flip-side. Age works differently as 
a mitigating factor from intent to kill and relative level of participation. We 
Court nevertheless would have come out the same. Ohio's limited menu of mitigating 
circumstances still would not have allowed Lockett to argue that the death penalty was unwarranted 
because of her less-culpable state of mind or her minor role as an accomplice in the shop owner's 
murder. 
Now suppose (in addition to the foregoing, altered set of facts) that Ohio required proof of an 
actual intent to kill for a murder conviction. Alternatively, suppose that Ohio recognized felony 
murder but that it required proof that one intended death as an aggravating factor. Or suppose that 
Ohio recognized felony murder but that it required proof that one was the leader or instigator of the 
deadly criminal enterprise. Under these alternative scenarios, the Supreme Court would not have 
disturbed Lockett's death sentence. If this had been Ohio law, Lockett would have been able to 
argue that the death penalty was unwarranted because of her minor role as an accomplice to the 
shop owner's murder and because of her not having an intent to kill. If this is correct, then 
mitigation was not the issue in Lockett. My first hypothetical shows that if we leave Ohio's law 
untouched, then the case comes out the same, even on these different facts. It is only when we 
change the law that the case comes out differently. We can satisfy the Lockett court's concerns if 
we alter the make-up of Ohio's murder definition and list of aggravating factors. But then, if this is 
so, the problem with the Ohio statute was not that it failed to allow sufficient mitigation or the right 
kind of mitigation. 
108. In summarizing the constitutional defects of the Ohio law, Justice Burger's exact words
for the Court were: 
The absence of direct proof that the defendant intended to cause the death of 
the victim is relevant for mitigating purposeJ only if it is determined that it 
sheds some light on one of the three statutory mitigating factors. Similarly, 
consideration of a defendant's comparatively minor role in the offense, or age, 
would generally not be permitted, as such, to affect the sentencing decision. 
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978). 
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do not view age as an affirmative reason to punish or as a reason to punish 
an offender more severely than we would otherwise. Intentional-states are 
included in the definitions of criminal offenses, whereas age very rarely is. 109
Even though the lists of aggravating factors in state death penalty statutes 
have proliferated from Section 210.6's eight elements to over twenty,110 the
offender's being middle-aged or elderly has yet to appear on one of these 
lists, and is unlikely ever to do so. 
If age is a mitigating factor that has no converse in the form of offense 
elements or aggravating factors, then this mitigating factor cannot be factored 
out of the Lockett case. This is the reason that I concentrated my initial 
analysis of the case on the questions of Lockett's having no intent to kill and 
only a minor role as an accomplice in the murder. 
My confession to this sleight of hand does not weaken my argument; it 
strengthens and extends it. If age works differently as a mitigating factor, in 
comparison to Lockett's minor role in the murder or her lack of intent to kill, 
then this is not a difference which the Lockett court noticed. Nor is it a 
difference which the term "mitigation" captures. If some mitigating factors 
are the flip-side of an aggravating factor, and some mitigating factors do not 
have an aggravating converse, then "mitigation" is ambiguous. 
Furthermore, whereas proof of mitigation does tend to show that the 
defendant is not culpable, the ambiguity of mitigation does not come to light 
when the concept of mitigation is used to analyze culpability, for one simple 
reason: the concept of culpability also is ambiguous. One kind of culpability 
pertains to things such as one's role in the offense and one's state of mind; 
and another, fundamentally different, kind of culpability pertains to things 
such as one's age. 111 
109. One exception is the use of the age of the accused in the definition of statutory rape. The
rationale for this use, and the reason that it does not constitute a counter-instance to the argument 
presented above, is explained below. See infra note 223. 
110. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(l) (1995 & Supp. 1998) (listing twenty­
two aggravating factors). 
111. Incidentally, the distinction between age and the other mitigating factors at issue in
Lockett does not correspond to a distinction between aspects of the person and aspects of the crime. 
Lockett also argued that she had a demonstrated capacity for rehabilitation and reform, based on her 
successful history in a drug treatment program, and that she ought to have been permitted to present 
this fact in mitigation. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 597. This mitigating factor was a feature of Lockett as 
a person. However, in the analysis of her culpability, it operates like her having no intent to kill 
and her minor role as accomplice, because it has an obvious aggravating converse. We easily can 
imagine a crime premised on the converse of reform potential, incorrigibility, because we have such 
laws, in the form of habitual offender statutes. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U;S. 263, 268 (1968); 
Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 503 (1962). Incorrigibility also can be framed as an aggravating 
factor. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 37.07l(b) (Vernon Supp. 1975-1976) ("[W]hether 
1220 ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J. 
This double layer of ambiguity is the culprit in much of the Court's 
confusion over capital punishment. It forms the subject matter of Parts II 
and III of this Article. To resolve the ambiguity in the concepts of mitigation 
and culpability leads to a powerful conception of proportionality in 
punishment that has concrete implications for the constitutional regulation of 
the penalty phase of the capital trial. 
C. The Problem of Undue Deference.
If the Court's effort to guarantee proportionate death sentencing has been 
thwarted by the rudimentary concepts that it has used for this purpose, then 
some responsibility for this failure lies with the theorists of punishment. The 
theory of punishment is a diverse and contentious field. The Court can 
hardly be expected to pursue a consistent theoretical path if it is confronted 
with a maze. 
On the other hand, no one can hope to synthesize the theory of 
punishment for the Court's use. The most that any punishment theorist can 
do when the Court appears to need a theory of punishment is to offer one­
preferably with the implications for the constitutional problem at hand 
already worked out as fully as possible. 
However, the question remains whether the Court is willing to accept any 
assistance of this kind. In spite of the fact that it jumped squarely into a 
substantive criminal law question when it mandated individualized death 
sentencing, the Court seems unwilling frankly to embrace either 
proportionality in punishment as the prime Eighth Amendment value, or the 
theory of punishment as an essential tool in the constitutional analysis of the 
death penalty. The question is, why? One answer to this question is that the 
Justices believe-mistakenly-that the theory of punishment is not within the 
institutional competence of the Court. 
The concepts and concerns of the theory of punishment are irreducibly 
normative. To articulate a theory of punishment that authorizes unjust 
punishment is to fail to articulate a viable theory of punishment. For 
example, the principal occupation of consequentialist theorists of punishment 
at mid-point in the last century was to escape the objection that 
consequentialism authorized the unjust punishment of the innocent for the 
there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would 
constitute a continuing threat to society."). 
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sake of maximum welfare. 112 Similarly, to advance any definition of desert
or proportionate punishment is to invoke some conception of just 
punishment. 
The Supreme Court's reluctance to regulate criminal justice at this 
normative level is notorious, 113 and this reluctance is fully evident in its
interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. The Court's 
fundamental Eighth Amendment standard-under which it decides not only 
claims of improper death sentencing procedure, 114 but also claims concerning
prohibitions on capital punishment, 115 methods of execution, 116 conditions of
confinement, 117 and proportionality in non-death sentencing118-asks whether
the challenged practice conforms to "the evolving standards of decency that 
mark the progress of a maturing society. "119 On its face, the evolving
standards of decency test is an appeal to "broad and idealistic concepts of 
dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency. "120
112. See, e.g., John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, reprinted in THE PHILOSOPHY OF
PUNISHMENT, supra note 46, at 105 (1955); Anthony M. Quinton, On Punishment, reprinted in 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT, supra note 46, at 55 (1954). 
113. Louis D. Bilionis, Process, the Constitution, and Substantive Criminal Law, 96 MICH. L.
REV. 1269, 1269 (1998) ("Criminal law scholars have pined for a substantive constitutional 
criminal law ever since Henry Hart and Herbert Packer first embraced the notion in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s." (citing Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 L. & CONTEMP. 
PRODS. 401 (1958) and Herbert L. Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. CT. REY. 
107)). 
114. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 300, 319-20 (1987) (applying the evolving
standards of decency test to hold that racially disparate impact does not invalidate Georgia 
sentencing procedure); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 336 (1976) (finding mandatory death 
sentencing violates evolving standards of decency); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 190 (1976) 
(evolving standards of decency tests supports practice of jury sentencing in capital cases). 
115. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 821 (1988) (holding death penalty per
se prohibited for offenders under sixteen years of age, under the evolving standards of decency 
test). 
116. See, e.g., Campbell v. Wood, 511 U.S. 1119, 1119 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(rejecting the denial of certiori regarding a stay to challenge hanging as method of punishment); 
Gomez v. U.S. Dist. Ct. N. D. Cal., 503 U.S. 653, 658 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (rejecting 
the denial of stay for challenge to cyanide gas as means of execution). 
117. See, e.g., Fanner v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-35 (1994) (applying the "evolving
standards of decency" test in case requiring conscious disregard of risk of harm by prison officials 
to support Eighth Amendment claim for denial of humane conditions of confinement); Estelle v. 
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-03 (1976) (applying the evolving standards of decency test to hold that 
deliberate indifference to an inmate's medical needs is cruel and unusual punishment). 
118. See, e.g., Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274-75 (1980) (applying the evolving
standards of decency test to a habitual offender statute). 
119. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion).
120. Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968), quoted in Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 102 (1976). 
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In practice, however, the standard receives a minimalist construction, 
because the constitutional regulation of the criminal law is dominated by the 
"legal process" orientation of the Court. 121 The Court attempts, to the 
greatest extent possible, to defer to legislatures' institutional competence in 
the matter of criminal justice policy, 122 and to balance the constitutional value 
of federalism against constitutional values embodied · in the Eighth 
Amendment, the due process clauses, and the First Amendment. 123 Under
this approach, the two principal indicators of the evolving standards of 
decency are legislation and jury verdicts. 124 This approach guarantees a
proper degree of deference and automatically balances competing concerns 
within the federal system� 
This deferential construction of the evolving standards of decency. test has 
prompted the criticism that the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is a 
sham, because to hold states only to the standard of their existing practices is 
an empty constitutional requirement. 125 This assessment may be unduly
bleak. The evolving standards of decency test has a substantive component 
that has the potential, at least, to set significant limits on death sentencing. 
The Court has held that, in addition to legislation and jury verdicts, the 
Court must examine the challenged sentencing practice in light of substantive 
121. Bilionis, supra note 113, at 1300-02 (arguing that seemingly inconsistent or unprincipled
decisions on punishment can be explained by the Court's commitment to legal process principles). 
The term "legal process" refers to a theory of adjudication that combined the Legal Realist's 
rejection of formalism and recognition of the political dimension of law with the rationalist 
insistence of Cardozo and others that principled adjudication was nevertheless possible. William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to THE LEGAL PROCESS, 
in HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE 
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW, at liv-lxviii (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, 
eds. 1994) (1958). The legal process school stressed the relative institutional competence of 
legislatures· and courts; assigned legislatures primacy in the creation of law; and described the 
courts' distinctive role in the reasoned elaboration of law, subject to legislative primacy. Id. at xci­
xcvi. While it originated as a theory of legislation and statutory interpretation, the legal process 
approach was quickly and easily adapted to the constitutional context. Id. at cxv-cxviii. 
122. Bilionis, supra note 113, at 1318-32 (describing this deference in the Court's Eighth
Amendment regulation of death sentencing). 
123. Louis D. Bilionis, Legitimating Death, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1643, 1669-81 (1993)
(describing this balancing in the Court's recent Eighth Amendment cases). 
124. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 293 (1976) ("The two crucial indicators of
evolving standards of decency respecting the imposition of punishment in our society-jury 
determinations and legislative enactments-both point conclusively to the repudiation of automatic 
death sentences."). 
125. Goldberg & Dershowitz, supra note 18, at 1782; see also Susan Raeker-Iordan, A Pro­
Death, Seif-Fulfilling Constitutional Construct: The Supreme Court's Evolving Standard of Decency 
for the Death Penalty, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 455, 513 (1996) (arguing the Court's decisions 
"insidiously help to manipulate sentencing juries into death sentences and thus skew this indicator of 
the evolving standards of decency when the Court employs it to evaluate substantive challenges to 
the death penalty" (footnote omitted)). 
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criminal law principles, including culpability, proportionality, and the 
justifying purposes of punishment. However, support for this substantive 
criminal law approach rests with a shifting and uncertain majority. 126 The 
legal process instincts of the Court ensure unanimous support only for the 
much thinner inquiry into the relative number of states endorsing a given 
position. 127 
In this controversy over the meaning of the evolving standards of decency 
test, a substantial minority on the Court has taken the view that any 
invocation of concepts from the theory of punishment can reflect only the 
subjective opinions and personal preferences of individual Justices, and that 
such an inquiry is therefore inconsistent with the Court's proper role. Justice 
Scalia stated this position most explicitly in Stanford v. Kentucky . 128
126. The uncertainty is due primarily to changes in the Court's personnel and the subtle
shadings of Justice O'Connor's views. In banning the execution of those who are insane at the time 
of execution, Justices Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun, Stevens, and Powell provided a bare majority 
for the view that the evolving standards of decency test was to be interpreted by reference to 
indicators other than legislation and jury verdicts, and that the Justices' own views on substantive 
criminal law principles, especially as they may be found in common law, were a permissible 
consideration. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406-10 (1986); see also id. at 419-23 (Powell, 
J .• concurring). Justices Burger, Rehnquist, White and O'Connor formed a substantial minority 
behind the view that the only pennissible considerations in the application of the evolving standards 
of decency test are legislation and jury verdicts. Id. at 427 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); see also id. at 431-33 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
In banning the execution of offenders who were younger than 16 at the time of their 
crime, Justices Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun maintained the same position on the 
issue that they had taken in Ford. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 833-38 (1988). Justice 
O'Connor contributed her vote to the majority's holding, and expressed her belief that 
blameworthiness and proportionality were relevant to death sentencing, but rejected the plurality's 
view that such issues play a role in per se Eighth Amendment analysis. Id. at 853-54 (O'Connor, 
J.. concurring). 
In Stanford v. Kentucky, Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, White, and Kennedy took the view, 
as they had in Thompson, that the only permissible considerations in the application of the evolving 
standards of decency test are legislation and jury verdicts, and stated expressly that the Justices own 
views on blameworthiness, proportionality, and like issues were entitled to no weight. 492 U.S. 
361, 370-80 (1989). Justice O'Connor agreed with the plurality that sixteen and seventeen year-old 
children could be executed, but wrote that the Court has an obligation to make an independent 
evaluation of the proportionality of punishment in light of blameworthiness. Id. at 382. 
127. For example, in Penry v. Lynaugh, the Court considered the question whether the
execution of a mentally retarded offender ought to be prohibited as inconsistent with the evolving 
standards of decency under the Eighth Amendment. All members of the Court agreed on the 
relevance, if not the implications, of the fact that two states had prohibited such executions in 
legislation. Id. at 334 (1989). However, only Justice O'Connor and the four dissenters extended 
the inquiry into matters such as whether the "execution of a mentally retarded person ... with a 
reasoning capacity of approximately a 7-year-old would be cruel and unusual because it is 
disproportionate to his degree of personal culpability" (citing the brief for the Petitioner 49-50), and 
whether the "execution of mentally retarded people convicted of capital offenses serves [any] valid 
retributive purpose." Id. at 336-37. 
128. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
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It has never been thought that [the evolving standards of decency 
test] was a shorthand reference to the preferences of a majority of 
this Court. By reaching a decision supported neither by 
constitutional text nor by the demonstrable current standards of our 
citizens, the dissent displays a failure to appreciate that "those 
institutions which the Constitution is supposed to limit" include the 
Court itself. To say, as the dissent says, that "'it is for us 
ultimately to judge whether the Eighth Amendment permits 
imposition of the death penalty,'". . . and to mean that as the 
dissent means it, i.e., that it is for us to judge, not on the basis of 
what we perceive the Eighth Amendment originally prohibited, or 
on the basis of what we perceive the society through its democratic 
processes now overwhelmingly disapproves, but on the basis of 
what we think "proportionate" and "measurably contributory to 
acceptable goals and punishment" -to say and mean that, is to 
replace judges of the law with a committee of philosopher-kings. 129 
Stanford and the other cases in which the Court has considered the 
meaning of its evolving standards of decency test involved claims of a 
prohibition on capital punishment. The question is less acute in the 
regulation of the penalty phase, because the Court is not asked to determine 
the proportionality of any given punishment, but only to ensure that the 
jury's deliberations on the proportionality of a death sentence are properly 
provided for. However, neither the evolving standards of decency test nor 
the Justices' fear of entanglement in "subjective" questions is confined to the 
matter of per se Eighth Amendment prohibitions. 130 
129. Id. at 379. Justice O'Connor did not join this part of Justice Scalia's opinion in Stanford,
but apparently this was not because she did not share his views on the "subjectivity" of the Justices' 
views on proportionality. In Thompson v. Oklahoma, decided the year before Stanford, she had 
written: 
The special qualitative characteristics of juveniles that justify legislatures in 
treating them differently from adults for many other purposes are also relevant 
to Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis. These characteristics, 
however, vary widely among different individuals of the same age, and I would 
not substitute our inevitably subjective judgment about the best age at which to 
draw a line in the capital punishment context for the judgments of the Nation's 
legislatures. 
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 854 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Counting votes, 
the upshot of the Ford, Thompson, and Stanford opinions seems to be that the Court ought to make 
an independent determination under the evolving standards of decency test; that principles from the 
theory of punishment such as proportionality and culpability are relevant to this determination; but 
that these questions are dangerously "subjective" and therefore ought to be handled with constant 
deference to legislative judgment. 
130. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 411 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
("We should not allow our personal preferences ... guide our judicial decision in cases such as 
these."). Id. at 431 (Powell, J ., dissenting) ("It is too easy to propound our subjective standards of 
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The Justices' anxiety about their institutional competence to consider 
questions of proportionality, culpability, and so on, probably explains their 
reluctance to abandon Furman-Gregg in the constitutional regulation of the 
penalty phase. In the prohibition cases, the Court confines itself to state-by­
state tallies of legislation and jury verdicts in order to remain within its area 
of institutional competence. In the penalty phase cases, the Court has 
maintained Furman-Gregg's insistence on structure in the death sentencing 
jury's deliberations for the same reason. The demand for structure was 
originally intended to guarantee equality-a· paradigmatic judicial function. 
In its present guise as a due process ban on "arbitrary and capricious" 
sentencing, 131 Furman-Gregg's structure-in-sentencing requirement seems 
appropriately deferential to states and legislatures. 
The difficulty is that, as Woodson-Lockett recognizes, a constitutional 
guarantee of proportionality in death sentencing requires more than the 
avoidance of arbitrary and capricious action. The conflict between Furman­
Gregg and Woodson-Lockett is attributable to the Court's failure, in either 
line of cases, to find the appropriate kind or level of structure that would 
ensure proportionality in death sentencing. 
The Court's reluctance to permit Woodson-Lockett to predominate, and 
their further reluctance frankly and fully to employ the theory of punishment 
in the development of this line of constitutional regulation, is unfounded. 
The syllogism that leads to the Court's present impasse is suggested by 
Justice Scalia's disdain for the "preferences" of the Justices, and by an often­
quoted maxim from Justice White to the effect that "these Eighth 
Amendment judgments should not be, or appear to be, merely the subjective 
views of individual Justice. " 132 These pejorative usages of "preference" and 
"subjective" are meant to suggest that matters such as culpability or 
proportionality are not capable of rational resolution; that the only rational 
means to resolve such issues is by the orderly, democratic aggregation of 
arational preferences; and that these matters are therefore properly 
committed to the legislatures. 
wise policy under the rubric of more or less universally held standards of decency."); see also 
Herrera v. Collins 506 U.S. 390, 428 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (contending that, in a case 
involving a claim of actual innocence, "the dissenters apply nothing but their personal opinions to 
invalidate the rules of more than two-thirds of the States, and a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
for which this Court itself is responsible."); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 986 (1991) 
(Scalia, J.) (cautioning that, in a case of allegedly disproportionate non-death sentencing, "the 
proportionality principle becomes an invitation to imposition of subjective values"); McCleskey v. 
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 300 (1987) (eschewing "subjective judgment" in the Eighth Amendment 
regulation of the penalty phase). 
131. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 306-07.
132. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977). 
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This syllogism is fallacious, because the "merely subjective" premise 
rests on a philosophical mistake. The view that value judgments are merely 
arational expressions of feeling, a view that defines a position in ethics 
known as non-cognitivism, received a thorough philosophical debunking in 
the 1950's and 1960's. 133 The syllogism's other premise also is false. The 
idea that the only rational means to resolve issues of public concern is by the 
orderly aggregation of arational preferences in elections and legislation 
contradicts an older, wiser, tradition in American legal and political 
philosophy. Classical republicanism places greater faith in human beings' 
capacity for reasoned deliberation on questions of value in the public 
sphere. 134 In sharp contrast to Justice Scalia's conception of adjudication, the 
republican constitutional tradition permitted the Court to engage in full­
blooded judging-properly respectful of the legislative branch, but cognizant 
of its own distinctive role in public deliberations on questions of value. 135 
133. See Hilary Putnam, Objectivity and the Science-Ethics Distinction, in THE QUALITY OF 
LIFE 143, 144 (Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1997). See, e.g., R.M. HARE, THE 
LANGUAGE OF MORALS 111-50 (1966) (describing the interplay of evaluative and descriptive uses 
of words such as "good"); PAUL w. TAYLOR, NORMATIVE DISCOURSE 48-67 (1961) (arguing 
against the view that value judgments are merely expressions of non-cognitive attitudes). But see 
ALFRED JULES AYER, LANGU,'\GE, TRUTH AND LoGIC 102-120 (2d ed. 1967) (arguing for the view 
that value judgments are merely expressions of non-cognitive attitudes); J .L. MACKIE, ETHICS: 
INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG 50-63 (1977) (arguing that "good" has no objective meaning apart 
from "egocentric commendation"). 
134. The classical republicanism of the founding era was based on a universally shared 
assumption that reasoned deliberation on the public good was the very point of government. See 
generally Symposium, 77,e Republican Civic Tradition, 91 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); see also 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., What is Republicanism, and Is It Wonh Reviving?, 102 HARV. L. REV. 
1695, 1697· (1989); Frank I. Michelman, 77,e Supreme Coun 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self­
Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 55-73 (1986). In the contest between Federalists and Anti­
Federalists, the former faction prevailed, not because it supplanted the latter's classical 
republicanism, but because the Federalist Constitution brilliantly reconceptualized the republican 
tradition. GoRDON s. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 562-64 
(1969). 
135. It is perfectly clear that in the original constitutional design the Supreme Court was to 
have a full, distinctive, counter-majoritarian role in public deliberations. This, after all, was the 
avowed point of life tenure. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 527 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. 
Cook ed., 1961). 
Id. 
This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the Constitution 
and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill humors which the arts 
of designing men, or the influence of particular conjunctures, sometimes 
disseminate among the people themselves, and which, though they speedily 
give place to better information and more deliberate reflection, have a tendency 
in the meantime to occasion dangerous innovations in the government, and 
serious oppressions of the minor party in the community. 
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The rise of a radical136 legal process stance on the Court coincides,
historically, with the Rehnquist Court's deliberate effacement of the Warren 
Court legacy. It is instructive, then, to consider Chief Justice Warren's 
conception of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, as he stated it in Trop v. 
Dulles. 131 
In concluding as we do that the Eighth Amendment forbids 
Congress to punish by talcing away citizenship, we are mindful of 
the gravity of the issue inevitably raised whenever the 
constitutionality of an Act of the National Legislature is challenged 
. . . . This task requires the exercise of judgment, not the reliance 
upon personal preferences. Courts must not consider the wisdom 
of statutes but neither can they sanction as being merely unwise 
that which the Constitution forbids. 138
For Justice Scalia, the only conceivable alternative to deference to 
legislative judgment is the judicial enactment of personal preferences.139 But
this is a false dilemma-the product of an untenable philosophical non­
cognitivism that unaccountably lingers on in some intellectual circles. 140 In 
contrast, Chief Justice Warren viewed the judicial enactment of personal 
preferences in opposition, not to institutional deference, but to the exercise of 
sound practical judgment. In doing so, he drew on a far deeper tradition in 
political theory and ethics.141
136. The founders of the Legal Process school would not have endorsed Justice Scalia's
positions. Henry M. Hart urged the Court to take a "substantive due process" approach to the 
constitutional regulation of the criminal law. Hart, supra note 113, at 411. Herbert Wechsler's 
conception of "neutral" constitutional adjudication was much closer to Chief Justice Warren's than 
to Scalia's. Wechsler wrote: "The courts have both the title and the duty when a case is properly 
before them to review the actions of the other branches in the light of constitutional provisions, 
even though the action involves value choices, as invariably action does." Herbert Wechsler, 
Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19 (1959). 
137. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
138. Id. at 104 (Warren, C.J.). 
139. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (Scalia, J.) ("'[PJroportionality' analysis
itself can only be conducted on the basis of the standards set by our own society; the only 
alternative, once again, would be our personal preferences."). 
140. See Vivian Walsh, Philosophy and Economics, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 861, 868 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987) (describing economists' 
persistent attachment to non-cognitivism); Heidi Margaret Hurd, Note, Relativistic Jurisprudence: 
Skepticism Founded on Confusion, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1417, 1445-59 (1988) (describing four 
current jurisprudential strategies for dealing with the supposed arbitrariness of value judgments in 
law). 
141. The faculty of practical judgment is a central feature of Aristotelian ethics. See 
ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, bk. I, ch. 7, § 1098a & bk. VI, ch. 7, § 1141b (Martin 
Ostwald trans., 26th prtg. 1988); see also TERENCE IRWIN, ARISTOTLE'S FIRST PRINCIPLES 334-46 
(1988) (describing Aristotle's conception of rational agency in relation to the good and 
responsibility). The republican political tradition is descended from Aristotle, by way of Polybius 
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The constitutional regulation of the penalty phase of capital trials is not a 
deferential project. It involves judging. In Furman-Gregg, the Court 
attempted to justify its active regulation of death sentencing by remaining 
within the bounds of the paradigmatic judicial formalism of equality analysis. 
Subsequent cases, beginning with Woodson, and continuing with Lockett and 
Lockett's progeny, such as Penry and 'Zant, brought the underlying concern 
with proportionate punishment to the surface, and led the Court to judge 
penalty phase cases explicitly in terms drawn from the theory of punishment. 
The difficulty is that the Court has not done this very well. When the 
Court has employed the theory of punishment in the constitutional regulation 
of death sentencing, it has done so tentatively, and with a poorly conceived 
terminology. A fully coherent body of death sentencing law requires not 
only the termination of Furman-Gregg as a distinct line of authority, but also 
the adoption of a more sophisticated approach to the core Eighth Amendment 
value of proportionality. I propose to pursue this diagnosis and course of 
treatment in the remainder of this Article. 
III. FAULT AND ELIGIBILITY DISTINGUISHED
Sandra Lockett raised three points in mitigation, all of which bore on her 
culpability for the murder in which she was involved and all of which the 
Court believed ought to have been considered by the jury in some fashion, 
before it imposed a death sentence. These three mitigators fall into two 
groups. Her not having an intent to kill and her minor role as an accomplice 
are mitigators which can be translated into converse forms, as offense 
elements or aggravating factors. The matter of her age is a mitigator which 
does not have any such converse forms. This distinction between kinds of 
mitigators has profound implications, because it indicates an ambiguity in the 
concept of culpability-the concept which, more than any other, has guided 
the Court's thinking on the constitutional adequacy of the penalty phase. 
This Part will further distinguish these two strains of culpability, and will 
explicate them in ways that will prove helpful in resolving the muddles into 
which the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has fallen. 
The two strains of culpability that the Court has failed to distinguish are 
fault in wrongdoing and eligibility for punishment according to capability. In 
Lockett's case, for example, her lack of an intent to kill and her minor role 
as an accomplice were matters of fault; her age was an eligibility concern. 
and Machiavelli. See J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL 
THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRAomoN 66-80, 183-218, 506-26 (1975). 
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However, let me defer further discussion of these concepts in relation to the 
Lockett case or death sentencing, in favor of a more general approach. 
Fault in wrongdoing is an inference from the particular manner or 
circumstances of wrongdoing that provides an affirmative, justifying reason 
to punish the wrongdoer, above and beyond the reasons provided by the bare 
conduct or harm of the wrongdoing itself. In other words, to find fault is to 
say not only that it is just to punish the wrongdoer, but also that to fail to 
punish him would be unjust. Fault traditionally has been conceptualized as 
mens rea, and usually is framed in terms of intentional-states on the occasion 
of wrongdoing. A presumption exists that the accused is not at fault, and the 
state bears the burden of proving that he is at fault. 142 Fault, unlike
eligibility, is an element of the criminal offense. The absence of fault results 
in a failure of proof. 143
Eligibility for punishment is a question of the rationality of punishing the 
defendant in light of her capacity for criminal wrongdoing. In order to be 
eligible for punishment, the accused must have been capable of the alleged 
wrongdoing, in the sense that she had power or control over the actions in 
question. The accused is not capable in this sense, and is not eligible for 
punishment, if she is insane, if she is an infant, if she acted involuntarily, 144 
142. PAUL H. ROBINSON, 1 CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES§ 34(b) (1984).
143. Id. § 22 (describing the defenses of mistake, intoxication, and diminished capacity as 
failure of proof defenses, which involve the negation of a required fault element of the offense). 
144. The so-called "involuntary act" requirement for crime is typically categorized as "actus
reus" instead of "mens rea," and so might seem to be out of place here. However, the term 
"involuntary act" is itself a confusion, because the act requirement for crime and the voluntariness 
requirement for crime are two different things. DOUGLAS N. HUSAK, PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL 
LAW 91 (1987) ("Hence definitions of actus reus that include voluntariness become confusing at 
best and useless at worst."). CJ. George P. Fletcher, On the Moral I"elevance of Bodily 
Movements, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1443, 1444 (1994) (distinguishing the question of act versus 
omission from the question of human agency). The criminal act is a normative category, not a 
natural kind. Stephen J. Morse, Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1587, 1651 (1994). 
It is clarifying, then, to conceive of the criminal act as any behavior that violates a criminal 
prohibition, and to consolidate the question of voluntariness with other such questions in the 
category of eligibility and excuse. See, e.g., id. (arguing that the significance of unconsciousness 
for criminal responsibility should be assessed as a matter of excuse rather than· as a matter of the 
existence of a criminal act). For these reasons, I treat involuntariness as a matter of eligibility. 
For example, if a bystander on a beach fails to save a drowning child because he chooses not to 
do so, then he has not committed a criminal act, but his behavior is voluntary within the meaning of 
the criminal law: he exercised his will when he chose not to save the child. If a state-employed life­
guard who is presently on duty behaves exactly like the bystander on the beach, then she has 
committed a crime, because her duty converts her omission into a criminal act, and she also 
behaved voluntarily when she chose not to save the child. Suppose, however, that this lifeguard 
does not act to save the child, but she is incapable of choosing whether or not to do so because she 
has been drugged against her will and without her knowledge. In this case, her omission is still a 
criminal act, but she will be excused on the ground that her involuntariness makes her ineligible for 
punishment in a just system of punishment. 
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and so on. A presumption exists that the accused has ordinary human 
capabilities and is therefore eligible for punishment, and the accused bears 
the burden of proving otherwise. 145 The term "excuse" denotes ineligibility 
for punishment on grounds of incapability. 146 
I explicate fault and eligibility in more detail below, in Sections ill.A. 
and m.B., respectively, and summarize the differences between them in 
Section 111.C. I will use these concepts to frame a conception of 
proportionality in Part 111.D. Part IV applies this set of concepts to the 
leading death penalty cases and to the basic issues concerning mitigation and 
aggravation that I discussed in Part I, Section B, and also to five fundamental 
issues in the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. 
A. Fault as an Aspect of Wrongdoing
The word "culpability" often is used indiscriminately to refer to two 
different features of crime. One kind of culpability, unlike the other, is an 
aspect of criminal wrongdoing and is defined in relation to particular 
offenses. "Fault" is a more precise term for this kind of culpability because 
it accords with our ordinary usage. When we say that someone is at fault in 
some matter, we mean both that she has done something wrong and that she 
is to be blamed and possibly punished for it. And yet we find no difficulty in 
separating wrongdoing from fault when it is clear that blame and punishment 
for the wrongdoing are not warranted. If I run a stop sign and ram your car 
broadside at an intersection, then I will (if I am honest) get out of my car and 
say "My fault," meaning both that I raii the stop sign and that there is 
nothing in the manner or circumstances of my doing so that makes me 
undeserving of blame and possibly punishment. But if my view of the stop 
sign and the street from which you entered the intersection are totally 
obscured by overgrown bushes, then I will not concede fault, even if I will 
concede wrongdoing, i.e., that I did run the stop sign and ram your car. 
In most instances of its use, the word "culpability" means fault. Consider 
the "Kinds of Culpability" that are listed in Model Penal Code's section 
f02(2): purpose, knowledge, recklessness, criminal negligence. 147 The 
culpability to which this section refers is fault, because this culpability is 
145. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 799 (1952).
146. ROBINSON, supra note 142, § 25(b) ("Each of these excusing conditions will give the
actor a defense, so long as the condition has been caused by the actor's disability."). 
147. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (1985).
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defined in relation to the elements of a criminal offense. For example, the 
first three of these kinds of culpability are intentional-states. Obviously, 
none of these intentional-states standing alone describes a kind of culpability. 
To act with a purpose with respect to a· result or circumstance is to act with 
the objective of bringing it about. 148 If I pat my baby's back with the 
objective of raising a burp, then I act with a purpose, but I do not act 
culpably. In order to act culpably, I must act with a purpose to bring about a 
result or circumstance that constitutes a crime. A purpose to kill is a 
culpable mental state, whereas a purpose to burp a baby is not a culpable 
mental state. The difference is that wrongdoing is involved in the former 
case, but not the latter. This strain of culpability which is an aspect of 
wrongdoing is more precisely termed fault. 
To isolate fault within the concept of culpability and to recognize that 
fault is an aspect of wrongdoing produces a number of benefits, analytically 
speaking. Not the least of these benefits is the recognition that fault is not 
always indicated by an intentional state on the occasion of action. We infer 
fault from the particular manner and circumstances of the defendant's 
wrongdoing. A discrete intentional state is only one such aspect of 
wrongdoing, only one indicator of fault, and it is not always present. 
Consider strict liability and the usual definition of it as criminal liability 
which is imposed without proof of a culpable mental state. Some cases in 
which a defendant is convicted of a crime without proof that he acted with a 
particular intentional state are genuine cases of liability without fault. 149 
These cases are troubling because punishment that 1s. imposed without regard 
to desert seems, and is, unjustified. However, . we can easily identify many 
other cases in which the accused is convicted without proof of an intentional 
state on the occasion of wrongdoing, but in which the defendant clearly is at 
fault and clearly does deserve punishment. A drunken rapist might have no 
fixed intentional state regarding his victim's non-consent. He might not even 
recognize her non-consent, no matter how forcefully she expresses it. 150 
148. Id. § 2.02(2)(a).
149. See, e.g., United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 377 (1952) (convicting the president
and general manager of the corporation of misbranding drugs sold by the company). 
150. For example, suppose that a defendant claims that he genuinely believed that the victim
of his rape, his friend's wife, had consented to have sex with him. The defendant claims that he 
and his friend were extremely drunk, and his friend persuaded him that the friend's wife was 
"kinky," and that she would be "turned on" by being raped. In light of these representations, the 
defendant interpreted the victim wife's overt refusals and resistance to intercourse as consent. On 
an intentionalist construction of mistake and fault, this defendant. is entitled to an instruction to 
acquit because (if the jury believes his story) the defendant lacked a mental state of purpose, 
knowledge, or recklessness regarding the victim's non-consent to intercourse-an essential element 
of rape. But this defendant is nevertheless at fault, and his fault lies in the combination of his 
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However, to say that such a rapist is not at fault and does not deserve 
punishment is absurd. The fault of the drunken rapist is inferred from the 
particular manner: and circumstances in which the crime was committed. In 
cases such as this, we can see that fault is an aspect of the defendant's 
wrongdoing, 151 and that intentional-states are only one such aspect of this
wrongdoing. 
The question of non-intentional fault is especially pertinent to the analysis 
of the penalty phase of a capital trial because the fault in capital murder 
characteristically is non-intentional fault. 152 The extreme fault of capital 
particular circumstances, including: his severe voluntary intoxication; his poor choice of friends; his 
evident ability to make himself believe whatever he finds it convenient to believe; and a general 
moral obtuseness, as evidenced by his failure to perceive not only a woman's genuine resistance to 
forced sexual intercourse, but also the fact that even a simulated rape is an act degrading to human 
dignity. Were he denied a jury instruction to acquit based on his lack of any intentional state 
regarding non-consent, to affinn his conviction would nevertheless be consistent with reason and 
justice. See Regina v. Morgan, 1976 A.C. 182 (H.L. 1976) (appeal from the English Court of 
Appeals), 203-04 (Lord Cross), 214-15 (Lord Hailsham), 237-39 (Lord Fraser) (affirming rape 
convictions of several British military officers on these facts, citing the Criminal Appeal Act, 1968, 
c. 19, §2(1) (Eng.), and authorizing the affinnance of convictions in spite of error when not 
inconsistent with justice)). 
151. This view of fault makes a case such as Montana v; Egelhoff much less alanning then it 
might otherwise be. 518 U.S. 32 (1996). Egelhoff holds that due process permits a state to bar 
evidence of intoxication offered for the purpose of disproving the culpable mental states of purpose 
and knowledge that ordinarily are required for proof of murder. Because this rule separates murder 
from intentional-state culpability, some have worried that the case represents a tum toward the 
incapacitation of dangerous persons in disregard of fault or desert-with disastrous implications for 
the values of liberty, autonomy, and human dignity. Stephen J. Morse, Fear of Danger, Flight 
from Culpability, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y. & L. 250, 251-52 (1998). This might be so if the 
departure from proof of intentional-states necessarily entailed criminal liability without fault, a 
transfer of culpability between distinct offenses, or major criminal liability for the minor culpability 
of negligence. But non-intentional fault need not entail any of these things. Fault as a reflection of 
the quality of the offender's practical reasoning can be denoted either by an intentional state or by 
some other aspect of the manner and circumstances of the crime. As I explain elsewhere, this 
conception of fault is perfectly consistent with a liberal legal order and the rule of law. Huigens, 
Dete"ence, supra note 7, at 982-84 (regarding Egelhoff), 1031-34 (regarding the rule of law 
objection to this conception of non-intentional fault). 
152. The Supreme Court has recognized this point:
A narrow focus on the question of whether or not a given defendant "intended 
to kill," however, is a highly unsatisfactory means of definitively 
distinguishing the most culpable and dangerous of murderers. . . . [S]ome 
nonintentional murderers may be among the most dangerous and inhumane of 
all-the person who tortures another not caring whether the victim lives or
dies, or the robber who shoots someone in the course of the robbery, utterly 
indifferent to the fact that the desire to rob may have the unintended 
consequence of killing the victim as well as taking the victim's property. This
reckless indifference to the value of human life may be every bit as shocking to
the moral sense as an "intent to kill."
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murder might be .evident in premeditation, but it also is likely to be evident 
in the murderer's status as the leader of a homicidal conspiracy, in the 
murders being done for money, in the murders involving multiple victims, or 
in any of the other non-intentional features of the crime that appear in capital 
punishment statutes as aggravating factors, and that purport to justify the 
extreme punishment of death. Historically, the inability of intentionality 
concepts such as premeditation to capture the full range of reasons to punish 
by death resulted in an unlimited discretion in juries to impose death 
sentences.153 This led in tum to the Model Penal Code's abandonment of the
concept of premeditation, and its effort to define the fault that justifies death 
as a punishment in more objective terms. 154 Therefore, the central task for
any theory of punishment that is invoked to assist in the constitutional 
analysis of the penalty phase is to account for the non-intentional fault that is 
characteristic of capital murder. 
Neither deontological nor consequentialist theories of punishment can 
perform this task. Difficulties over non-intentional fault are endemic to 
deontological theories of punishment. Following Kant, the deontologist takes 
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157 (1987). Tison authorizes the imposition of the death penalty 
for non-intentional murder, but this holding is somewhat buried in the facts of the case. In Tison, 
two brothers were convicted of murder and sentenced to die because they helped their father break 
out of prison and, soon thereafter, he killed a family of three. The Court held that "major 
participation in the felony committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life, is 
sufficient" to constitute fault for capital murder. Id. at 158. Recklessness is ordinarily considered 
an intentional state. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1985). But Tison does not require proof of 
an intentional state regarding death for a capital murder conviction. The Tison brothers did not 
participate in the killing, and there was no evidence that theyvcreated a risk of death, except by 
helping their father to escape froi:n prison. Tison, 481 U.S. at 141. At one point, just before the 
murders, the brothers were aware that their father might kill the victims, but neither the killings nor 
the risk that the killings might occur was attributable to conduct of the brothers at this point in time. 
Id. at 144. As the Tison opinion makes clear, the brothers' fault lay in the fact that they helped 
their father to escape at an earlier point in time, when they ought to have known that he was likely 
to kill. This is non-intentional fault. q. Andrew H. Friedman, Note, Tison v. Arizona: The Death 
Penalty and the Non-Triggerman: The Scales of Justice Are Broken, 15 CORNELL L. REV. 123, 
145-50 (1989) (arguing that the Tison brothers lacked fault because their conduct was neither
purposeful nor reckless).
153. Benjamin Cardozo offered this classic assessment:
If intent is deliberate and premeditated whenever there is choice, then in truth
it is always deliberate and premeditated, since choice is involved in the
hypothesis of the intent. What we have is merely a privilege offered to the
jury to find the lesser degree when the suddenness of the intent, the vehemence
of the passion, seems to call irresistibly for the exercise of mercy. I have no
objection to giving them this dispensing power, but it should be given to them 
directly and not in a mystifying cloud of words. 
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, What Medicine Can Do For Law, in LAW AND LITERATURE AND OTHER 
ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES 70, 100 (1931). 
154. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.2, 210.6 (1985). 
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the will to be the seat of moral agency. 155 The matter of culpability is framed 
in terms of modes of voluntariness, intentional-states are construed as such 
modes, and an intentional state on the occasion of wrongdoing is therefore 
held to be a necessary condition of criminal liability. 156 However, we do not 
in fact limit criminal liability to cases in which an intentional state is present. 
We impose punishment in cases of negligence, unreasonable mistake, 
voluntary intoxication, switched victims, careless accomplices, felony 
murder, depraved heart murder, and so on. 
This pattern of liability places the deontologist in a dilemma. He can 
embrace his counterintuitive position that a defendant such as the 
unreasonably mistaken rapist is not guilty, 157 or he can embrace "arrant, 
bare-faced fiction[s] of the kind dear to the heart of the medieval pleader, " 158 
in order to transfer intentional-states around the criminal transaction. 159 The 
155. Brudner, supra note 8, at 29-30. 
156. Stephen J. Morse, The "Guilty Mind:" Mens Rea, in HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY AND 
LAW 207, 211 (D.K. Kagehiro & W.S. Laufer eds., 1992) (describing the "just deserts" position as 
holding that "there is no blameworlhiness unless there is an appropriate mental state such as intent 
or knowledge, that marks an actor's offending conduct as 'hers'"). See, e.g., Jerome Hall, 
Negligent Behavior Should Be Excluded from Penal Liability, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 632, 634-35 
(1963) (making such an argument). 
157. Glanville Williams adopted this strategy in connection with Regina v. Morgan, 1976 
A.C. 182 (H.L. 1976), the most notorious case of unreasonably mistaken rape. Glanville Williams, 
Letter to THE TIMES (LoNDON) (May 8, 1975), cited and qU1Jted in SANFORD H. KADISH &
STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 322-23 
(6th ed. 1995). 
158. William Prosser, Transferred Intent, 45 TEX. L. REV. 650, 650 (1967).
159. In cases of switched victims, or "transferred intent," if A shoots at B, intending to kill B,
but A succeeds in killing bystander C instead, an apparently widespread intuition holds that A is 
guilty of the murder of C. The deontologist's intentional-states construction of fault dictates that A
is guilty of only attempted murder in the death of B; and A is guilty of only manslaughter, probably 
of the negligent homicide variety, in the death of C. In order to avoid this implication and to 
accommodate the intuition that A is guilty of C's murder, the deontologist decrees that A's intention 
to murder B transfers to C. Douglas N. Husak, Transferred Intent, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS 
& PUB. POL'Y 65, 66-67 (1996). I use the term "switched victims" for this problem because the 
transference of intentions to fill gaps in the deontologist's theory is not limited to this particular 
gap. 
Similarly, the deontologist's construction of fault as intentional-states implies that a severely 
intoxicated offender is innocent because of his severe intoxication. The Model Penal Code partially 
avoids this implication by means of a prohibition on proof of voluntary intoxication to negate the 
intentional state of recklessness, and justifies the prohibition with the transparent fiction of a 
"general moral equivalence" between recklessness in getting drunk and recklessness while one is 
drunk. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 cmt. 1 (1985). 
Sometimes, the deontologist's identification of intentionality with fault leads him simply to 
decree the existence of facts to match intentional-states. For example, suppose that a man has sex 
with a nine year-old girl in the belief that she is eleven. The law defines sex with a person who is 
younger than 10 as a class A felony, and sex with a person who is at least ten and under 12 as a 
class B felony. Our defendant is guilty of neither crime on a strict intentional-states construction of 
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difficulty with the latter option, for the deontologist, is not only that the 
doctrines are fictions, but that fiction cannot ground theory. Cases decided 
under these doctrines cannot be defended as instances of just punishment. 
This means that they are to be explained only as public welfare measures. 
But if this is conceded, then the deontologist has ceded much of the 
theoretical field to the consequentialist. 160 
The consequentialist theory of punishment has a different sort of difficulty 
in explaining cases of non-intentional fault. The consequentialist, of course, 
has no theoretical commitment to intentional-states as necessary conditions to 
criminal liability. Indeed, the consequentialist theory is open to the objection 
that it authorizes scapegoating, because it seems to authorize punishment 
where no culpability of any description is present, provided that this 
punishment would optimize social welfare. In response to this objection, 
sophisticated consequentialists, such as H.L.A. Hart, adopt the strategy of 
rule consequentialism. 161 They contend, plausibly, that public . welfare is 
more likely to be optimized by a set of regular rules for the distribution of 
punishment. They add that these distribution rules are most likely to 
optimize welfare if they are premised on traditional or intuitive notions of 
desert. 162 
These desert-based distribution rules serve as side-constraints on 
punishment, and this is their first weakness. In spite of its widespread 
acceptance, this conception of fault suffers from a certain implausibility: in 
cases of culpable wrongdoing, we feel not only that to punish is justified, but 
also that to fail to punish would be an injustice. Fault provides a reason to 
punish and a justification for punishment. Its function is not limited to that 
of a side-constraint on punishment. 
A more serious problem than implausibility lurks here. The 
consequentialist interprets the rule that criminal liability is limited to cases in 
fault: the act but no corresponding intentional state can be proved for the class A felony; the 
intentional state but no corresponding act can be proved for the class B felony. Section 2.04(2) of 
the Model Penal Code decrees guilt for the class B felony in such cases, because he would have 
been guilty of the offense "had the facts been as he believed them to be." Id. § 2.04(2). 
160. Kant, the progenitor of the deontological theory of punishment, adamantly distinguished
matters of punishment from matters of utility or welfare. KANT, supra note 42, at 141 ("The 
principle of punishment is a categorical imperative, and woe to him who crawls through the 
windings of eudaemonism in order to discover something that releases the criminal from 
punishment.; ... "). The word "eudaemonism" is from the Greek word "eudaemonia," which is 
usually translated as "happiness." Eudaemonia belongs to the realm of phenomena and cannot 
ground morality. See Paul Guyer, Introduction, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO KANT 1, 10-
11 (Paul Guyer ed., 1992). 
161. See supra note 45.
162. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 N.W. L. REV. 453, 477-
78, 490 (1997) (advancing this argument). 
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which an intentional state is present on the occasion of wrongdoing as an 
optimizing rule for the distribution of punishment. If and when we impose 
criminal liability in the absence of such an intentional state, this is interpreted 
as an optimizing departure from the otherwise optimizing rule. The 
difficulty is that there is no theoretical limit to these optimizing departures 
from the rule. Depending on shifting circumstances-including changes. in 
the public's beliefs about punishment and culpability-optimizing departures 
from the rule that limits criminal liability to cases of intentional wrongdoing 
will simply swallow that rule. Like all rule-consequentialisms, this one 
collapses back into act-consequentialism, and the scapegoating objection is 
revived. If we punish a person who commits a criminal act without an 
intentional state, we may be doing this, not on any principled basis, but only 
because a majority finds it satisfying to do so. 
Contrary to the deontologist, we do not limit criminal liability to cases of 
intentional wrongdoing; but, contrary to the consequentialist, we punish non­
intentional wrongdoing on some principled basis that makes these cases cases 
of genuine fault. A virtue ethics theory of punishment resolves these 
difficulties over the explanation of non-intentional fault with a fundamentally 
different conception of wrongdoing and fault. Because it is able to do this, 
the virtue ethics theory can explain the non-intentional fault that is 
characteristic of capital murder. For this reason alone it presents the best 
means to analyze proportionality as an Eighth Amendment value in the 
regulation of death sentencing. 
Consider the nature of criminal wrongdoing. The deontologist maintains 
that wrongdoing consists of violations of principle; for example, we punish 
because of the disparagement of another person's moral worth as autonomous 
beings that is implicit in any crime. 163 The consequentialist maintains that 
criminal wrongdoing consists of the infliction of harm or, more broadly, 
negative utility. 164 A virtue ethics theory of punishment conceives of 
wrongdoing as a violation of ethical generalizations. The conduct rules of 
the criminal law are sound practical judgments on particular matters, 
generalized as rules and positively adopted in legislation. The significance of 
harm is caught up in this generalization. Criminal wrongdoing is the 
violation of these legal rules. 165 
Fault is determined when wrongdoing is adjudicated. If the conduct rule 
that defines a criminal offense is premised on an ethical generalization, then 
163. See, e.g., Jean Hampton, Correaing Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of
Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1686 (1992). 
164. JOEL FEINBERG, 1 THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO OTHERS 11,
37 (1984); GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 51 (1976). 
165. Huigens, Deterrence, supra note 7, at 1023-25.
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the conduct rule presents an implicit demand that the accused should engage 
in sound practical reasoning in the circumstances in which such a crime 
might be committed. However, if this demand for good practical judgment 
and the offender's failure to comply with it are to be invoked as a 
justification for punishment, then no individual case can be decided under the 
criminal law until the ethical generalization of the conduct rule is returned to 
the level of particularity from which the conduct rule originated, and at 
which good judgment or its absence is manifest. The jury's comparison 
between the defendant's practical reasoning in the relevant circumstances and 
the sound practical reasoning that is implicit in the applicable conduct rule is 
an inquiry into the particular manner and circumstances of the offender's 
wrongdoing, as they reflect the quality of his practical judgment. Fault is an 
inference, drawn in the course of this adjudicative process, that the practical 
judgment of the accused is inadequate or flawed. 
In order to draw this inference, the jury compares the conduct of the 
accused under the particular circumstances of the case with the conduct of a 
person of sound practical judgment, similarly situated. This latter conduct is 
inferred from the evidence and from the offense definition, because the 
offense definition is a generalization of sound practical judgments in the area 
of conduct covered by the offense. The jury's "specification" of the criminal 
prohibition reverses the legislature's generalization, and returns the norm to 
the level of particulars at which sound practical judgment or its absence is 
manifest. 
This adjudicative determination of fault brings the justification for the 
criminal prohibition to bear upon the individual case of punishment in a 
justifying way. The inference of fault justifies his punishment, not only 
because of its relationship to the prohibition at issue, but more generally 
because the justifying purpose of the criminal law is the inculcation of sound 
practical judgment166-a quality which is also. known as virtue. 167 This is
why fault is not merely a side constraint on punishment, but also an 
affirmative, justifying reason to punish. 
166. See infra notes 207-12. 
167. One should not be put off from this theory of punishment by the colloquial meaning of 
the word "virtue." The virtue ethics theory of punishment is not premised on, nor does it seek to 
revive, a rigid traditional morality. The word "virtue" refers to self-governance at the level of 
motivation by means of the conscious cultivation of one's values, attitudes, and propensities. The 
principal characteristic of a person of virtue is sound practical judgment: the capacity to do the right 
thing in any given context because one perceives, values, and pursues the good as it presents itself 
in particular circumstances. This quality of judgment is the focus of virtue ethics, and it stands in 
direct contrast to a doctrine of moral duties. Huigens, Virtue, supra note 7, at 1449-56. 
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This analysis accounts for non-intentional fault as genuine fault. In most 
cases, the offender's flawed or inadequate practical judgment is evident in an 
intentional state with which the wrongdoing was done. In other cases, the 
evaluation of the practical reasoning of the accused will tum on a broader set 
of facts pertaining to his wrongdoing-such as his indifference to whether his 
sex partner is 9 or 11 years old; or his torturing to death a victim whom he 
had intended to keep alive long enough to reveal information. 
As we will see below, the foregoing analysis of fault is required for a full 
understanding, not only of aggravating factors, but also of most mitigating 
factors. One cannot hope to structure a constitutionally adequate penalty 
phase without these theoretical resources. 
B. Eligibility and the Expressive Rationality of Punishment.
We usually use the word "culpability" to denote fault, but we also use it 
to describe a feature of punishment that is quite independent of wrongdoing. 
For example, when we say that an insane wrongdoer is not culpable, we do 
not mean that he has not committed an offense with the requisite fault­
because in most cases he has done so. 168 We mean instead that our 
categories of wrongdoing and fault as a whole, and the hard treatment that 
may follow their application, are in some fundamental sense inapplicable to 
his case. In order to avoid this ambiguity in the word "culpability," we 
ought to speak of eligibility for punishment according to the capabilities of 
the offender if this-instead of fault-is what we mean. 
For this purpose, the word "eligibility" is preferable not only to 
"culpability," but also to "blameworthiness" and to "responsibility." We 
might say .that an insane person is not blameworthy. The difficulty is that the 
word "blameworthy" is equally apt to describe a person who deserves 
punishment because of the manner and circumstances of his wrongdoing, and 
also to describe a person who is an appropriate candidate (worthy) for the 
application of the concepts (including blame, fault, and desert) that regulate 
punishment. Similarly, the word "responsible" usually means that the agent 
to whom it is applied is eligible for punishment, but the language of 
responsibility has been prominently and deliberately mis-used, by no less a 
168. For example, if I kill a man because I believe that I am Jack Ruby and he is Lee Harvey
Oswald, then I have purposely killed a human being. I have the mens rea, or requisite fault, for 
murder. Nevertheless, I will be excused because I am insane. In contrast, if I kill a man because I 
believe that I am God's avenging angel and that he is the fallen angel Beelzebub, then I did not have 
a purpose to kill a human being. I will have acted without the legally prescribed kind of fault, with 
the result that I have a failure of proof defense of diminished capacity, in addition to my insanity 
excuse. 
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figure than H.L.A. Hart, to describe the mens rea elements of offenses 
which properly speaking denote fault. 169 Furthermore, "responsibility" often
is used as a synonym for "liability." This usage compounds the potential for 
confusion if we were also to use "responsibility" to refer to only one aspect 
or component of legitimate criminal liability: eligibility, or, that which is 
present when we do not excuse. 
1. Eligibility for Punishment and Expressive Rationality
We excuse wrongdoing when the offender suffers from some incapacity 
or incapability, such as insanity, duress, or infancy. Incapability is a reason 
not to punish-to think that it would be unjust or unfair to do so. But this 
intuition of unfairness or injustice has to be further accounted for. The 
incapability that grounds excuse has been described variously as irrationality, 
involuntariness, the loss of control, or the absence of genuine action, free 
will, intention, or choice.170 However, these are descriptions of natural kinds
or psychological categories, not norms. It is not self-evident that we ought 
not to punish in such cases. We want to say that it makes no sense to punish 
the insane offender, for example, but the important question, for present 
purposes, is why it makes no sense.171 
The standard account goes something like this. It might well be rational 
to punish the insane offender. Other, sane people would be as strongly 
deterred by this instance of punishment as by any other instance of 
punishment, if not more so. The sanity or insanity of the person punished 
has no direct bearing on the criminal law's system of incentives. However, 
we do not punish those who are insane when they commit crimes because 
social welfare is optimized if we forego the short-term benefits of sending 
169. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, Postscript: Responsibility and Retribution, in PUNISHMENT
AND RESPONSIBILITY: EsSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 45, at 210, 218-19. 
170. Morse, supra note 144, at 1590-160S. 
171. Jeremy Bentham, the father of consequentialist legal theory, thought that it did not make
sense to punish the insane offender. He argued that punishment could not act as an incentive to a 
person who is unable to appreciate the threat of punishment or to conform his conduct to it. 
Therefore, punishment could not deter such a person and his punishment would not be justified on 
consequentialist (in Bentham's case, Utilitarian) grounds. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION 
TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 174 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1982). 
But, of course, this is a non-sequitur. HART, supra note 45, at 19. If we punish the insane 
offender, then other, sane, people will be as strongly deterred by this instance of punishment as by 
any other instance of punishment. In fact, one could argue that the deterrent effect of the 
punishment of the insane would be greater than it is in the ordinary case. If legal authorities punish 
the insane in spite of the widespread intuition that there is something wrong with such punishments, 
then the legal authorities send the message that no criminal wrongdoing, by anyone, under any 
circumstances, will be tolerated. 
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this forceful deterrent message, and instead adopt a rule that accommodates 
the public's belief that punishment of the insane offender is unjust. 172 
There are two problems with this explanation of the irrationality of 
punishing the insane offender. First, it is not plausible. To judge from the 
public's reaction to the last high-profile insanity verdict, there is no 
widespread popular consensus or intuition to the effect that it is unjust to 
punish the insane offender. 173 If this is so, then social welfare would be 
optimized by the abolition of the insanity excuse, not by its creation or 
retention. The second, more fundamental problem with this explanation of 
the logic of the insanity excuse is that the argument equates rationality with 
optimization. The public's beliefs about the punishment of insane offenders 
can change, and the balance of costs and benefits that takes these beliefs into 
account eventually will seem to dictate the abandonment of the rule that 
grants an excuse from punishment. What then? If we follow the rule that 
excuses insane offenders, then we behave irrationally or arationally, if 
practical rationality requires us consistently to optimize social welfare. If we 
do the rational thing, then we will discard the rule and optimize social 
welfare by punishing the insane offender. This standard account of the 
insanity excuse forces us to choose between abiding by the rule and behaving 
rationally. 
The conflict raised by this standard account of the insanity excuse should 
cause us to question the standard account, not the insanity excuse. The 
suggestion that we might require eligibility for punishment according to 
capability on irrational or arational grounds is attributable to the dominant 
consequentialism of mainstream legal theory. Consequentialism and its 
attendant conception of practical rationality174 impede our understanding of 
eligibility as a feature of a rational system of punishment. 
172. Robinson & Darley, supra note 162, at 477-78 (advancing this explanation).
173. See PETER w. LOW ET AL., THE TRIAL OP JOHN HINCKLEY, JR.: A CASE STUDY IN THE 
INSANITY DEFENSE 127 (1986) ("The Hinckley trial crystallized public discomfort with the insanity 
defense and its administration, and triggered legislative activity throughout the,: country."); Stephen 
J. Morse, Excusing the Crazy: The Insanity Defense Reconsidered, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 779
(198S) ("The shock generated by the verdict in the Hinckley case has revived recurrent criticism
and efforts to abolish or reform the insanity defense."). In response to the Hinckley verdict, the 
United States Congress adopted a narrow definition of the offense. 18 U.S.C. § 17(a) (1994)
(excusing only for cognitive impairment, and omitting any excuse for volitional or "capacity to
control" impairment). Two states abolished the insanity defense. See IDAHO CODE § 18-207
(Michie 1982); MONT. CODE ANN.§ 46-16-201(2) (1999).
174. This simplified description of a complex relationship between an ethical theory and a
theory of practical reasoning is accurate with respect to a simple consequentialism, such as 
economics, but perhaps less so with regard to more sophisticated consequentialist theories. See 
Justin Oakley, Varieties of Virtue Ethics, 9 RATIO 128, 128 (1996) (describing varieties of 
consequentialism that assume different conceptions of value and practical reasoning). However, my 
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When we analyze the law, we make certain fundamental assumptions 
about practical reasoning; that is, about the nature of value, the nature of a 
rational response to value, and the nature of motivation to action. In this 
regard, consequentialism in one form or another has dominated Anglo­
American legal thought for at least the last one hundred years. 
Consequentialism of any variety assumes that value is a single thing that can 
be optimized across all practical contexts; that reason requires us always to 
optimize value; and that action is motivated by non-cognitive desires. 175 One
sees the consequentialist conception of practical rationality everywhere, from 
Holmes' s invocation of "the bad man" 176 to the current prestige and influence
of law and economics. 177 It is audible in the foregoing standard analysis of
the insanity defense, in that argument's references to the criminal law's 
system of incentives and to the optimization of social welfare. 
However, alternative conceptions of practical rationality have always been 
available. For example, Kantian deontology, which is characterized in part 
by a cognitivist conception of value and motivation, 178 has never ceased to
play a major role in the theory of punishment. 179 Recently, another
alternative conception of practical rationality, commonly known as the theory 
concern is not with philosophical consequentialism, but with the naive consequentialism that is 
pervasive in Anglo-American legal and popular thought, and its instrumentalist, non-cognitivist 
conception of practical rationality. See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 379-80 (1989) 
(Scalia, J.) (describing judicial decisions about the proportionality of some death sentences as 
"subjective"). 
175. Huigens, Deterrence, supra note 7, at 994-97. 
176. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459
(1897) ("If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares 
only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict . . . . ") 
177. For example, Nobel laureate Gary Becker writes: 
The economic approach to human behavior is not new, even outside the market 
sector. Adam Smith often (but not always!) Used this approach to understand
political behavior. Jeremy Bentham was explicit about his belief that the
pleasure-pain calculus is applicable to all human behavior: "Nature has placed
mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It
is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine
what we shall do. . . . They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we
think." 
BECKER, supra note 164, at 8 (quoting JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES 
OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (1963) [1781]). 
178. See CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, CREATING THE KINGDOM OF ENDS 43-67 (1996);
Garrett Cullity & Berys Gaut, Introduction to ETHICS AND PRACTICAL REASON 19 (Garrett Cullity 
& Berys Gaut eds., 1997). 
179. Brudner, supra note 8, at 29; Duff, supra note 46, at 7. See, e.g., Hampton, supra note
163, at 1667 (invoking the support of Kant's theory of moral worth in a retributive theory of 
punishment). 
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of expressive rationality, has gained currency in legal scholarship. 180 In 
connection with the criminal law, the expressivist conception of practical 
rationality implies an Aristotelian or virtue-ethics theory of punishment that 
is distinct from both the deterrence theory of the consequentialist and the 
retributive theory of the deontologist. 181 If we frame the question of 
eligibility for punishment in terms of expressive rationality and the virtue 
ethics theory of punishment, then we see the sense in which eligibility is a 
matter of the rationality of punishment. 
In contrast to the consequentialist conception of value as something 
monistic or homogeneous, the expressivist conception of practical rationality 
portrays value as something plural, because value is strongly determined by 
the context in which it occurs. 182 Value has an affective component; we 
value or disvalue objects according to our emotional responses to them. But 
value also has a cognitive component, because neither emotion nor valuation 
is reducible to raw feelings. 183 Emotions have propositional content; 
appropriate and inappropriate occasions; and intelligible and unintelligible 
manifestations. 184 We rationally reflect on the propriety of our emotions, and 
180. See Gillian K. Hadfield, An Expressive Theory of Contract: From Feminist Dilemmas to a
Reconceptualization of Rational Choice in Contract Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1235, 1261-63 
(1998); Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 419-25 
(1999); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions.Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 597-601 
(1996) [hereinafter Kahan, Alternative Sanctions]; Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, 
Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 66-72 (1995); Richard H. Pildes & 
Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts,• and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election­
District Appearances after Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 506-16 (1993); Richard H. 
Pildes, Conceptions of Value in Legal Thought, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1520, 1522, passim (1992) 
[hereinafter Pildes, Value]; Richard H. Pildes, The Unintended Cultural Consequences of Public 
Policy: A Comment on the Symposium, 89 MICH. L. REV. 936, 938-39 (1991); Richard H. Pildes & 
Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and 
Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121, 2143-66 (1990); Cass R. Sunstein, On the 
Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 820-24 (1994) [hereinafter 
Sunstein, Incommensurability]. These legal scholars have been influenced principally by (and in 
one instance collaborated with) three philosophers: Elizabeth Anderson, Martha Nussbaum, and 
Joseph Raz. CJ. generally ELIZABETH s. ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1993); 
MARTHA NUSSBAUM, LOVE'S KNOWLEDGE (1990); JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 
(1986). 
181. Huigens, Deterrence, supra note 7, at 1015-36.
182. Sunstein, lncommensurability, supra note 180, at 784-85. 
183. RONALD DE SOUSA, THE RATIONALITY OF EMOTION 141-203 (1987); GERALD F. GAUS,
VALUE AND JUSTIFICATION: THE FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERAL THEORY 49-79 (1990); JUSTIN 
OAKLEY, MORALITY AND THE EMOTIONS 41-42 (1992). 
184. Pildes, Value, supra note 180, at 1546 ("Certain beliefs are necessary to make certain
emotions posible: fear, love, grief, regret (modem techniques of cognitive psychotherapy, of 
course, rest on this very view)."); Robert C. Roberts, What an Emotion Is: A Sketch, 67 PHIL REV. 
183, 183-84 (1988). 
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we take deliberate, effective steps to alter our emotional propensities. 185 
Because our valuations cannot be severed from these cognitive features of 
emotion, value is dependent on practical context. Because human life is rich 
in distinct practical contexts-boating safety, spiritual quests, investing in 
municipal bonds-the appropriate occasions and intelligible manifestations of 
emotion are manifold and various. Value is plural, not monistic, because 
valuation consists of these context-specific affective-cognitive responses. 186 
The expressivist portrays rational response to value in correspondingly 
plural terms. Depending on the practical context in which value arises, the 
rational response to value might be to honor or express it, in ways that are 
not reducible to optimization. 187 Indeed, the valuation which is premised on 
a particular emotion might have no existence apart from the conduct which is 
the distinctive manifestation of that emotion on its proper occasion. For 
example, if I go to visit a friend in the hospital, and explain that I have come 
to see him because this visit · optimizes social welfare, quite apart from our 
shared history and emotional ties, then he will rightly conclude that I have 
misunderstood either my own motivations or the nature of friendship. 188 In 
this light, to treat optimization as the unique rational response to value is a 
mistake. 189 Optimization may or may not be the response which the value in
question calls forth. 190 
Within an expressivist conception of practical reason, motivation to action 
is far more than an impulse of desire. One non-optimizing response to value 
185. GAUS, supra note 183, at 31-34. 
186. Id. at 25; see also ANDERSON, supra note 180, at 55-59.
187. Sunstein, Incommensurability, supra note 180, at 834-40 (describing optimizing and non­
optimizing valuations of the environment). 
188. Michael Stocker, The Schizophrenia of Modem Ethical Theories, reprinted in VIRTUE
ETHICS 66, 74-75 (Roger Crisp & Michael Slote eds., 1997); see also MICHAEL STOCKER, PLURAL 
AND CONFLICTING VALUES, 338-42 (1990); see generally Michael Stocker, Values and Purposes, 
78 J. PHIL. 747 (1981); Christine Swanton, Profiles of the Virtues, 16 PACIFIC PHIL. Q. 47 (1995); 
Christine Swanton, Satisjicing and Virtue, 90 J. PHIL. 33 (1993) [hereinafter Swanton, Satisjicing]. 
189. The consequentialist ordinarily will concede that his representation of practical reasoning 
is not a perfect representation, but he will contend that it is a sufficiently accurate representation. 
This elicits the question, sufficient for what? Surely it cannot be sufficient for normative 
governance in all practical contexts. The lintitations of the consequentialist's account of practical 
reasoning necessarily lintit his theory's normative range. ANDERSON, supra note 180, at 129-40 
(arguing that consequentialist's rational choice theory tracks reliable judgments of value only 
because it is parasitic on the expressive theory); Sunstein, Incomrnensurability, supra note 180, at 
820-24 (describing the distorting effects on nonnative questions of the assumption that value is 
homogeneous or monistic). But cf. Fred S. McChesney, Desperately Shunning Science? 71 B.U. 
L. REV. 281, 281 (1991) ("Economic methodology is thoroughly general and applicable to any
subject.").
190. See Swanton, Satisjicing, supra note 188, at 40. 
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is the integration of the value into one's identity. 191 This integration occurs 
at a basic affective level. 192 We engage in rational reflections on the 
propriety of our emotional responses, and as we attempt to form and 
maintain a coherent personal identity, reflections such as these form ongoing 
deliberations on value and on our ultimate ends in light of these values. 
When we take steps to alter our emotional propensities in accordance with 
these deliberations on value, we engage in the rational construction of our 
motivations. 193 For example, my annoyance at my children for interrupting 
me when I work at home might tip me off to the fact that I am allowing my 
role as a lawyer to overwhelm my role as a father, in contradiction to my 
deeply held beliefs about the relative value of these roles to me and to 
society. I might consciously prolong these interruptions in the future, giving 
my children my full attention, in order to allow my love for them to dispel 
my annoyance in the short term and to re-order the distribution of my time 
and energies away from work and toward my family in the long term. 
This view of motivation contradicts Hume's dictum that: "Reason is, and 
ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other 
office than to serve and obey them. " 194 Hume's non-cognitivist conception 
of value and motivation continues to dominate Anglo-American legal 
thought. 195 In this light, the expressivist conception of motivation might be 
191. For example, if I devote my life to relieving human suffering in a poor country, and a
government soldier tells me that either I will kill one villager or his platoon will massacre the entire 
village, it is not perfectly obvious-as the consequentialist would have it-that to kill the villager is 
the rational thing for me to do. It is also rational for me to seek integrity between my actions and 
my standing motivations. Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM, FOR 
AND AGAINST 98-99, 108-18 (1973). 
192. GAUS, supra note 183, at 300-06 (describing the acquisition of a disposition to act for
moral reasons at the level of emotional response). 
193. ROBERT AUDI, MORAL KNOWLEDGE AND ETHICAL CHARACTER 1S7-73 (1997) 
(describing control over and responsibility for character traits); MICHAEL SMITH, THE MORAL 
PROBLEM 16S07S (1994) (describing the deliberate acquisition of dispositions as part of a neo­
Humean theory of motivation); BERNARD WILLIAMS, Internal and External Reasons, in MORAL 
LUCK: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 1973-1980, at 101, 104 (1981) (describing deliberations over and 
adjustments to one's "motivational set" as part of a neo-Humean conception of motivation). 
194. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, bk. II, pt. III, § III, at 41S (L.A. 
Selby-Bigge & P.H. Nidditch eds., 2nd ed. 1978). 
195. For example, Richard Epstein writes: 
[E]ven though we might not be able to explain why certain individuals value 
certain goods, we can still say that ceteris paribus they prefer more of those 
goods to fewer, although after some point, additional utility from an additional
unit of good will start to decline. It therefore becomes relatively easy to 
explain the relationship between changes in behavior and changes in the 
various quantities of available goods, even if some ultimate mystery surrounds
the fact that certain goods have positive value in the first place.
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the most significant of the three features of the expressivist conception of 
practical rationality discussed here. It permits us to view human action as 
more than a product of non-cognitive appetites and passions; and to view 
practical rationality as more than the instrumental matching of means to 
satisfactions. 196 It enables us to premise law on a conception of the person as
the causal agent of her identity, capable of deliberating on the standing 
motivations that constitute her character.197
2. Eligibility as Expressive Rationality
If we frame the principal question in the theory of punishment in terms of 
the expressivist conception of practical rationality, then we see eligibility as a 
matter of the rationality of punishment in light of the capabilities of the 
wrongdoer-and do so in a way that genuinely preserves and explains our 
rule against the punishment of the insane offender. 
Justified punishment is a response to wrongdoing and fault, and we can 
distinguish three lines of explanation for justified punishment. For the 
consequentialist, the justification of punishment is to be found, of course, in 
its consequences. These include not only deterrence, but also incapacitation, 
and also some effects that have an "expressive" dimension.198 Punishment
functions as a concrete declaration of the criminal law, and in this light it 
serves both to publicize the law and to provide an effective but appropriately 
formal catharsis for the outrage that the public often feels over violations of 
the law. According to the consequentialist, all of these effects and functions 
of punishment serve to justify it, because and to the extent that each of them 
contributes to a net gain in social welfare. 
For the deontologist, only one function or effect of punishment serves to 
justify it. The infliction of just deserts, or retribution, serves to rectify the 
Richard A. Epstein, Are Values Incommensurable, or is Utility the Ruler of the World?, 1995 UTAH 
L. REV. 683, 688 (1995); see also id. at 689 ("[l]f one person likes vanilla and another likes
strawberry, there is little we can do to broker the irreducible difference between them."). See
supra notes 128-140 and accompanying text (regarding the non-cognitivism of Scalia, J.).
196. ANDERSON, supra note 180, at 132-40 (describing the effects on motivation of reflections 
on value, and contrasting this with consequentialist accounts of motivation). Self-governance at the 
level of motivation is a central feature of virtue ethics in the Aristotelian tradition. See M.F. 
Burnyeat, Aristotle on Leaming to be Good, in EsSAYS ON ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS 69, 74-80 (Amelie 
Oksenberg Rorty ed., 1980). 
197. See, e.g., Huigens, Deterrence, supra note 7, at 1028-31 (describing criminal fault in 
virtue ethics tenns). 
198. Kahan, Alternative Sanctions, supra note 180, at 597. But see Huigens, Dete"ence,
supra note 7, at 987-1016 (criticizing Kahan's invocation of expressive rationality in support of a 
consequentialist theory of punishment). 
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situation created by the offender, and to bring human relationships back into 
line with categorical principle. 199 The way in which just punishment does 
this, of course, has received a wide variety of treatments,200 but the 
paradigmatic deontological theory of punishment holds that to punish the 
offender is an imperative, categorical duty upon the other members of 
society.201 
Under the theory of punishment which draws on an expressivist 
conception of practical rationality, the punishment of the offender also is a 
requirement of principle, but of practical rather than categorical principle. 
Under a virtue ethics theory, punishment is a justified response to 
wrongdoing and faulr°2 because it is the response that a person of sound 
practical judgment would have. 
We know at least two things about how a person who is wise in practical 
matters responds to wrongdoing. First, she responds to it intelligently and 
not unemotionally in a way that will, among other things, forestall any 
repetition of the wrongdoing. Hard treatment as punishment for crime fits 
this description. Second, in light of the harshness and gravity of this 
response to wrongdoing, the practically wise person commits this project to a 
framework of legal rules, in order to prevent· its being carried out in an ad 
hoc and ad hominem fashion. 203 Retaliation and revenge are no more a part 
of the justification of punishment under a virtue ethics theory than they are 
under a deontological retributive theory of punishment. 204
We can surmise a third feature of the practically wise person's response 
to wrongdoing. Her grasp of the nature of her own virtue as self-governance 
at the level of motivation would prompt her to seek the adoption of legal 
rules that forestall the repetition of the wrongdoing in a particular way. In 
order to affect another person's behavior, it is not enough to write rules and 
insist that they be obeyed. Nor it is enough to provide incentives within a 
system of rules, in a way that takes advantage of the motivations that people 
happen to have. In order truly to affect behavior, one must shape motivation 
itself, and an effective legal system can hope to forestall wrongdoing only if 
it reduces or eliminates the motivation to engage in wrongdoing. 205 One of 
199. KANT, supra note 42, at 140-45.
200. Duff, supra note 44, at 51-53.
201. See supra note 42 (referencing Kant on the categorical duty to punish).
202. On the relationship between fault and wrongdoing see Huigens, Dete"ence, supra note 7,
at 1027-31. See also supra notes 165-167 and accompanying text; infra note 275 and accompanying 
text. 
203. Huigens, Deterrence, supra note 7, at 1030-34.
204. Id. at 1024.
205. Id. at 1024-27. This point is recognized even by consequentialists in the theory of
punishment. See e.g., Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a 
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the principal functions of the criminal law-the way in which it deters 
wrongdoing-is to bring about and to guide rational self-governance at the 
level of motivation. 206 
This function of the criminal law is the inculcation of virtue, as Aristotle 
conceived of it: the deliberate cultivation of character toward the propensity 
to do the right act in any given situation-not only because one knows the 
right thing to do, but because one values the right ends.207 The several 
effects of punishment-the deterrence of wrongdoing as a matter of 
instrumental reasoning on the occasion of action; the publication and 
concrete exhibition of legal norms in the public trial of cases; the visceral 
effect of public catharsis over wrongdoing-are not justifying effects of 
punishment because they promote a generic social welfare. These effects of 
punishment are integral parts of the criminal law's project of fostering 
rational self-governance at the level of motivation, or the inculcation of 
virtue.208
Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1, 24-32 (advancing a "preference-shaping" theory of 
culpability); Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83. VA. L. REV. 
349, 374-76 (1997) (describing the role of preference-shaping in deterrence); Kahan, Alternative 
Sanctions, supra note 180, at 603-04 (describing the role of preference-shaping in deterrence). 
206. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 cmt. 1 (1985) ("No less important, legal norms and
sanctions operate not only at the moment of climactic choice, but also in the fashioning of values 
and of character."). 
207. See Huigens, Virtue, supra note 7, at 1444-62; see also ARISTOTLE, supra note 141, at
bk. II, ch. 1, §§ 1103a-1103b, bk. II, ch. 4, §§ 1105a-1105b, bk. X, ch. 9, §§ 1179b-1180a 
(describing the acquisition of virtue as a fixed disposition toward the good); L.A. Kosman, Being 
Properly Affected: Virtues and Feelings in Aristotle's Ethics, in EsSAYS ON ARISTOLE'S ETHICS, 
supra note 196, at 103, 108-09 (describing virtue as action from proper motives, construed as 
emotional states); John McDowell, Deliberation and Moral Development in Aristotle's Ethics, in 
ARISTOTLE, KANT, AND THE STOICS: RETHINKING HAPPINESS AND DUTY 19, 24-26 (Stephen 
Engstrom & Jennifer Whiting eds., 1996). 
208. The notion that law inculcates virtue has an ominous ring of brainwashing or subliminal
conditioning to it, but such fears are prompted mostly by the prevailing habit of thinking of 
motivation in non-cognitive terms. The law can govern us at the level of motivation without being 
illiberal or oppressive, because motivation, like the emotions that constitute it, is a cognitive as well 
as an affective response to value, and because the virtues are, accordingly, cognizable, articulable, 
and defeasible reasons for action. Bumyeat, supra note 196, at 74. The content and binding force 
of these norms can be intelligently debated, and they can be intelligently adhered to, modified, or 
abandoned. Id. at 76, 80. The inculcation of virtue is not only a matter of living according to the 
virtues until they have become second-nature, as Aristotle prescribed. Id. at 77. It is also a matter 
of understanding the point of the virtues; of apprehending the connection between certain kinds of 
conduct and one's welfare within a community. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 141, at bk. II, ch. 1, 
§§ 1103a-1103b; bk. II, ch. 4, §§ 1105a-1105b, bk. X, ch. 9, §§ 1179b-1180a; see also Bumyeat,
supra note 196, at 69, 74. A person who acquires the virtues maintains an internal debate about the
requirements of virtue in particular practical contexts throughout the remainder of his life. See
ARISTOTLE, supra note 141, at bk. I, ch. 3, § 1094b, bk. II, ch. 2, § 1104a, bk. II, ch. 4, § 1105a,
bk. V, ch. 10, §1137b, bk. VI, ch. 7, §§ 114lb-bk. VI, ch. 9, § 1142b, bk. VI, ch. 12, § 1144b,
bk. VI, ch. 13, §§ 1144b-1145a, bk. IX, ch. 2, § 1165a. This is even more true if the capacity to
I 
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The criminal law's requirement of eligibility for punishment according to 
personal capabilities can be represented as a fourth feature of the practically 
wise person's response to wrongdoing.209 No virtuous man or woman would
punish the insane offender, for example, because to punish a person who has 
no capacity to comprehend or to respond to the criminal law would be to 
commit a pointless act of brutality. 210 If punishment is expressive and if the
expressive features of punishment serve to inculcate virtue, then punishment 
must be intelligible to the offender. The offender who lacks the capacity 
rationally to construct a character in light of deliberations on his standing 
motivations because he is insane is simply outside the reach of the criminal 
law's method of rational govemance.211 The offender for whom punishment 
is unintelligible is ineligible for punishment because she is incapable of 
taking part in the project with which the criminal law is concerned. 212
This is not to say that the punishment of the insane offender would not be 
effective in the inculcation of virtue in others. It might be so. Indeed, if we 
broaden our view of the eligibility requirement to include cases of duress, 
infancy, and involuntariness, then we can see that the punishment of these 
offenders might serve to inculcate virtue in them: given that they will not 
always be under duress, immature, or in an involuntary state, they could well 
take punishment's lesson into account in the cultivation of their ends and 
motivations in the future. But if the criminal law tracks the choices of the 
practically wise person, then the question whether the punishment of an 
insane or otherwise incapacitated offender would be effective in the 
inculcation of virtue as a consequence is beside the point. 
In the ongoing project of the criminal law, we are concerned not only 
with the virtue of offenders and potential offenders, but also with the virtue 
of the punishing majority. The project of the criminal law is not the 
optimization of virtue as such-as an ingredient in, or for the sake of generic 
social welfare. The criminal law's inculcation of rational self-governance at 
think critically is considered one of the vinues; and we have every reason to believe that critical 
thinking is considered a vinue and can be taught as such in a modem liberal democracy. In short, 
the accusation of "brainwashing" against a criminal law which inculcates vinue is wildly off the 
mark. 
209. Huigens, Deterrence, supra note 7, at 950-52.
210. Id. at 975. 
211. See Huigens, Virtue, supra note 7, at 1445-49.
212. The deontological morality of the retributive theory of punishment represents the
requirement that the criminal law produce its effects by intelligible means as a categorical 
imperative to respect the autonomy of the person. FRED D. MILLER, JR., NATURE, JUSTICE, AND 
RIGHTS IN ARISTOTLE'S PoLmcs 131-39 (1995). But we need not be persuaded that unaided 
reason imposes categorical imperatives in order to value respect for personal autonomy as a virtue­
as a practical principle that can be inferred from the experience of previous generations. Id. at 137-
38. 
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the level of motivation is part of a more comprehensive process of the 
deliberate, ongoing construction of social life in the conduct of practical 
affairs.213 When, in our collective legal capacity, we consider whether or not 
to punish an individual, we are concerned, not only with the offender's 
practical judgment and his set of standing motivations, but also with our own 
judgments, motivations, and characters, both individually and as a society. 
To punish an offender whose practical judgmeni simply was not engaged and 
is not implicated in his wrongful act would define us, the punishing majority, 
in a way that ultimately would prove self-defeating.214 We will not punish in 
some cases even if it might be effective to do so, if to punish in this way 
would make us a brutal society instead of an enlightened one. 
For example, take the paradigm case of the insane offender. The 
punishment of such a person would be unintelligible to her: she could not 
draw any appropriate lesson from punishment or apply it to the project of 
cultivating her standing motivations. This kind of punishment-regardless of 
the actual intelligibility or effectiveness of punishment in individual cases-is 
one which the practically wise person would disdain. Punishment that is 
unintelligible to the offender can produce its good consequences only by 
force. If motivation were to be affected at all by an unintelligible 
punishment, this effect could amount to nothing more than subliminal 
conditioning, instead of the inculcation of virtue-the difference being that 
the latter involves the deliberate incorporation of cognizable, articulable, and 
defeasible reasons for action into one's standing motivations.215 
To impose unintelligible punishments routinely and systematically as a 
standard feature of our criminal law would define us not only as a brutal and 
uncompassionate society, but also as a society oblivious to the value and 
devices of rational self governance. Not to adopt standing rules that will 
excuse the incapable offender would be an irrational act on our part, in our 
collective capacity as the punis:{ter-unless, of course, we wish to m�ke 
ourselves a brutal, uncompassionate, and manipulative people. 
This is the expressive rationality of the eligibility requirement. A 
defendant's eligibility for punishment is a matter of social self-definition in 
our collective rational response to the highly distinctive disvalue of criminal 
wrongdoing. We do not punish the insane offender, not only because of 
what such punishment would say about us, but because of what it would 
make us. 
213. Huigens, Virtue, supra note 7, at 14S8-62.
214. Id.
21S. See supra note 208. 
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One way to look at this conception of punishment is to note that it takes 
the Eighth Amendment "evolving standards of decency" test quite seriously. 
Decency is a virtue-a character trait, a quality of practical judgment that 
combines compassion for others and respect for oneself. As is the case with 
all virtues, the requirements of decency are context-dependent.216 We state 
this norm in terms of a character trait precisely because we cannot state it as 
a rule.217 Because of this context-dependency, the requirements of virtue 
evolve in response to changing circumstances. This means that it might be 
difficult to say, at a given point in history, in a particular practical context, 
what our evolving standard of decency requires. But we often do need an 
answer to this question and it often happens that this need arises in the 
morally hazardous matter of punishment-as it does when we must decide 
whether or not to punish an insane offender or to execute a particular 
murderer. 
If this kind. of limitation on punishment is included in our Constitution, 
then we must be able to commit questions such as this to the Supreme Court 
for an authoritative determination. When we do this, we hope, at a 
minimum, that the Court will understand what it is that we require from 
them-that they will not utterly misunderstand the question, deem all answers 
"subjective," and refuse to respond. 
216. Consider David Wiggins's description of context-dependency in Aristotelian virtue:
No theory, if it is to recapitulate or reconstruct practical reasoning even as well
as mathematical logic recapitulates or reconstructs the actual experience of
conducting or exploring deductive argument, can treat the concerns which an
agent brings to any situation as forming a .closed, complete, consistent system.
For it is of the essence of these concerns to make competing and inconsistent
claims. (This is a mark not of irrationality but of rationality in the face of the
plurality of ends and the plurality of human goods.) The weight of the claims
represented by these concerns is not necessarily fixed in advance. Nor need the
concerns be hierarchically ordered. Indeed, a man's reflection on a new
situation that confronts him may disrupt such order and fixity as had previously
existed, and bring a change in his evolving conception of the point (to hou
heneka), or the several or many points, of living or acting.
David Wiggins, Deliberation and Practical Reason, in ESSAYS ON ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS, supra note 
196, at 221, 233 (footnote omitted). 
217. Rosalind Hursthouse wisely cautions that, in evaluating ethical theories, we should avoid
treating it "as a condition of adequacy, that any adeq·Jate action-guiding theory must make the 
difficult business of knowing what ·to do if one is to act well easy, that it must provide clear 
guidance about what ought not to be done which any reasonably clever adolescent could follow if 
she chose." Rosalind Hursthouse, Virtue Theory and Abortion, reprinted in VIRTUE ETHICS, supra 
note 6, at 217, 223-24. 
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C. Fault and Eligibility Distinguished
Fault is difficult to distinguish from eligibility because fault is also a 
matter of expressive rationality and a limitation on just punishment. 218 Just
punishment cannot be inflicted where fault is absent, but not because there 
are no good consequences to be achieved by doing so (the existence of 
regulatory strict liability offenses tells us otherwise) nor because it is . optimal 
in terms of welfare effects not to do so.219 We treat fault as a necessary
condition on just punishment because it would not be expressively rational to 
punish a person whose actions do not evince poor or inadequate practical 
reasoning. If the inculcation of virtue, or rational governance at the level of 
motivation, is one of the principal functions of punishment, then it would be 
incoherent-even if it might be consequentially effective-to punish one 
whose actions do evince sound practical judgment, e.ven when these actions 
constitute criminal wrongdoing. 
However, fault is unlike eligibility in at least three respects. First, fault is 
not only a necessary condition for punishment, but is also an affirmative, 
justifying reason to punish. 22� That is, fault is not only a reason to think that
punishment in a given case is just, but also a reason to think that to fail to 
punish would be unjust. The offender's poor or inadequate practical 
judgment that a finding of fault reveals gives us cause to invoke the 
deterring, incapacitating, retributive, condemnatory, and rehabilitative 
functions of punishment. Eligibility, in contrast, is only "a necessary 
condition for punishment."221 We do not suppose that a person's being
possessed of ordinary capabilities is an affirmative, justifying reason to 
punish him. Such an assumption contradicts the presumption of innocence. 222 
Second, fault is a matter of character. The question is whether the 
offender's conduct demonstrates the absence of virtue; that is, a failure to 
govern himself by the acquisition of a set of standing motivations that gives a 
due regard to others. Eligibility, in contrast, is a matter of capabilities. The 
question is whether the offender exhibits an inability to govern himself by the 
218. Consequentialist theories of punishment recognize only this side-constraint function of
fault, which leads them to conflate fault with eligibility under the rubric of "culpability." See supra 
note 8. 
219. If the optimization of welfare were the reason that we recognize fault as a side-constraint
on punishment, then we would eventually face a choice between continued adherence to this rule 
and the abandonment of this rule when changed circumstances make adherence to the rule irrational 
in optimizing tenns. We should abandon the consequentialist's conception of practical reasoning 
before we abandon the practice of requiring fault for criminal liability. See supra note 173 and 
accompanying text (making the same argument regarding the insanity excuse). 
220. Huigens, Deterrence, supra note 7, at 951.
221. Id. at 952.
222. See generally In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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acquisition·of a set of standing motivations that gives a due regard to others. 
If an offender is in a condition that renders him unable to develop his 
character, unable to acquire and maintain a proper set of ends, then he is 
outside the criminal law's project with respect to virtue, and it would be 
expressively irrational to punish him. 223
Third, fault is an aspect of wrongdoing, and eligibility is not. The rules 
that govern eligibility for punishment according to capability are not 
correlated to the criminal law's conduct rules.224 Eligibility concerns are 
manifested, doctrinally, in the excuses, whereas the defenses which tum on 
the terms and scope of the criminal law's prohibitions are justifications, such 
as self-defense, and failure of proof claims, such as mistake and diminished 
capacity. 225
223. This distinction does not correspond to a distinction between features of the crime and 
features of the criminal. See supra note 111. As a corollary, it is possible that some features of the 
criminal that ordinarily are relevant to eligibility will sometimes be relevant to fault. For example, 
some statutory rape definitions use the age of the defendant as an element of the offense in order not 
to criminalize consensual sexual conduct between young peers. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE§ 
9A.44.070 (1983) (defining Statutory Rape in the First Degree as sex involving a defendant who is 
greater than 13 years old and a victim who is less than 11 years old). This age element can be read 
as a non-intentional fault element. A great disparity in age between the defendant and the victim is 
something in the manner and circumstances of the crime that evinces poor or inadequate practical 
judgment, and that serves to justify punishment in the individual case. See supra notes 165-67 and 
accompanying text; infra note 275 and accompanying text. This is a different use of the defendant's 
age from that which was at issue in Lockett. See supra notes 98-111 and accompanying text. 
224. The paradigmatic excuse of insanity exhibits the relative independence of eligibility
considerations from the criminal law's primary norms and questions of wrongdoing. If the question 
in a case of insanity is the defendant's ability to appreciate the difference between right and wrong, 
then this question must be framed in terms of moral right and wrong. If we attempt to frame the 
question more narrowly, in terms of the legal rights and wrongs that are defined by the criminal 
code, then we produce anomalous results. For example, suppose that I am schizophrenic and I 
believe that my death at the hands of the state will redeem the sins of all mankind. I kill a police 
officer and immediately surrender after doing so, in order to ensure that I will be convicted of 
murder and executed. If the insanity defense is framed in terms of an inability to distinguish legal 
right and wrong, then I will not be able to claim the defense, because I understood that I was 
violating the Jaw against murder. I also have demonstrated my capacity to conform my conduct to 
the requirements of the law, albeit perversely. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (198S). But I 
ought to be able to assert the defense, because I am mentally ill and utterly delusional. The reasons 
behind my right to be excused from punishment turn on considerations which are independent of the 
prohibitions contained in the criminal code. Of course, the jury cannot help but to assess the sanity 
of a defendant in light of the crime with which he is charged. Perhaps I would be less likely to 
succeed with an insanity defense if my crime were the machine-gunning of a kindergarten class. 
But this distortion in the jury's deliberations is a far cry from the kind of necessary, conceptual 
relationship that one finds between fault and wrongdoing. 
22S. Huigens, Deterrence, supra note 7, at 9S1. Incidentally, the name of the defense known 
as diminished capacity is, under the terminology used here, a misnomer. When used properly, the 
term refers to a failure of proof on an essential mental- or intentional-state element of an offense. 
United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 998 n.S2 (1972). This defense is not a junior insanity 
defense. It is not an excuse defense. Id. It is not in any way a matter of eligibility for punishment 
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The foregoing. virtue ethics analysis accounts for the principal doctrinal 
manifestation of the distinction between fault and eligibility. The 
government bears the burden of proof on matters of fault, but the defendant 
bears the burden of proof on matters of eligibility. Fault usually is explicitly 
represented in an offense definition by intentional-states. These mental 
elements-purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and the like-must be proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt, just as any other material element of the offense 
must be proved. The reason for this requirement is the fact that fault is an 
aspect· of wrongdoing that serves to justify punishment in the individual 
case. 226 If the offense is one in which fault is not indicated by an intentional
state-think of the drunken rapist-then the determination of fault is more 
subtle, but it is no less a matter of the prosecution's proof of the offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In contrast, the defendant bears the burden of persuasion on the excuses227 
because they are matters of eligibility, and because eligibility for punishment 
is fundamentally distinct from fault. The general application of the penal law 
to those who fall within its jurisdiction reflects a presumption that each 
according to (and herein lies the potential for confusion) capability or capacity. Diminished 
capacity is a failure of proof defense that is a function of an intentionalist construction of fault such 
as that set forth in the Model Penal Code. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (198S). 
226. Despite some recent confusion on this point on the part of the Supreme Court, the state
has always borne the burden of proving all the facts which constitute affirmative, justifying reasons 
for punishment. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000) (holding that, except for 
criminal history, any fact that increases the level of punishment beyond the statutory maximum 
must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 703-04 
(197S) (holding that to require defendant to prove heat of passion is unconstitutionally to assign 
defendant the burden of proof on the essential element of fault in homicide); see also Jones v. 
United States, S26 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999) ("[U}nder the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact, (other than 
prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, 
submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt."). See generally Mark D. Knoll & 
Richard G. Singer, Searching for the "Tail of the Dog": Finding "Elements" of Crimes in the Wake 
of McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 10S7 (1999); Note, Awaiting the Mikado: 
Limiting Legislative Discretion to Define Criminal Elements and Sentencing Factors, 112 HARV. L. 
REV. 1349 (1999). 
227. See Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 797 (19S2); State v. Blair, 732 A.2d 448, 4S1-S2
(N.H. 1999); State v. Harris, 662 A.2d 333, 346 (N.J. 1995); Commonwealth v. Kappler, 62S 
N.E.2d S13 (Mass. 1993); State v. loyner, 62S A.2d 791, 802-03 (Conn. 1993); State v. Curry, 
S43 N.E.2d 1228, 1231 (Ohio 1989); State v. Turrentine, 730 P.2d 238, 242 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1986); Brown v. State, 29S S.E.2d 727, 732-33 (Ga. 1982); Price v. State, 412 N.E.2d 783, 78S 
(Ind. 1980); State v. Bott, 246 N.W.2d 48, S1-52 (Minn. 1976); see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-
11-S01 (1997) (for offenses occurring on or after July 1, 1995, insanity is an affirmative defense
which the defendant has the burden of proving by "clear and convincing evidence"). But see
Edwards v. Leverette, 258 S.E.2d 436, 439-40 cw: Va. 1979) (prosecution bears burden of
persuasion on insanity). q. In re Manuel L., 865 P.2d 718, 728 (Cal. 1994) (defendant bears
burden of persuasion on claim of minority status).
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member of society is capable of bearing the burdens that the law imposes-to 
respect property, not to kill other people, and so on. To claim an excuse is 
to claim that one is extraordinary in this regard. It is to claim an exemption 
from the general application of the penal law because the presumption of 
capability does not hold. The burden of persuasion is properly assigned to 
the person who makes such a claim. The defendant who invokes an excuse 
invokes a special kind of legal rule that negates the force of vast stretches of 
law. It makes sense for the law to guard such a rule jealously, and only 
rarely to permit a person to impose a legal obligation on all others to free 
him from his own legal obligations. 228
D. Proportionality as Expressive Rationality
In the next Part, I argue that fault and eligibility are or ought to be the 
governing concepts in Eighth Amendment analysis. One obvious objection 
can be lodged against this proposal. How can eligibility be an issue in the 
penalty phase at all? If the defendant is ineligible for punishment, then he 
will be acquitted. The penalty phase concerns sentencing, and innocent 
defendants are never sentenced. 
Eligibility remains an issue in the penalty phase because the matter of 
eligibility actually consists of two lexically-ordered questions about the 
expressive rationality of punishment: eligibility for punishment in general 
and eligibility for a particular punishment, such as death. The first question 
is whether punishment of any kind is expressively rational in the case, in 
light of the defendant's capabilities. This is the question. of excuse, and I 
have elaborated upon it above, using the example of the insane offender. If 
the answer to the question of excuse is that the infliction of any punishment 
is irrational, then the defendant is acquitted. If the answer to the question of 
228. The principles that govern the assignment of burdens of persuasion in criminal cases. are
neither settled nor clear. See generally George S. Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal Rules: A 
Comparative Study of Burden-of-Persuasion Practices in Criminal Cases, 77 Y ALB L.J. 880 (1968) 
(discussing differing burdens of proof); Barbara Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: 
Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86 YALE L.J. 1299 (1977) (discus!\ing controversy 
surrounding the criminal reasonable doubt standard). Even the claim that the government must 
disprove non-fault is not uncontroversial. At one time, the defendant routinely bore the burden of 
persuasion on issues of non-fault such as mistake, because the law distinguished only crudely 
between matters of inculpation and matters of exculpation. See Fletcher supra, at 899. George 
Fletcher makes a persuasive case that the long-term historical trend is toward a recognition that all 
issues which bear on punishment's justification, including all issues of culpability, are for the 
government to prove. Id. at 930-35. Fletcher does not distinguish between fault and eligibility in 
this argument. This is unfortunate, because in the history he recounts it is clear that his thesis is 
borne out for matters of fault, but not for matters of eligibility. Id. at 917-19. 
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excuse is, instead, that punishment of some kind is expressively rational, 
then the second question arises. This is the question of proportionality: 
whether a particular punishment is expressively rational in the individual 
case, not only in light of the offender's capabilities, but also in light of the 
wrongdoing and fault at issue. 
Proportionality in punishment, like all questions of expressive rationality, 
is in part a question of self-definition. We have determined, for example, 
that death is disproportionate even for a crime as extreme as rape, because 
such a punishment does not meet our evolving standard of decency. 229 This 
is an expressive, not a consequentialist, criterion. The question is not 
whether something or other will be produced in an optimal amount, and 
certainly not whether more or fewer legislatures have revealed a preference 
for executing rapists. 230 The question is instead how law will give our 
rational responses to rape-fear, anger, sadness-the emotional resonance 
that will best serve society's purposes, not the least of which are the 
inculcation of rational self-governance at the level of motivation and the 
maintenance of our shared identity as an enlightened civilization. In this 
process of social self-definition-constitutional law in its deepest sense-we 
ask whether execution is the kind of punishment that a decent person would 
inflict, and we recognize that decency is a matter of context-sensitive 
practical reasoning in light of our ongoing deliberations on the meaning of 
the word, the practices which we are willing and unwilling to place under its 
rubric, and the implications of these practices for the construction of our 
identity and standing motivations. In other words, decency is a virtue. 231 
We presently do understand punishment by death for murder to be a 
decent act, a proportionate punishment in at least some cases. 232 However, 
229. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598-99 (1977). 
230. See supra notes 132-37 (a plurality of the Court holds the view that proportionality
review under the evolving standards of decency test cannot involve anything more than an 
assessment of existing legislation and jury verdicts). 
231. Martha Nussbaum effectively describes our deliberations on the decency of capital 
punishment when she writes that each virtue is a: 
[P]erspicuous mapping of the sphere of the grounding experiences. When we
understand more precisely what problems human beings encounter in their
lives with one another, what circumstan.ces they face in which choice of some
sort is required, we will have a way of assessing competing responses to those
problems, and we will begin to understand what it might be to act well in the 
face of them.
Martha Nussbaum, Non-Relative Virtues.: An Aristotelian Approach, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE 242, 
248 (Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993). 
232. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 168-88 (1976) (Joint Opinion of Justices Stewan,
Powell, and Stevens); Id. at 226 (Opinion of Justice White with whom Chief Justice Burger and 
Justice Rehnquist concurred). 
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we must consider more than the kind of wrongdoing which is at issue before 
we can say that death is a proportionate punishment in a particular case. We 
cannot conclude that an individual offender ought to die, even for the 
extreme crime of murder, unless and until we consider his fault; that is, the 
particular manner and circumstances in which he committed this 
wrongdoing. 233 
This brings out an important difference between the two lexically-ordered 
questions that comprise the matter of eligibility. Whereas the question of 
excuse can be answered without regard to the defendant's wrongdoing and 
fault, the question of proportionality obviously cannot be. An extremely 
harsh punishment might mark us as a brutal, callous, and blindly vengeful 
society-or it might not, depending upon the wrongdoing and fault for which 
this punishment is inflicted. 
The question of proportionality, then, is whether it is expressively rational 
to inflict a particular punishment on an offender, not only in light of his 
capabilities, but also in light of his wrongdoing and fault. So stated, this 
formulation of proportionality might seem to tell us little about whether a 
particular punishment is proportionate in a given case. But one reason to 
formulate proportionality in this way is to stress precisely the fact that we 
cannot tell in advance whether a particular punishment is proportionate in a 
given case. Even from the relatively abstract point of view of the legislature 
or the Supreme Court, where the question is proportionate punishments for 
classes of cases, no abstract formula exists for the determination of 
proportionality. 234 This is even more true in the adjudication of individual 
233. The reasons that we cannot do this relate to the justification of punishment in virtue ethics
terms and the nature and necessity of the fault detennination in light of this justification. See supra 
notes 165-67 and accompanying text; infra note 275 and accompanying text. 
234. This legislative task has at least two parts: the determination of ordinal proportionality, or
the relative ranking of offenses according to severity of punishment; and the determination of 
cardinal proportionality, which is the anchoring of the penalty scale as a whole at some absolute 
level of severity. No abstract formula exists for either of these questions. The more difficult of the 
two is cardinal proportionality, and both consequentialist and deontological theorists have proposed 
the adoption of a decremental strategy for its detennination. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PHILIP 
PE1TIT, NOT JUST DESERTS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 137-55 (1990) 
(advancing a consequentialist version of the decremental strategy); VON HIRSCH, supra note 43, at 
40-46 (advancing a deontological version of the decremental strategy). That is, from a starting 
point of some level of severity, we might incrementally decrease punishments for each kind of 
crime until we encounter a rise in the rate at which it is committed. In this way, we might 
determine an optimal level of severity. This answer to the question of cardinal proportionality is 
essentially political. It is also inherently controversial, because the meaning of optimality for this 
purpose is up for grabs. Even Pettit and Braithwaite's consequentialist account of it is considerably 
more robust than the economist's would be. The definition of proportionality given in the text is 
formulated with an eye to the adjudicative determination of a punishment in an individual case, but 
it would also be relevant to the legislative question at this level. That is, it states the core of a 
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cases, in which the issues of fault and eligibility according to capacity are 
intensely context-dependent. Only the sentencer can make these 
determinations. The most one can do from a theoretical standpoint is to state 
the relevant considerations and the point of the exercise. 
For present purposes, however, this is sufficient. If we understand the 
nature of fault and eligibility, then even a broad definition of proportionality 
tells us a great deal about the constitutional regulation of the penalty phase. 
IV. THE CLARIFYING EFFECTS OF THE FAULT-ELIGIBILITY DISTINCTION
With the distinction between fault and eligibility in hand, we can see what 
the Court has been trying to say in the Woodson-Lockett line of cases. I have 
used the Penry, Roberts, and Lockett cases to raise doubts about the utility of 
culpability, aggravation, and mitigation as governing concepts in the penalty 
phase of a capital trial. In Section A of this Part, I show that · the issues 
raised by these cases dissolve when we substitute fault and eligibility in this 
role. Furthermore, if we pursue the idea of fault and eligibility as governing 
concepts, then we can describe the structure of a constitutionally valid 
penalty phase. In Section B of this Part, I use the conception of 
proportionality advanced above to describe the respective roles of 
legislatures, courts, and juries in the determination of proportionate death 
sentences. Questions about the right to jury sentencing, the nature of 
mandatory death sentencing, the apportionment of burdens of persuasion, and 
the necessity of jury unanimity can be answered more clearly than the Court 
has done. . To do this frames a penalty phase that will ensure the proper 
determination of proportionality in death sentencing. 
A. Dispensing with Aggravation and Mitigation
The difficulties which I raised over the Penry, Roberts, and Lockett cases 
served to bring out the inadequacy of culpability, aggravation, and mitigation 
as governing concepts. The same difficulties serve just as well to 
demonstrate the value of substituting fault and eligibility in this role. 
Recall Justice Scalia's argument, in dissent, that Texas law as applied to 
Johnny Paul Penry did address mitigation sufficiently well to ensure the 
"reasoned moral response"235 from the sentencing jury upon which the Penry
majority insisted. Penry received an instruction to the effect that his mental 
virtue .ethics theory's approach to the decremental strategy for the determination of cardinal 
proportionality. 
235. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989). 
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retardation could be considered in connection with the question of whether or 
not he deliberated on his victim's death.236 Doesn't this mean, Justice Scalia 
asked, that the jury considered Penry's "personal culpability" before it 
imposed a death sentence on him?237 
The answer to this question, of course, is yes and no. The answer is yes 
because the jury considered the question of culpability in the sense of fault. 
Whether or not Penry deliberated on death was a question of the presence or 
absence of an intentional state regarding one of the material elements of the 
crime-the usual form of the adjudicative inquiry into fault. But the answer 
also is no, because Penry did not have an opportunity to argue the question 
of culpability in the sense of eligibility. Whether or not it was expressively 
rational to punish Penry by execution in light of his limited capabilities was 
not a question presented by the jury instructions which were given at the 
penalty phase of his trial. The Penry majority wisely declined Justice 
Scalia' s invitation to affirm a death sentence that was supported by a 
determination of fault, but that had been imposed without regard to 
proportionality, the second question of eligibility. 
Did the Louisiana statute which the Court struck down in Roberts create a 
mandatory death penalty? It seems that it did not. As I argued above, 
Louisiana's first degree murder statute, unlike North Carolina's law, 
incorporated well-recognized aggravating factors as offense elements.238 
Furthermore, most of these aggravators had a converse mitigating form, or a 
negative finding on these aggravators had a mitigating implication. It seems 
a mistake to call a statute that permits consideration of aggravating and 
mitigating factors an impermissible mandatory death penalty provision. 
Nevertheless, the Court's decision in Roberts to strike down this statute as 
a mandatory death penalty provision was correct. A closer reading of the 
Louisiana law shows that it permitted the jury to consider the question of 
culpability-but only in the sense of the defendant's fault or non-fault. None 
of the offense elements in Louisiana's first degree murder statute pertained to 
the other strain of culpability, the question of eligibility for punishment. 239 
Jury instructions that presented only the elements of Louisiana's first degree 
murder for the jury's decision would have permitted the jury to consider the 
236. Id. at 310. 
237. Id. at 358-59.
238. See supra notes 88-97 and accompanying text. 
239. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (West 1997) (providing the elements of first degree 
murder: that the murder occurred in the course of a kidnaping, rape or robbery; that the victim was 
a fireman or peace officer; that the offender had been previously convicted of an unrelated murder 
or was serving a life sentence; that there were multiple victims; that the killing was a contract 
killing). 
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quality of the offender's practical reasoning in light of the manner and 
circumstances of his wrongdoing, but would not have permitted the jury to 
consider the expressive rationality of the offender's execution. No death 
sentencing procedure that failed to provide for the consideration of 
proportionality could produce a just sentence, and the term "mandatory death 
penalty" seems a fair, if somewhat imprecise, name for this problem. 
In the analysis of the Lockett case, we confront an ironic dilemma. The 
case is noteworthy for its holding that the jury must be permitted to consider 
all mitigating evidence, but the case demonstrates either the irrelevance or 
the ambiguity of mitigation as a concept. Mitigation is irrelevant because it 
can be factored out of the case. The principal concern of the Supreme Court 
was that Lockett had been unable to argue the relevance of her not having an 
intent to kill and her being only a minor accomplice in the crime. But 
Lockett could have made these arguments if Ohio law had required proof of 
intent to kill or a leading role in the deadly enterprise as offense elements or 
aggravating factors. It is true that a third mitigator was at issue in the case­
Lockett' s age-and that this mitigator cannot be factored out of the case 
because it has no plausible converse form as an offense element or 
aggravating factor. However, this tells us only that the concept of mitigation 
is ambiguous; that it refers to two fundamentally different kinds of 
consideration. 
The Lockett court overlooked the ambiguity of mitigation for a simple 
reason: the Court focused on the adequate adjudication of Lockett's 
culpability, and culpability too is an ambiguous concept. Culpability's 
components are fault and eligibility. Intent to kill and an accomplice's 
relative role in an offense are questions of fault because they might present 
affirmative, justifying reasons to punish in light of the particular manner and 
circumstances of the offender's wrongdoing. Age is a question of eligibility 
for punishment because it concerns the expressive rationality of punishment 
in the case, in light of the offender's capabilities; that is, it causes us to ask 
whether this punishment makes sense for us, the punishing majority, in the 
ongoing process of defining ourselves as a society. The Lockett opinion 
would have been more clear had the Court recognized the distinction between 
fault and eligibility. Given Lockett 's central role in the most prominent 
conflict in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the value of this greater clarity 
would be difficult to overestimate. However, the Court's use of the concept 
of mitigation precluded any recognition of culpability's ambiguity, just as 
surely as the Court's focus on culpability reinforced its use of the ambiguous 
concept of mitigation. 
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The superiority of fault and eligibility to aggravation and mitigation as 
governing concepts matters enormously. Penry tells us that the objective of 
the penalty phase of a capital trial is a reasoned moral response to the 
offender and his offense240-but the concepts of aggravation and mitigation 
cannot tell us what this means. We run the risk of overlooking an essential 
consideration-as Justice Scalia did-if we do not frame our evaluation of the 
penalty phase in terms of fault and eligibility. 241 Florida created a mandatory 
death penalty, and the Court was right to strike it down in Roberts-but we 
cannot explain why this is so if we use the concepts of aggravation and 
mitigation. If we do not use fault and eligibility as our governing concepts, 
then the constitutional category of the mandatory death penalty has no clear 
content or parameters, and, by the same token, neither does the jury's proper 
role in death sentencing. Finally, Lockett lies at the heart of the central 
conflict in the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, and it seems fair to 
say that the conflict is attributable at least in part to the concept of mitigation 
itself. We can resolve this central conflict only if we make fault and 
eligibility the governing concepts in Eighth Amendment analysis. 
B. The Proper Structure for Proportionate Death Sentencing
The question in the constitutional regulation of the penalty phase is not 
whether any given death sentence is proportionate, nor is the Supreme Court 
the body which determines the question of proportionality that arises in the 
course of the penalty phase of individual cases. In these respects, the 
regulation of the penalty phase differs from the prohibition of some death 
sentences under the Eighth Amendment on the ground that they are 
disproportionate per se. Furthermore, the question in the regulation of the 
240. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989).
241. In subsequent cases arising under the Texas sentencing scheme which was at issue in
Penry, the Court has indeed seemed to miss the point of Justice O'Connor's opinion. See, e.g., 
Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 371 (1993) (holding that instruction on future dangerousness 
based on probability of violence constituting continuing threat to society allowed adequate 
consideration of defendant's youth); Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 476-77 (1993) (holding that 
petitioner's argument that Texas special issues sentencing scheme precluded consideration of his 
youth, unstable family background, and positive character traits constituted a new rule on which 
habeas corpus relief could not be granted under retroactivity doctrine). In Johnson, the jury 
considered something that could plausibly be called mitigation and culpability, but did not consider 
the issue of eligibility for the punishment of death in light of the offender's capabilities. Johnson, 
509 U.S. at 367-68. In Graham, the Court could not possibly have read the petitioner's arguments 
as constituting a new rule for purposes of habeas corpus retroactivity doctrine if it had recognized 
the issue as the petitioner's eligibility for the punishment of death in light of the offender's 
capabilities. Graham, 506 U.S. at 477. Far from being a new rule, proportionality in this sense 
has always been an essential feature of just punishment. 
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penalty phase is not, as has been claimed, a question of structure in death 
sentencing versus individualized consideration in death sentencing. To frame 
the question in this way simply perpetuates the Furman-Gregg versus 
Woodson-Lockett conflict. 
The question in the constitutional regulation of the penalty phase is the 
proper kind and degree of structure in death sentencing, in light of the core 
Eighth Amendment value of proportionality. This structural question 
involves a proper division of authority between legislatures and juries in the 
determination of proportionate death sentences, and a definition of the proper 
content of these respective roles. This Section performs these tasks by 
means of the analysis of five issues: the necessity of "weighing," the concept 
of mandatory death sentencing, the right to a jury at the penalty phase, the 
distribution of burdens of persuasion, and the necessity of jury unanimity on 
mitigating factors. 
1. The Necessity of "Weighing"
The Model Penal Code recommended the weighing of aggravating and 
mitigating factors, but this weighing has never been constitutionally 
required.242 In contrast, the "weighing" of fault and eligibility is
constitutionally required. It is difficult, at first, to see how this could be so. 
I have been at pains throughout this Article to argue that eligibility and fault 
are fundamentally different matters. We can envision the weighing of 
aggravating and mitigating factors, but to weigh fault and eligibility against 
one another in the penalty phase would be to weigh apples and oranges. 
The answer to this conundrum lies in the necessity of the concurrent 
consideration of fault and eligibility under the rubric of proportionality. A 
death sentence violates the Eighth Amendment if its proportionality has not 
been properly determined, and the proportionality of a sentence is a question 
of its expressive rationality. The expressive rationality of death as a penalty 
for an individual murderer can be finally determined only in light of the 
particular manner and circumstances in which the murder was committed. 
Therefore, the imposition of a constitutionally valid death sentence must be 
preceded by this consideration of fault in the context of the second question 
of eligibility: whether a particular sentence is proportionate as a matter of 
expressive rationality, in light of the offender's fault as well as his 
capabilities. 
242. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 875 n.13 (noting that the Georgia statute approved
in Gregg and the Texas statute approved in Jurek did not require weighing). 
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Our actual experience with death sentencing tends to confirm this 
theoretical account. Consider California's pattern jury instruction on the 
definition of "weighing" in death sentencing. 
The weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances does not 
mean a mere mechanical weighing of factors on each side of an 
imaginary scale, or the arbitrary assignment of weights to any of 
them. You are free to assign whatever moral or sympathetic value 
you deem appropriate to each and all of the various factors you are 
permitted to consider. In weighing the various circumstances you 
simply determine under the relevant evidence which penalty is 
justified and appropriate by considering the totality of the 
aggravating circumstances with the totality of the mitigating 
circumstances. 243
This instruction contemplates an appropriately broad-ranging inquiry into 
the proportionality of a death sentence, and explicitly rejects a monistic view 
of the values involved, in favor of a more pluralistic approach. To ask 
whether death is an appropriate punishment in light of the totality of 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances is to ask whether death is an 
expressively rational sentence in light of the offender's capabilities and fault . 
. Proportionality· in this sense is indeed a broad question. But consider the 
alternative. Were this instruction more strictly structured, it would be more 
precisely prescriptive and more in accord with the Furman-Gregg conception 
of death sentencing. But the experience of the last twenty-five years tells us 
that we do not really believe that more structure in this context produces 
more just sentences.244 The Woodson-Lockett line emerged for precisely this 
reason. The California instruction is part of a constitutionally adequate death 
sentencing regime because it asks whether death is an expressively rational 
sentence in light of the offender's capabilities and fault. California's version 
of the penalty phase treats the core Eighth Amendment value of 
proportionality in punishment in the right way, because this kind of 
"weighing" is required in death sentencing. 
243. Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 37S (1990) (quoting 1 CALJIC 8.88 (5th ed. 1988)). 
244. Commentators have noted that the Court's death penalty jurisprudence has essentially 
returned to the pre-Furman state of the law, under which jury discretion played a large and 
legitimate role in death sentencing. Steiker & Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts, supra note 35, at 
359 ("Indeed, most surprisingly, the overall effect of twenty-odd years of doctrinal head-banging 
has been to substantially reproduce the pre-Furman world of capital sentencing."). 
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2. The Nature and Significance of Mandatory Death Sentencing
The question of mandatory death sentencing is the question of who is to 
make the proportionality determination. No death sentence is literally 
mandatory, of course, because every death sentence is imposed in the course 
of or as a consequence of adjudication. The concept of mandatory death 
sentencing refers, broadly speaking, to the legislature's exercise of an 
impermissible degree of control over this adjudication. For example, in 
Woodson, the jury determined the offender's sentence when it decided 
whether or not he had committed a premeditated murder. The Court 
decided, however, that the North Carolina legislature ought to have ceded to 
North Carolina juries a greater role.in death sentencing than was provided by 
the standard definition of capital murder as a premeditated murder. Woodson 
is the simplest case of mandatory death sentencing. 
To consider a more subtle case of the same problem, using the concepts 
of fault and eligibility instead of aggravation and mitigation, allows us to 
define a mandatory death sentencing regime more precisely as one in which 
the ultimate question of the proportionality of a death sentence has been 
taken away from the sentencer. We also can see the way in which the 
rudimentary concepts used in the Woodson-Lockett line of cases have led the 
Court astray on the proper division of authority between the legislature and 
the sentencer in this regard. 
In Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 245 the defendant offered no evidence on 
mitigation in the penalty phase of his trial. 246 Nevertheless, the trial court 
instructed the jury that it should consider any mitigating circumstances which 
it might infer from any evidence offered by either party at the guilt phase of 
the trial. 247 The jury also was instructed that it must sentence the offender to 
"death if the jury unanimously finds at least one aggravating circumstance .. 
. and no mitigating circumstance. "248 The Supreme Court concluded that this 
procedure did not violate the command of Lockett and Penry that the jury 
must be able to give effect to any and all mitigating evidence.249 It also did 
not constitute mandatory death sentencing as defined by Woodson, Roberts, 
or Sumner v. Shuman.250 Whereas neither North Carolina, Louisiana, nor 
245. 494 U.S. 299 (1990).
246. Id. at 306 n.4.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 302.
249. Id. at 304-05.
250. 483 U.S. 66 (1987). In each of its early cases holding that a mandatory death penalty
violated the Eighth Amendment, the Court reserved the question of whether a murder by an inmate 
already serving a life sentence might justify a mandatory sentence of death. Id. at 77 (citing 
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 n.11 (1978); Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 635 n.2 
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Nevada had provided any opportunity for the jury to consider mitigating 
factors, both the Pennsylvania statute and the instructions at Blystone's trial 
directed the jury to consider mitigating factors, to find them if the evidence 
presented them, and to weigh them against aggravating factors.251 
The dissent contended that Blystone had received a mandatory death 
sentence. Regardless of the instructions on mitigation, the jury had not been 
granted an opportunity to consider whether or not the aggravating factor, 
standing alone, was sufficient to justify a death sentence. 252 Under 
Pennsylvania's procedure, the jury's role was limited to finding the existence 
of an aggravating factor. The legislature's determination that such an 
aggravating factor, if found, would justify a sentence of death, in the absence 
of a finding of mitigation, was dispositive. The fact that this determination 
was made by the legislature instead of the jury, made the procedure a 
mandatory death sentencing provision. 
In this way, Blystone came down to the question of whether an 
aggravating factor has an absolute weight that the jury ought to assess; or 
whether the weight of an aggravating factor need be assessed only in relation 
to a mitigating factor. For the Blystone dissenters, Justice Brennan 
complained that, "[t]he 'weight' of an aggravating circumstance is just as 
relevant to the propriety of the death penalty as the 'weight' Qf any 
mitigating circumstances. "253 The majority answered that the legislature has 
the power to structure the consideration of mitigating and aggravating 
evidence in any way it wishes. 254 In a companion case, the majority 
suggested that to require the sentencer to determine the absolute weight of an 
aggravator, even when no mitigator can be found to set against it, would be 
(1977); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 334 n.9 
(1976); Woodson v. Nonh Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,287 n.7 (1976)). In 1987, the Court resolved 
this question by overturning the death sentence of Raymond Shuman, who had been sentenced for 
such a murder in 1975, under Nevada's pre-Woothon mandatory capital punishment regime. 
Sumner, 483 U.S. at 85. Not only Woodson, but also the intervening Lockett line of cases, 
persuaded a majority that "the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment 
requires that the defendant be able to present any relevant mitigating evidence that could justify a 
lesser sentence." Id.
251. Furthermore-as Pennsylvania, if not the majority, argued-if the jury ought to have
considered reasons not to impose a death sentence, then the jury had done so, even though it had 
only aggravating factors before it. Each of the aggravating factors had a mitigating converse that 
the jury had considered and rejected. Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 319 n.8 (Brennan, 
J., dissenting). This argument, of course, exploits the ambiguity of culpability and the dual aspect 
of fault. The jury had considered fault, as Pennsylvania pointed out, but it had not considered the 
question of eligibility in the sense of proportionality. 
2S2. Id. at 310-11. 
2S3. Id. at 323-24. 
254. Id. at 309.
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to require unfettered sentencing discretion in the jury. 255 Blystone passed 
into the books as one more unenlightening round in the Furman-Gregg and 
Woodson-Lockett contest. Whereas the advocates of individualized 
adjudication of "personal culpability" had prevailed in Sumner,256 the 
advocates of structured jury decision-making had prevailed in Blystone. 251 
The heart of the difficulty in Blystone is that the categories of eligibility 
and fault cut across the categories of aggravation and mitigation in such a 
way that a jury's finding no mitigating factors does not necessarily mean that 
the question of proportionality-the offender's eligibility for the punishment 
of death in light of his fault as well as his capabilities-has been answered. 
In Blystone, it so happened that the question of proportionality turned on a 
matter of fault, with no controversy over capabilities, and that the kind of 
fault at issue was one which is ordinarily framed as an aggravating factor. 258
The result was that, as the dissenters perceived, the question of the 
expressive rationality of a sentence of death in the case was confip.ed to, but 
not fully addressed in, the matter of this aggravating factor. The jury's 
finding that the aggravating factor existed was a determination of fault, but to 
determine the question of proportionality required the jury to consider the 
further, distinct question of whether this fault was such that a death sentence 
was expressively rational in light of this fault, and in light of the offender's 
normal capabilities. Confmed to the language of aggravation and mitigation, 
the dissenters could only frame this question as whether the aggravating 
factor ought to be weighed against itself, or whether the aggravator had an 
absolute weight that ought to be determined by the jury. 259 Their argument 
failed, Iiot on the underlying logic of the question, but because of an 
overextended metaphor. 
In response to the dissent's awkward imagery, the Blystone majority was 
able to exploit the fact that heretofore, under the influence of Lockett and 
Penry, the Court happened to have analyzed questions of proportionality 
under the rubric of mitigation. In Blystone, the trial court's instructions on 
mitigation and the jury's conclusion that no mitigating factors were present 
made it appear that the question of death as a proportionate punishment had 
been decided by the jury, when in fact it had not been. 
The statute at issue in Blystone was an impermissible mandatory death 
sentencing provision because it failed to provide for the sentencer's 
255. See Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 377 (1990).
256. See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
257. Blystone, 494 U.S. at 309.
258. Blystone was found to have "'committed a killing while in the perpetration of a felony.'"
Id. at 302 (quoting 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(d)(6) (1988)). 
259. Id. at 318.
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detennination of the question of proportionality. The expressive rationality 
of a death sentence is a matter of community identity and social self­
definition. We will not punish even murder in this way if to do so would 
make us a brutal society instead of an enlightened one. Like all questions of 
expressive rationality, the question of a death sentence's proportionality is 
context-dependant. Whether or not we will kill a murderer is a question of 
our decency, and like all questions about virtue, this one cannot be reduced 
to rules.260 It requires the consideration of particulars in context. The 
proportionality of death as a punishment in an individual case is, therefore, 
an inherently adjudicative question, and it cannot be answered prospectively, 
in the abstract, by a legislature. 
Notice, however, that to say the question of proportionality must be 
answered by the sentencer is not to say that it must be answered by a jury. 
In Blystone, the jury was the sentencer under Pennsylvania law, and to 
commit the question of proportionality to the sentencer meant committing it 
to the jury. But this is not universally or necessarily true. To say that 
proportionality is not a question that can be answered in the abstract is to 
exclude only the legislature from the role of sentencer. It is not to exclude 
the trial judge, or even an appellate court,261 from the list of adjudicative 
decision-makers who might make the proportionality decision based on the 
particular facts of the individual case. Given that proportionality is a 
question in every sentencing, and given that jury sentencing is unique to 
death sentencing, this should not be surprising. If a jury is required at the 
penalty phase, then it must be for a different reason. 
3. The Right to a Jury at the Penalty Phase
The Furman-Gregg and Woodson-Lockett conflict adumbrates two views 
on the wisdom and necessity of jury adjudication in the penalty phase. If the 
objective in death sentencing is the consistent application of the death penalty 
over the full range of cases, and the avoidance of arbitrary and capricious 
decision-making, then judicial sentencing actually is preferable to jury 
adjudication. 262 On the other hand, a sympathetic, hindsight examination of 
the offender and his choices, within a reconstruction of the practical situation 
that he faced, seems to be exactly what is needed if the issue to be decided is 
260. See supra note 216.
261. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 647-49 (1990) (appellate weighing of aggravation
versus mitigation after invalidation of an aggravating factor is permissible); Clemons v. Mississippi, 
494 U.S. 738, 752-53 (1990). 
262. Clemons, 494 U.S. at 749; Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242,252. (1976).
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the proportionality of death as a punishment. 263 The Supreme Court has 
failed to recognize that an offender has a jury right at the penalty phase, 
principally because of the distorting influence of Furman-Gregg and its 
misplaced repertoire of equal protection and due process concepts. But other 
errors also have contributed to the Court's failure to recognize the right to a 
jury at the penalty phase. 
The central error of the Court's decisions on the right to a jury at the 
penalty phase is its conclusion that aggravating and mitigating factors are not 
elements of a distinct offense of capital murder, to which trial rights such as 
jury adjudication ought to attach. 264 This conclusion rests on nothing more 
than the fact that legislatures happen to have assigned aggravating and 
mitigating factors to the sentencing phase of the capital trial for decision. 
This unduly deferential approach to the question of a jury right at the penalty 
phase reflects, and is partly predicated upon,265 the Court's unduly 
deferential approach to the general question of the jury right under the Due 
Process Clauses and the Sixth Amendment. 266 The Court's errors there have 
been perpetuated in the Eighth Amendment context. 
263. "Jury sentencing has been considered desirable in capital cases in order 'to maintain a
link between contemporary community values and the penal system-a link without which the 
determination of punishment could hardly reflect "the evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society."'" Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 190 (1976) (quoting 
Witherspoon v. -Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 
(1958))). 
264. Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 384-85 (1986).
265. Clemons, 494 U.S. at 746 (citing Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638 (1989) and McMillan
v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 93 (1986)).
266. In the constitutional regulation of punishment under the Due Process Clauses and the 
Sixth Amendment, the Court is reputed to have taken the position that it is for the legislature to 
decide whether a particular fact is relevant to punishment, and to determine the particular relevance 
that this fact will have-whether as an element of an offense, an element of a defense, or a factor in 
sentencing. See, e.g., Bilionis, supra note 113, at 1305. However, this is not quite right. In the 
leading case of McMillan, the Court said that it would defer to the legislature to a great extent, but 
that ultimately legislatures do not have a free hand in the definition of crime. McMillan, 477 U.S. 
at 86. Only a moment's reflection is required to see why this is so: constitutional requirements of 
notice, jury, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt would be empty if the states could escape these 
obligations by redesignating offense elements as defenses or sentencing factors. What the Court 
declined to do in McMillan was to state the limitation on the states as a rule, or even to provide a 
statement of the principle beyond the suggestion that it would not permit a defense or sentencing 
factor "to be the tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense." Id. at 88. In McMillan, in 
other words, the Court placed its trust in the legislatures' fidelity to tradition and fundamental 
fairness under a standard that was the criminal law equivalent of Justice Stewart's definition of 
obscenity. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, I., concurring) ("I know it 
when I see it."). 
This approach has had a predictable result: the legislatures, particularly Congress, have run 
roughshod over the Court's trust. They have relieved their governments of any obligation to 
provide notice of essential allegations of crime, or to prove these allegations to a jury beyond a 
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In Cabana v. Bullock,261 the Court considered whether a jury must make 
the determination, required by Enmund v. Florida, 268 that an accomplice who 
is convicted of felony murder must have had an intention to· kill, or must in 
fact have killed or attempted to kill.269 In the course of denying this Eighth 
Amendment claim, Justice White wrote for the Court: 
If a person sentenced to death in fact killed, attempted to kill, or 
intended to kill, the eighth Amendment itself is not violated by his 
or her execution regardless of who makes the determination of the 
requisite culpability; by the same token, if a person sentenced to 
death lacks the requisite culpability, the Eighth Amendment 
violation can be adequately remedied by any court that has the 
power to find the facts and vacate the sentence. At what precise 
point in its criminal process a State chooses. to make the Enmund 
determination is of little concern from the standpoint of the 
Constitution. The State has considerable freedom to structure its 
capital sentencing system as it sees fit . . . . 270 
This passage demonstrates as clearly as any other the cost of the Court's 
inattention to the theory of punishment. The Court recognizes that the issue 
at hand is the defendant's culpability. But had the Court recognized further 
the nature and significance of culpability as fault it could not possibly have 
concluded that an offender has no right to a jury at the penalty phase­
certainly not on grounds as meager as the Court's preference for deference. 
Jury adjudication at the penalty phase is required because issues of fault 
and non-fault are presented for decision. Not only the elements of capital 
murder but also the aggravating factors that are invoked to justify a death 
sentence are fault elements: indications that the murder was committed under 
circumstances or in a manner that justifies the most extreme penalty. 271 
Furthermore, most "mitigating" factors present issues of fault: they are 
reasonable doubt, by the simple expediency of declaring the facts at issue to be sentencing factors. 
The Court has found it necessary to signal a halt to this erosion of fundamental law. See Apprendi 
v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000) (finding that any fact, except crimlnal history, that increases
punishment beyond the statutory maximum must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt);
Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 242-43 n.6 (1999) (Congress cannot have intended to make
"serious bodily injury" and "death" sentencing factors instead of elements of the offense of "car­
jacking," because to do so probably would have violated due process under the Fifth Amendment
and the jury trial and notice guarantees of the Sixth Amendment).
267. 474 U.S. 376 (1986). 
268. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
269 .. Cabana, 474 U.S. at 386.
270. Id. at 386-87.
271. In this regard, consider the fact that a single consideration can function simultaneously as
an element of capital murder and as an aggravating factor. See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 
231, 241-46 (1988). 
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indications that the murder was committed under circumstances or in a 
manner that will not justify the most extreme penalty. 2n These are the 
mitigators-such as Lockett's minor role as an accomplice and her not having 
an intention to kill273-which we can easily translate into converse, 
aggravating forms. No less than the elements of capital murder and the 
aggravating factors, these mitigating factors pertain to the manner and 
circumstances of the offender's wrongdoing, and they bear on the affirmative 
justifying reasons to punish in his case. 
These fault issues ought to be decided by a jury to the same extent and for 
the same reasons that the - other essential elements of a crime ought to be 
determined by a jury. No one would suggest that the mental state elements 
of a crime ever should be determined otherwise than by a jury. This is 
because fault is an aspect of criminal wrongdoing, and cannot be determined 
in isolation from the determination of wrongdoing. The same logic applies 
to non-intentional fault elements, including aggravators and· mitigators, 
regardless of whether they are to be decided at the trial or at the penalty 
phase. 
In this light, jury adjudication is required in the penalty phase of a capital 
trial not because the penalty phase is sufficiently similar to the trial on the 
merits, but because it is continuous with the trial on the merits along the 
parameter of fault. 274 The distinctive offense elements of capital murder, all 
aggravating factors, and most mitigating factors present a single issue: the 
offender's fault in the commission of murder. The issues of fault that are 
relevant to death sentencing are variously framed as offense elements, 
aggravators, or mitigators for exogenous reasons having to do with prior 
legal practice and intuitive phrasing. In tum, these several issues of fault are 
assigned to the trial or to the penalty phase for exogenous reasons having to 
do with evidence rules, lesser included - offense analysis, and maintaining the 
gravity of the sentencing proceeding.275 If a jury is required to resolve the 
272. For example, consider the Model Penal Code's list of mitigating factors. See supra note
58. Factors a through e are questions of fault, and only f and g present questions of eligibility in
the form of excuse analogues; specifically, insanity and duress.
273. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 590-91 (1987).
274. The virtue ethics theory of punishment makes the right to a jury at the penalty phase
especially clear, because it portrays legal rules and jury adjudication as complementary, rather than 
antithetical, to one another. See supra notes 165-67 and accompanying text; see also Huigens, 
Deterrence, supra note 7, at 1022-24, 1028-31. 
275. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 cmt. 8 (1985) (prejudicial effect at trial of, e.g., 
criminal history evidence requires bifurcation); see also Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 336 
(1985) (finding bifurcation impresses the gravity of death sentencing on the jury). The lesser 
included offense concern arises from the fact that to incorporate aggravating factors into a highly 
specific definition of murder increases both the possibility of an acquittal on that charge and the 
1270 ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J. 
issues of fault that are assigned to the trial on the merits, then a jury is 
required to decide the issues of fault that only happen to be framed as 
aggravators and mitigators, and that only happen to be assigned to the 
penalty phase. A death sentence cannot be justified if the fault that serves to 
justify such a punishment has not been properly determined, regardless of the 
several forms that the inquiry into fault might take. The proper determination 
of fault in all its .guises requires a jury determination at the penalty phase, no 
less than at the trial on the merits. 
The nature of fault requires a jury at the penalty phase, if the penalty 
phase is used to determine an extra degree of fault in the offender's crime in 
order to justify his execution. However, this is not to say that a penalty 
phase is constitutionally required, or to say that the other issues to be 
determined at the penalty phase require a jury determination. Questions of 
eligibility, including the question of proportionality, are not elements of the 
offense; nor are they analogous to elements of the offense. They do not 
serve to justify punishment, but serve instead to limit it. For Eighth 
Amendment purposes, our evolving standards of decency have long held that 
punishment cannot be inflicted unless wrongdoing and fault have been 
determined by a jury. But we cannot say that the evolving standards of 
decency of our society require a jury determination of the proportionality of 
a death sentence. Proportionality is a question in all sentencing, and jury 
sentencing has always been the exception rather than the rule. One might 
argue that our practice in death sentencing in particular is the only proper 
measure of the evolving standard of decency on this question. But even 
here, a substantial number of jurisdictions place the ultimate question of life 
or death in the hands of a judge and not in the hands of a jury. 276 Therefore, 
one cannot say that our evolving standards of decency require a jury decision 
on the question of proportionality. 
Preliminary factual determinations of capability appear not to require jury 
adjudication, for similar reasons. For example, if the offender claims that 
his mental retardation renders a death sentence disproportionate, then the fact 
of his mental retardation must be determined. This predicate fact is vastly 
danger that the poor drafting of such a statute will preclude conviction on any lesser included 
offense, resulting in total acquittal. 
276. A number of states commit the question entirely to the trial court. See ARIZ. REV. ST AT.
ANN. §§ 13-703(B), (C) (WEST 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-11-103(l)(a), ( b) (West 
2000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(c) (1995); IDAHO CODB §§ 19-2515(e), (f) (Michie 1997); 
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-18-301, 302 (1999); NBB. REV. STAT. § 29-2521 (1995). 
Some states use advisory juries. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-45(d) (1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
921.141(2) (West 2000); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(k) (Michie 1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-
4624(b), (c) (1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-2000(a)(2), (3) (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
2929.03(0)(2) (Anderson 2000). 
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different from the matter of fault, because it is not a mixed question of law 
and fact, nor does its proof serve to justify punishment. Strictly speaking, 
therefore, the mitigators that do ·not present issues of fault-the capability 
mitigators that resemble duress and insanity, 277 for example-do not require a
jury determination. 
· However, on this question, one can make the case that our practice over
the last quarter century has established a right to a jury determination. Our 
evolving standards of decency have always provided for the jury's 
determination of claims of excuse. Whether because of the capability 
mitigators' similarity to the excuses, or because of a simple failure to 
distinguish between the two, the vast majority of jurisdictions have provided 
for the jury adjudication of capability mitigators, at least since the post­
Furman redrafting of their capital sentericing statutes. 278 Regardless of 
whether this practice might have originated in confusion about the nature and 
function of the capability mitigators, this guarantee of a jury determination 
on predicate facts of capability is now part of our standard of decency in 
death sentencing. 
277. Virtually all modern death penalty statutes, following section 210.6 of the Model Penal 
Code, list duress and insanity as mitigating factors. These are not excuses, of course, because the 
defendant who successfully proves them will not be acquitted. These capability mitigators pertain 
to the second of the two lexically-ordered questions of eligibility: proportionality. See, e.g., CAL. 
PENAL CODE§§ 190.3(g) (duress), 190.3(h) (insanity) (West 1999); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §  
16-11-103(4)(b) (insanity), 16-11-103(4)(c) (duress) (West 1999); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §
400.27(9)(b) (insanity), 400.27(9)(c) (duress) (McKinney Supp.2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-
2000(f)(5) (duress), 15A-2000(f)(6) (insanity) (1999). 
278. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(A) (1994); ALA. CODE§§ 13A-5-45(a), (c) (1994); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 5-4-602(4) (Michie 1999); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-46a(b)-(c) (West Supp. 2000); 
FLA. ST-6.T. ANN. § 921.141(1) (West 2000); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-l(g) (West Supp. 
2000); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(d)(2) (Michie 1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-4624(b)-(c) 
(1995); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(2) (Banks-Baldwin 1995); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. 
art. 905.1-2 (West 1997); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 413(b), (c)(i) (Supp. 1999); MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 99-19-101(1) (2000); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 565.030(3)-(4) (West 1999); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 630:5(11)-(111) (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(c)(l)(2)(a) (West 2000); N.M. STAT. 
ANN. §  31-20A-l(B), 2(A)(2) (Michie Supp. 2000); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 400.27(2), (6) 
(McKinney Supp. 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(b) (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
2929.03(0)(1) (West Supp. 2000); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 701.lO(A), (C) (West Supp. 
2000); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150(l)(c)(A) (1999); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 97ll(a)(l), (2) 
(West Supp. 2000); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-20(B)-(C) (Law. Co-op. 1999); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS §§ 23A-27A-l (Michie 1998); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-204(a), (c) (Supp. 1999); TEX. 
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 § 2(f)(4) (Vernon 2000); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-3-207(1)­
(3) (Supp. 1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(8) (Michie 2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
10.95.050(2), .060(3) (West 1997); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-2-102(b)-(c) (Michie Supp. 1999).
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4. The Burden of Persuasion on Mitigators
Regardless of whether a judge or jury makes the determination, the matter 
of fault and the predicate facts of capability must be proved. We are 
therefore required to assign the burden of persuasion on these issues. 279 The 
assignment of mitigating factors to the offender for proof by a preponderance 
is a nearly universal feature of death penalty statutes. If our Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence drew adequately on the principles of substantive 
criminal law, then this feature would also render these statutes 
unconstitutional. 
a. The Burden of Persuasion on Non-Fault Mitigators
As a general matter, the burden of persuasion on the matter of fault 
always remains with the government, because fault serves to justify, in part, 
the punishment which the government seeks to inflict. 280 This burden of 
persuasion extends to the disproof of non-fault. For example, when a 
defendant presents evidence that he had a mistaken belief that is inconsistent 
with his having the requisite intent for a crime, the government nevertheless 
279. The question of proportionality-that is whether the offender will receive a life or a death
sentence-ordinarily is not thought to be subject to a burden of persuasion. The ultimate question 
in sentencing never is, although it might be. See Deborah Young, Fact-Finding at Federal 
Sentencing: Why the Guidelines Should Meet the Rules, 19 CORNELL L. REV. 299, 305-32 (1994) 
(describing the absence of procedural protections, including clearly assigned burdens of proof, in 
sentencing). To the extent a burden of persuasion does attach to this ultimate question, it is a 
burden on the prosecution. This point turns on the fact, explored in the next Section, that to assign 
the _risk of non-unanimity to a party is effectively to assign that party the burden of persuasion. 
Most states assign the risk of non-unanimity on the ultimate question at the penalty phase to the 
prosecution. That is, if the jury is non-unanimous, a life sentence is imposed. See ARK. CODE 
ANN. §§ 5-4-603(a), (c) (Michie (1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-31.l(c) (Harrison 1998); 720 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-l(g) (West Supp. 2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4624(e) (1995); LA. 
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.6 (West 1997); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(k)(2) (Supp. 
1999); MISS. CODE ANN.§ 99-19-101(3) (2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 630:5(1X) (1996); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 2C:ll-3c(3)(c) (West 2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31�20A-3 (Michie Supp. 2000); 
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW§ 400.27(10) (McKinney Supp. 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(b) 
(1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 2929.03(0)(2) (West 1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.11 
(West Supp. 2000); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150(2)(a) (1999); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 
97ll(c)(l)(iv) (West Supp. 2000); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C) (Law. Co-op. 1999); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(h) (Supp. 1999); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 § 2(f) 
(Vernon Supp. 2000); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(4)(c) (Supp. 1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-
264.4(8) (Michie 2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.060(4) (West 1997); WYO. STAT. ANN. 
§ 6-2-102(e) (West 1997); see also COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 16-ll-103(2)(d) (West 1999)
(providing that if three-judge sentencing panel is non-unanimous, a life sentence is imposed).
280. See supra notes 226, 266.
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must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he did have the requisite 
intent.281
If the government seeks to justify a death sentence on the ground that a 
murderer's fault is extraordinarily great, then the distribution of the burden 
of persuasion on this issue ought to parallel the general distribution of the 
burden of persuasion on fault. Not surprisingly, we find that the government 
does bear the burden of proving the special offense elements of capital 
murder and aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. 282 However,
capital punishment statutes either assign to the offender the burden of 
proving all mitigators by a preponderance, or, uncJer the influence of 
Woodson-Lockett, simply leave the burden of persuasion on mitigators 
unspecified. 283 This is a conceptual error that ought to be recognized as a
281. See ROBINSON, supra note 142, § 62(1) at 244-45.
282. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) (1994); ALA. CODE§ 13A-5-45(e) (1994); ARK . .CODE ANN. §
5-4-603(a) (Michie 1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § S3a-46a(c) (West Supp. 2000); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(e) (Supp. 1998); IDAHO CODE§ 19-2S1S(h) (Michie Supp. 2000); 720 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-l(t) (West Supp. 2000); IND. CODE ANN. §  35-50-2-9(a), (k)(l) (Michie 
1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4624(e) (1999); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(3) (Banlcs­
Baldwin 1995); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.3 (West 1997); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 
413(d) (Supp. 1999); MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.032(1) (WEST 1999); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523(1) 
(Supp. 1998); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(111) (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(c)(2)(a) 
(West 2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-3 (Michie Supp. 2000); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 
400.27(3) (McKinney Supp. 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1SA-2000(c) (1999); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 2929.04(B) (West Supp. 2000); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.11 (West Supp. 2000); 
OR. REV. STAT. § 163.lSO(l)(d) (1999); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(c)(l)(iii) (West Supp. 
2000); s.c. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(A) (Law. Coop. 1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-5 
(Michie 1998); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(i) (Supp. 1999); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. 
art. 37.071 § 2(c) (Vernon 2000); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-S-205.5(4) (1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 
19.2-264.4(C) (Michie 2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.020 (West 1997); WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 6-2-102(d)(i)(A) (Michie 1998). Arizona requires the prosecution to prove aggravating 
factors, but does not specify the weight of the burden. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(C) (West 
Supp. 1999). 
283. Most states leave the burden of persuasion on mitigators unspecified. See IDAHO CODE §
19-2515(t) (Michie Supp. 2000); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-l(t) (West Supp. 2000); IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-S0-2-9(k)(2) (Michie 1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 2l-4624(e) (1995); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 532.025(3) (Banks-Baldwin 1995); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.3 (West
1997); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(3) (2000); MO. ANN. STAT. § 56S.032(3) (WEST 1999);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-305 (1999); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523(2) (SUPP. 1998); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2 (Michie Supp. 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1SA-2000(c) (1999); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B) (West Supp. 2000); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.11 (West Supp.
2000); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150(l)(c) (1999); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C) (Law. Co-op.
1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-3 (Michie 1998); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(j)
(Supp. 1999); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 § 2(e)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1999); UTAH
CODE ANN.§ 76-50205,5(4) (1999); VA. CODE ANN.§ 19.2-264.4(B) (Michie 2000).
A number of jurisdictions require the offender to prove mitigators by a preponderance. See 18 
U.S.C. § 3593(c) (1994); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(C) (West Supp. 1999); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a(c) (West Supp. 2000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(d) (1995); MD. 
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(g) (Supp. 1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(111) (1996); N.J. 
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constitutional error. In accordance with the substantive criminal law's rule 
on disproof of non-fault, the burden of persuasion on fault-based mitigators 
should remain with the government. If the government seeks to justify a 
death penalty on the ground of extraordinary fault, and if the offender 
contends that his fault is not extraordinarily great-because he was an 
accomplice with a minor role in the crime, for example-then the 
government must be obliged to disprove this claim of non-fault beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
The fact that these fault elements usually have been framed as mitigating 
factors in a sentencing hearing, instead of as elements in the definition of 
capital murder, is immaterial to the proper apportionment of the burden of 
persuasion. Several legitimate considerations might lead a legislature to 
apportion proof of essential elements, including fault, variously into trial and 
sentencing proceedings. Nevertheless, these considerations are exogenous to 
the matter of fault and the justification of punishment, and the principle that 
the government bears the burden of persuasion on all matters that justify the 
penalty to be imposed must be observed. 
284 
Capital sentencing statutes do, 
almost uniformly, observe this limitation where aggravating factors are 
concerned. These statutes require aggravators to be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt, usually to a jury, and frequently under evidence rules, in 
spite of the fact that this proof occurs at the penalty phase, for the purpose of 
sentencing, and not at the guilt phase of the trial. 
285 Legislatures and the 
STAT. ANN. § 2C:ll-3(c)(2)(a) (West 2000); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(6) (McKinney 
Supp. 2000); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 971l(c)(l)(iii) (West Supp. 2000); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 
6-2-102(d)(i)(B) (Michie 1999).
A handful of states require the prosecution to disprove mitigators by. a preponderance. See
ALA. CODE § 13A-S-4S(g) (1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § S-4-603(c) (Michie 1997) (placing risk of 
jury non-unanimity regarding aggravation and mitigation on prosecution); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 10.95.060(4) (West 1997).
284. See supra notes 226, 266.
28S. On the proof of aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, see supra note 282.
Most jurisdictions commit these aggravators to the jury for decision, but do not subject the proof to 
rules of evidence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3S93(B) (1994); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 413(b)-(c) (Supp. 
1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(1l)(a), (Ill) (1996); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-1 (Michie 
Supp. 2000); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.10 (West Supp. 2000); OR. REV. STAT. § 
163. lSO(l)(a) (1999); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 97ll(a)(1), (2) (West Supp. 2000); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-3-20(B) (Law. Co-op. 1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§ 23A-27A-2 (Michie 1998); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(a), (c) (Supp. 1999); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 § 2(a)
(Vernon Supp. 2000); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-3-207(1)-(2); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(C)
(Michie 2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§§ 10.95.0S0(2), 10.9S.060(3) (West 1997); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 6-2-102(c) (1999).
Some states require the prosecution to prove aggravators under to the jury under evidence rules. 
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-602(4) (Michie 1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a(b)-(c) 
(West Supp. 2000); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-l(e), (t) (West Supp. 2000); KY. REV. STAT., 
ANN. § S32.025(1)(a)-(b) (Banks-Baldwin 1995); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 90S.1 (West 
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Court have recognized that any given aggravator might be labeled an element 
of capital murder and vice versa, and that the manner of proof cannot, in 
justice, vary with this designation. In contrast, neither legislatures nor the 
Court have recognized that most mitigators are part of this same fault 
continuum. Once this point is recognized, the manner of proof for these 
mitigators, including the burden of persuasion, ought to be adjusted 
accordingly. Any death penalty statute which requires the defendant to 
disprove fault by proving a "mitigating" factor by a preponderance ought to 
be deemed unconstitutional. 
b. The Burden of Persuasion on Capability Mitigators
Not all of the standard mitigators are claims of non-fault. Some 
mitigators are excuse analogues or other matters of eligibility in light of 
personal capability. We have yet to consider the distribution of the burden 
of persuasion on these capability mitigators. 
Given that most capability mitigators are excuse analogues-claims that 
pertain to insanity, duress, minority, voluntariness, and the like-one might 
argue that the burden of persuasion on capability mitigators ought to be 
assigned to the offender. Claims of excuse are generally assigned to the 
defendant for proof by a preponderance, and properly so: the defendant who 
claims an excuse is making the extraordinary claim that the law imposes a 
legal obligation on all others to free him from his own legal obligations. 286
Some other principles of burden-assignment also support this view. The 
capability mitigators are (predominantly) factual predicates for a finding of 
disproportionality, the proof of which will redound to the offender's benefit 
and the evidence for which is most often in the offender's control.287 And, of 
course, there is the consideration which probably led the drafters of Model 
Penal Code section 210.6 and virtually all state legislatures to assign the 
burden of persuasion on mitigators to the offender: the crude distinction 
1997), 905.2 (West Supp. 2000); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(1) (2000); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 
565.030(4) (West 1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:ll-3(c)(l) (2)(b) (West 2000); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. 
LAW§ 400.27(3)(b) (McKinney Supp. 2000). 
A handful of states provide for proof to an advisory jury without evidence rules. See ALA. 
CODE§ 13A-5-45(d) (1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(1) (West Supp. 2000); IND. CODE ANN. 
§ 35-50-2-9(d) (Michie 1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-4624(b)-(c) (1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 
15A-2000(a)(2)-(3) (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2929.03(D)(l) (West 1997).
A number of states commit the question to the judge, for whom no evidence rules are required. 
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(8)-(C) (West Supp. 1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 
4209(c) (1995); IDAHO CODE§ 19-2515(e) (Michie Supp. 2000); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-18-
301, 302 (1999); NEB. REV. STAT.§ 29-2521 (1995). 
286. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
287. Underwood, supra note 228, at 1312-13, 1331-33.
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between matters of inculpation and matters of exculpation. To adopt this 
analysis leaves these mitigators in the same position with respect to burdens 
of persuasion that they now occupy. 
However, the better rule is that the burden of persuasion on all 
mitigators, capability as well as non-fault, is on the government. In addition 
to the inherent weaknesses of benefit and evidence-possession as guides to 
the distribution of the burden of persuasion, 288 . at least two reasons point 
toward this conclusion. 
The first reason is that the analogy between capability mitigation and 
excuse is imperfect and misleading. The claim that a penalty of death is 
disproportionate in an offender's case is different from a claim of excuse, 
even though excuse and proportionality are both questions of eligibility, and 
even if the offender invokes excuse analogues in support of his claim of 
disproportionality. These mitigators are not near-excuses. They are not 
premised on a theory of residual doubt on issues of genuine insanity, duress, 
or other excuse which might have been decided against the defendant at 
trial. 289 Nor are capability mitigators quasi-excuses. They share the logic of 
expressive rationality with the excuses, but they otherwise have their own 
rationale. Capability mitigators are predicates for the finding of 
proportionality as a matter of eligibility for the particular punishment of 
death. The offender who invokes a lack of capability at the penalty phase 
does not contend that he is exempt from the criminal law's obligations on the 
ground that to punish him in any way would be expressively irrational. He 
contends that a particular punishment, death, is expressively irrational in his 
case. 
The second reason to conclude that the prosecution should bear the 
burden of persuasion on capability mitigators is the fact that the Supreme 
Court has effectively placed this burden on the prosecution in its decisions 
concerning unanimity on mitigation in the penalty phase. This is an 
imperfect solution to a problem that arises only because of the initial mis­
assignment of the burden of persuasion on mitigators. The Court's imperfect 
solution ought to be improved upon by the explicit assignment of the burden 
of persuasion on all mitigators to the prosecution. 
288. The argument that the defendant benefits from a defense and therefore should be required
to prove it cannot be kept within any reasonable bounds. See id. at 1325-30. Control over the 
evidence is too contingent a matter to govern the distribution of burdens of persuasion in a 
principled fashion. See id. at 1333-36. 
289. Residual doubt has been consistently rejected by the Court as a consideration in death
sentencing. See Franklin v. Lynaugh , 487 U.S. 164, 172-75 (1988); Lockhart v. McCree , 476 
U.S. 162, 205-06 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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5. Jury Unanimity on Mitigation
The Supreme Court has groped its way toward the correct decision on 
burdens of persuasion on all mitigators under the rubric of jury unanimity. It 
has effectively re-assigned this burden of persuasion to the government by 
the adoption of a ban on unanimity requirements for the finding of mitigating 
factors. The sheer inelegance of this solutfon counts as a reason to think in 
terms of fault and eligibility according to capability, instead of mitigation. 
In Mills v. Marylaruf-9° and McKoy v. North Carolina, 291 the Court struck
down statutes that implicitly and explicitly required unanimity for a finding 
of mitigation, and that thus placed the risk and prejudice of non-unanimity on 
the offender. The Court explained the concern that drove its decisions in this 
way: 
The unanimity requirement thus allows one holdout juror to 
prevent the others from giving effect to evidence that they believe 
calls for a 'sentence less than death.' Moreover, even if all 12 
jurors agree that there are some mitigating circumstances, North 
Carolina's scheme prevents them from giving effect to evidence 
supporting any of those circumstances in their deliberations [ on the 
ultimate question of death] unless they unanimously find the 
existence of the same circumstances. 292 
Therefore, the Court concluded, the government must bear the risk of 
non-unanimity on all mitigators, and a requirement of jury unanimity on the 
question of mitigation is constitutionally prohibited if, as is usually the case, 
the offender bears the burden of proving mitigators. 
As a result of Mills and McKoy, the burden of persuasion on all mitigators 
has been shifted, as a constitutional matter, to the government, regardless of 
the nominal assignment of this burden of persuasion to the offender in 
virtually all capital sentencing statutes. 
In order to see this effect more clearly, consider the relationship between 
the burden of persuasion and the requirement of unanimity. The party to 
whom the burden of persuasion is distributed bears the risk of indecision: the 
issue will be decided adversely to him if the jury cannot determine the issue 
by the required margin of votes. In the context of the criminal law, the 
required margin is unanimity, and so the party to whom the burden of 
persuasion has been distributed bears the risk of non-unanimity. 
290. 486 U.S. 367,372 (1988).
291. 494 U.S. 433, 43S (1990).
292. Id. at 439 (citations omitted).
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To shift the risk of non-unanimity is, in effect, to shift the burden of 
persuasion. Suppose that we adopt a rule that a non-unanimous verdict 
should go against the defendant. The effect of this change will be significant 
even if we leave the weight of the burden unchanged. We can retain the rule 
that the government must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, but if we 
reassign the risk of non-unanimity, then the defendant will win only if he can 
raise a reasonable doubt in the minds of all jurors. The government must 
produce a greater degree of confidence in the minds of jurors in order to 
win: it must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. But if the risk of non­
unanimity is placed on the defendant, then the government can win by 
producing this degree of confidence in the mind of only one juror. To shift 
the risk of non-unanimity to the defendant is to shift the burden of persuasion 
to the defendant-and the balance of power to the government. 
Mills and McKay shifted the burden of persuasion on all mitigators in the 
opposite direction from that in the foregoing example. The states require the 
offender to prove any mitigating factors by a preponderance, or they simply 
leave this burden unspecified and unassigned. 293 By assigning the risk of 
non-unanimity to the government, the Court effectively shifted the burden of 
persuasion on all mitigators to the government. 
This shift is consistent with the position on the burden of persuasion that I 
advocated above. Furthermore, the Court's reasoning tends to corroborate 
the theoretical case that I advanced for such a distribution, based on the 
difference between excuses and capability mitigators as questions of 
expressive rationality.294 We might have qualms about the fact that a hold­
out juror can deny a defendant the benefit of an excuse such as an acquittal 
on grounds of insanity. But these qualms do not tempt us to alter the 
requirement of jury unanimity in the adjudication of the excuses. In contrast, 
the specter of the hold-out juror who condemns an offender to death is far 
more compelling-so compelling, in fact, that it has caused us to abandon 
our usual requirement of jury unanimity. The expressive rationality of a 
defendant's eligibility for any punishment in light of his capabilities is 
different from the expressive rationality of an offender's eligibility for the 
punishment of death in light of his capabilities. 
Nevertheless, the Court's method of ensuring expressive rationality in 
death sentencing-the problem that Mills and McKay frame in terms of the 
hold-out juror-is a highly imperfect substitute for explicitly assigning the 
burden of persuasion on all mitigators to the government, for two reasons. 
First, the Mills-McKoy solution leaves the weight of the burden unaffected. 
293. See supra note 283. 
294. See supra notes 290-291 and accompanying text. 
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If the defendant must prove mitigation by a preponderance, then even if we 
shift the risk of non-unanimity, and thereby the burden of· persuasion, to the 
government, the government need only dis-prove the mitigator by a 
preponderance. In the case of fault-based mitigators in particular, this is 
unacceptable. Proof of fault is no less essential to the justification of 
punishment than the proof of the other material elements of an offense. This 
is the reason that intentional-state offense elements must be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt, even in those cases in which this issue is framed in tenns 
of the dis-proof of the defendant's alleged mistake. By the same token, we 
ought to require non-fault in the guise of a mitigator to be disproved beyond 
a reasonable doubt. 
The second difficulty with Mills and McKoy is that they reach the correct 
result in the most confusing and inelegant way possible. To ban unanimous 
jury decision-making in any criminal matter is to court implausibility, 
because jury unanimity is a fundamental value in criminal law. 295 Juries in
criminal cases define the prohibitory norms that they apply, because these 
norms present predominantly mixed questions of law and fact for decision, 
and because the jury inevitably possesses substantial latitude to interpret the 
law in the course of applying it to facts.296 Given the jury's power to frame
these norms, unanimity is an essential counterbalance to the relatively 
unrepresentative make-up of criminal juries, their un-democratic selection, 
and their secret deliberations. In the decision of questions such as fault and 
eligibility, unanimity is particularly important, because these decision are 
about the nature of a decent society-our society. A grave and authoritative 
decision is called for, and the unanimity requirement forces deeper 
deliberations and produces a more credible judgment.297 
295. See Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 137-39 (1979); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S.
404, 406 (1972) (holding non-unanimous jury· of 12 pennissible in state courts, in a non-capital 
case). 
296. See Darryl K. Brown, Jury Nullification Within the Rule of Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 
1149, 1169 (1997) (arguing that some jury nullification consists of inevitable interpretive 
construction of law); see also Commonwealth v. Pahel, 689 A.2d 963 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997). In 
Pahel, the defendant was convicted of having "knowingly endanger[ed] the welfare of [a} child by 
violating a duty of care, protection, or support," on evidence that she had failed to seek prompt 
medical attention for a child's broken nose. Id. at 964 (citation omitted). The appellate court left 
undisturbed evidence to the effect that "the amount of trauma needed to inflict a nasal fracture could 
have caused injury to the brain." Id. Nevertheless, the appellate court reversed for insufficient 
evidence of risk to the child. Id. at 967. In other words, it rejected the jury's interpretation of the 
statute, under which the endangerment of a child encompassed a failure to treat a broken nose. 
291. See Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes in Jury Deliberations, 113 HARV. L. REV.
1261, 1272-74 (2000) (summarizing empirical evidence that majority voting by juries curtails 
deliberations and produces less accurate results). 
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Given the place of unanimous jury decision-making in the criminal law, 
Justice Scalia was able to cast the McKoy decision in an unflattering light 
without much difficulty. For the reasons given in the foregoing paragraph, 
the sentencer in a capital case is the jury, not individual jurors, and it follows 
that mitigating evidence is given effect by the sentencer, in accordance with 
Lockett, regardless of how the individual jurors' votes are tabulated to arrive 
at this sentencer's decision.298 The juror's vote has been given effect even if 
her view does not prevail in the verdict. Justice Scalia was right to conclude 
that, "Lockett and Eddings are quite simply irrelevant to the question before 
us, and cannot be pressed into service by describing them as establishing that 
'a sentencer [by which the reader is invited to understand an individual 
member of the jury] may not be precluded from giving effect to all 
mitigating evidence.' "299 
Justice Scalia's argument is sound, but it is also insensitive to the problem 
of the hold-out juror. The reason that neither the majority nor the dissent 
seems right in Mills and McKoy is that the issue was fundamentally 
misconceived in terms of mitigation. We can resolve the problem of the 
hold-out juror in one of two ways. We can ban unanimous jury decision­
making for mitigating factors; or we can explicitly place the burden of 
persuasion on mitigators on the government, so that the prejudicial effect of a 
non-unanimous verdict does not fall on the offender. The latter solution is 
obviously superior, because it allows us to maintain the practice of requiring 
jury unanimity in criminal matters, but the former solution is virtually 
dictated by the use of the word "mitigation." The crude language of 
aggravation and mitigation confines us to an equally crude apportionment of 
burdens of persuasion according to whether the matter is one of inculpation 
or exculpation. This places the burden of proving mitigation on the 
offender� and leaves the manipulation of jury unanimity as the only means of 
avoiding the injustice that the Mills and McKoy opinions cast in terms of the 
hold-out juror. 
In contrast, if we frame the mitigators in terms of fault and eligibility 
according to capability, then can we see that they are properly assigned to 
the government for disproof beyond a reasonable doubt. This places the risk 
of non-unanimity on the government, and allows us to maintain the practice 
of jury unanimity in the penalty phase, where it is most critically required. 300 
298. See McCoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 465 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
299. Id. at 466 (citation omitted).
300. However, the defendant might be required to give notice of his claims of incapability
shortly after conviction, to provide ample discovery on these claims, and to bear a heavy burden of 
production on these issues at the penalty hearing. One point of clarification about my proposal will 
make the need for these provisions apparent. When I say that the prosecution must bear the burden 
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V. CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis of constitutional death sentencing suggests a 
pressing need for the radical reform of present law. I have argued above for 
changes in the Supreme Court's assessment of the penalty phase under the 
Eighth Amendment. Ideally, however, this reform would occur in the state 
legislatures and in Congress. Only a short time ago, the chances for such 
reform would have seemed remote. However, some recent developments 
indicate that the issue is stirring in state capitals. The Nebraska Legislature 
recently passed a moratorium on executions that ultimately was vetoed. 301 
The Republican governor of Illinois declared an executive moratorium on 
executions. 302 Even if abolition remains a remote eventuality, then reform 
might nevertheless be a viable option. 
Only the broad outlines of reform legislation can be sketched here, but at 
a minimum it must include the elimination of the standard lists of aggravating 
and mitigating factors, and of the requirements of proof associated with 
them. Instead, capital sentencing statutes ought to set forth those special 
fault elements that the legislature believes can justify a sentence of death. 
The law should place the burdens of production and persuasion for these 
issues on the prosecution. The defendant; of course, has no opportunity, and 
therefore no responsibility, to set forth in advance of indictment or trial the 
indicators of non-fault and incapability that would make him ineligible for 
death as a punishment. Nor should the defendant be required to bear the 
of persuasion on issues of non-fault and incapability, I do not mean only that it should bear the 
burden of proving that these factors do not render death an unjust punishment. See supra notes 
226, 266. I mean that the prosecution must bear the burden of disproving the factual predicates of 
the offender's claims about non-fault and incapability as well. This is indeed an extraordinary 
burden, the evidence to decide these issues might well be in the control of the offender, and a 
proper .issue can be framed only if the defendant brings forth the evidence to do so. For reasons 
that I have given above, these considerations do not justify placing the burden of persuasion 
regarding capability mitigators on the offender, see supra note 283, but they might well justify the 
trial judge's not finding a justiciable issue if the offender has not made a strong showing at the 
penalty hearing and has not been fully forthcoming prior to the hearing on these issues. If a 
defendant relies on a specific claim of non-fault, the same requirements might be imposed, for the 
same reasons. 
301. See Robynn Tysver, Moratorium Vetoed: Death-Penalty Timeout Is Poor Policy, Johanns 
Says, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, May 26, 1999, available at 1999 WL 4S01362; Robynn Tysver, 
Veto Not End Of Issue: Moratorium Idea Spreads, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, May 27, 1999, 
available at 1999 WL 4S01431. 
302. See Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, Ryan: 'Until I Can Be Sure' Illinois is First State to
Suspend Death Penalty, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Feb. 1, 2000, available at 2000 WL 3632094. See 
also William Claiborne, Philadelphia City Council Backs Halt of Executions, WASH. POST, Feb. 
11, 2000, available at 2000 WL 228498S ("Besides Pennsylvania, death penalty moratoriums are 
under consideration by legislatures in Maryland, Alabama, New Jersey, Washington state and 
Oklahoma."). 
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burden of persuasion on these issues at the penalty-hearing. He should, 
however, be required to sustain a burden of production on his claims of 
incapability and non-fault at the penalty hearing, in order to frame a triable 
issue. 
The offender has a right to a jury trial and a unanimous determination on 
the predicate matters of fault and incapability that arise at the penalty phase. 
He does not, however, have a constitutional right to have the jury make the 
ultimate decision on whether or not death is a proportionate punishment in 
his case. 
Finally, the relevant statute and instructions on the ultimate issue of death 
or life ought to be phrased in a way that makes it unmistakably clear to the 
judge or juror that she is to be, by her decision, the principal agent of the 
offender's death, if he is to die. I have argued that the question of 
proportionality is whether a particular sentence, in this case death, is 
expressively rational in light of the fault and the capabilities of the offender. 
The expressive rationality of this punishment is a matter of community 
identity and social self-definition. It is a matter of whether the killing of this 
offender for this crime will make us a brutal or an enlightened society. The 
difficulty is that a question about society's identity is abstract, and that to 
pose the ultimate question to the sentencer in this way would defeat the 
purpose of asking it. If the sentencer is to feel the enormity of the decision 
before it, so that our identity as a civilized society is fully at stake in its 
decision, then the sentencing question must be framed in immediate terms. 
The judge or juror must be forced to ask: "Can I bear to be the agent of 
another human being's death? Can I incorporate this killing, forever, into 
my identity as a civilized being?" 
